CVE ID | Published | Description | Score | Severity |
---|---|---|---|---|
In Eclipse Mosquitto up to version 2.0.18a, an attacker can achieve memory leaking, segmentation fault or heap-use-after-free by sending specific sequences of "CONNECT", "DISCONNECT", "SUBSCRIBE", "UNSUBSCRIBE" and "PUBLISH" packets. | 7.2 |
High |
||
In Eclipse Mosquito before and including 2.0.5, establishing a connection to the mosquitto server without sending data causes the EPOLLOUT event to be added, which results excessive CPU consumption. This could be used by a malicious actor to perform denial of service type attack. This issue is fixed in 2.0.6 | 7.5 |
High |
||
In Mosquitto before 2.0.16, a memory leak occurs when clients send v5 CONNECT packets with a will message that contains invalid property types. | 7.5 |
High |
||
In Mosquitto before 2.0.16, excessive memory is allocated based on malicious initial packets that are not CONNECT packets. | 5.8 |
Medium |
||
In Eclipse Mosquitto versions 2.07 and earlier, the server will crash if the client tries to send a PUBLISH packet with topic length = 0. | 7.5 |
High |
||
The Eclipse Mosquitto broker up to version 1.4.15 does not reject strings that are not valid UTF-8. A malicious client could cause other clients that do reject invalid UTF-8 strings to disconnect themselves from the broker by sending a topic string which is not valid UTF-8, and so cause a denial of service for the clients. | 5.3 |
Medium |
||
In Eclipse Mosquitto 1.4.15 and earlier, a Memory Leak vulnerability was found within the Mosquitto Broker. Unauthenticated clients can send crafted CONNECT packets which could cause a denial of service in the Mosquitto Broker. | 7.5 |
High |
||
In Eclipse Mosquitto 1.4.14, a user can shutdown the Mosquitto server simply by filling the RAM memory with a lot of connections with large payload. This can be done without authentications if occur in connection phase of MQTT protocol. | 7.5 |
High |
||
In Mosquitto before 1.4.12, pattern based ACLs can be bypassed by clients that set their username/client id to '#' or '+'. This allows locally or remotely connected clients to access MQTT topics that they do have the rights to. The same issue may be present in third party authentication/access control plugins for Mosquitto. | 6.5 |
Medium |
||
In Mosquitto through 1.4.12, mosquitto.db (aka the persistence file) is world readable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive MQTT topic information. | 5.5 |
Medium |