CVE-2021-46997 : Detail

CVE-2021-46997

5.5
/
Medium
0.04%V3
Local
2024-02-28
08h13 +00:00
2024-12-19
07h33 +00:00
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CVE Descriptions

arm64: entry: always set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET during entry

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: entry: always set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET during entry Zenghui reports that booting a kernel with "irqchip.gicv3_pseudo_nmi=1" on the command line hits a warning during kernel entry, due to the way we manipulate the PMR. Early in the entry sequence, we call lockdep_hardirqs_off() to inform lockdep that interrupts have been masked (as the HW sets DAIF wqhen entering an exception). Architecturally PMR_EL1 is not affected by exception entry, and we don't set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET in the PMR early in the exception entry sequence, so early in exception entry the PMR can indicate that interrupts are unmasked even though they are masked by DAIF. If DEBUG_LOCKDEP is selected, lockdep_hardirqs_off() will check that interrupts are masked, before we set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET in any of the exception entry paths, and hence lockdep_hardirqs_off() will WARN() that something is amiss. We can avoid this by consistently setting GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET during exception entry so that kernel code sees a consistent environment. We must also update local_daif_inherit() to undo this, as currently only touches DAIF. For other paths, local_daif_restore() will update both DAIF and the PMR. With this done, we can remove the existing special cases which set this later in the entry code. We always use (GIC_PRIO_IRQON | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET) for consistency with local_daif_save(), as this will warn if it ever encounters (GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET), and never sets this itself. This matches the gic_prio_kentry_setup that we have to retain for ret_to_user. The original splat from Zenghui's report was: | DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled()) | WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 125 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4258 lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8 | Modules linked in: | CPU: 3 PID: 125 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 5.12.0-rc8+ #463 | Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 | pstate: 604003c5 (nZCv DAIF +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) | pc : lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8 | lr : lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8 | sp : ffff80002a39bad0 | pmr_save: 000000e0 | x29: ffff80002a39bad0 x28: ffff0000de214bc0 | x27: ffff0000de1c0400 x26: 000000000049b328 | x25: 0000000000406f30 x24: ffff0000de1c00a0 | x23: 0000000020400005 x22: ffff8000105f747c | x21: 0000000096000044 x20: 0000000000498ef9 | x19: ffff80002a39bc88 x18: ffffffffffffffff | x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff800011c61eb0 | x15: ffff800011700a88 x14: 0720072007200720 | x13: 0720072007200720 x12: 0720072007200720 | x11: 0720072007200720 x10: 0720072007200720 | x9 : ffff80002a39bad0 x8 : ffff80002a39bad0 | x7 : ffff8000119f0800 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff | x5 : ffff8000119f07a8 x4 : 0000000000000001 | x3 : 9bcdab23f2432800 x2 : ffff800011730538 | x1 : 9bcdab23f2432800 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8 | enter_from_kernel_mode.isra.5+0x7c/0xa8 | el1_abort+0x24/0x100 | el1_sync_handler+0x80/0xd0 | el1_sync+0x6c/0x100 | __arch_clear_user+0xc/0x90 | load_elf_binary+0x9fc/0x1450 | bprm_execve+0x404/0x880 | kernel_execve+0x180/0x188 | call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0xdc/0x158 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE Other No informations.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

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EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 5.10 To (excluding) 5.10.38

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 5.11 To (excluding) 5.11.22

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 5.12 To (excluding) 5.12.5

References