CVE ID | Published | Description | Score | Severity |
---|---|---|---|---|
Certain DNSSEC aspects of the DNS protocol (in RFC 4033, 4034, 4035, 6840, and related RFCs) allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via one or more DNSSEC responses, aka the "KeyTrap" issue. One of the concerns is that, when there is a zone with many DNSKEY and RRSIG records, the protocol specification implies that an algorithm must evaluate all combinations of DNSKEY and RRSIG records. | 7.5 |
High |
||
A bad interaction between DNS64 and serve-stale may cause `named` to crash with an assertion failure during recursive resolution, when both of these features are enabled. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.16.12 through 9.16.45, 9.18.0 through 9.18.21, 9.19.0 through 9.19.19, 9.16.12-S1 through 9.16.45-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.21-S1. | 7.5 |
High |
||
A flaw in query-handling code can cause `named` to exit prematurely with an assertion failure when:
- `nxdomain-redirect |
7.5 |
High |
||
The DNS message parsing code in `named` includes a section whose computational complexity is overly high. It does not cause problems for typical DNS traffic, but crafted queries and responses may cause excessive CPU load on the affected `named` instance by exploiting this flaw. This issue affects both authoritative servers and recursive resolvers. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.0.0 through 9.16.45, 9.18.0 through 9.18.21, 9.19.0 through 9.19.19, 9.9.3-S1 through 9.11.37-S1, 9.16.8-S1 through 9.16.45-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.21-S1. | 7.5 |
High |
||
The code that processes control channel messages sent to `named` calls certain functions recursively during packet parsing. Recursion depth is only limited by the maximum accepted packet size; depending on the environment, this may cause the packet-parsing code to run out of available stack memory, causing `named` to terminate unexpectedly. Since each incoming control channel message is fully parsed before its contents are authenticated, exploiting this flaw does not require the attacker to hold a valid RNDC key; only network access to the control channel's configured TCP port is necessary. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.2.0 through 9.16.43, 9.18.0 through 9.18.18, 9.19.0 through 9.19.16, 9.9.3-S1 through 9.16.43-S1, and 9.18.0-S1 through 9.18.18-S1. | 7.5 |
High |
||
Every `named` instance configured to run as a recursive resolver maintains a cache database holding the responses to the queries it has recently sent to authoritative servers. The size limit for that cache database can be configured using the `max-cache-size` statement in the configuration file; it defaults to 90% of the total amount of memory available on the host. When the size of the cache reaches 7/8 of the configured limit, a cache-cleaning algorithm starts to remove expired and/or least-recently used RRsets from the cache, to keep memory use below the configured limit. It has been discovered that the effectiveness of the cache-cleaning algorithm used in `named` can be severely diminished by querying the resolver for specific RRsets in a certain order, effectively allowing the configured `max-cache-size` limit to be significantly exceeded. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.16.41, 9.18.0 through 9.18.15, 9.19.0 through 9.19.13, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.16.41-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.15-S1. | 7.5 |
High |