CVE-2024-56588 : Detail

CVE-2024-56588

5.5
/
Medium
Memory Corruption
0.04%V3
Local
2024-12-27
14h50 +00:00
2025-01-20
06h23 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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CVE Descriptions

scsi: hisi_sas: Create all dump files during debugfs initialization

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: hisi_sas: Create all dump files during debugfs initialization For the current debugfs of hisi_sas, after user triggers dump, the driver allocate memory space to save the register information and create debugfs files to display the saved information. In this process, the debugfs files created after each dump. Therefore, when the dump is triggered while the driver is unbind, the following hang occurs: [67840.853907] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a0 [67840.862947] Mem abort info: [67840.865855] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [67840.869713] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [67840.875125] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [67840.878291] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [67840.881545] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [67840.886528] Data abort info: [67840.889524] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [67840.895117] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [67840.900284] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [67840.905709] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000002803a1f000 [67840.912263] [00000000000000a0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [67840.919177] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [67840.996435] pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [67841.003628] pc : down_write+0x30/0x98 [67841.007546] lr : start_creating.part.0+0x60/0x198 [67841.012495] sp : ffff8000b979ba20 [67841.016046] x29: ffff8000b979ba20 x28: 0000000000000010 x27: 0000000000024b40 [67841.023412] x26: 0000000000000012 x25: ffff20202b355ae8 x24: ffff20202b35a8c8 [67841.030779] x23: ffffa36877928208 x22: ffffa368b4972240 x21: ffff8000b979bb18 [67841.038147] x20: ffff00281dc1e3c0 x19: fffffffffffffffe x18: 0000000000000020 [67841.045515] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa368b128a530 x15: ffffffffffffffff [67841.052888] x14: ffff8000b979bc18 x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: ffff8000b979bb18 [67841.060263] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffa368b1289b18 [67841.067640] x8 : 0000000000000012 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 00000000000003a9 [67841.075014] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff002818c5cb00 x3 : 0000000000000001 [67841.082388] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff002818c5cb00 x0 : 00000000000000a0 [67841.089759] Call trace: [67841.092456] down_write+0x30/0x98 [67841.096017] start_creating.part.0+0x60/0x198 [67841.100613] debugfs_create_dir+0x48/0x1f8 [67841.104950] debugfs_create_files_v3_hw+0x88/0x348 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [67841.111447] debugfs_snapshot_regs_v3_hw+0x708/0x798 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [67841.118111] debugfs_trigger_dump_v3_hw_write+0x9c/0x120 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [67841.125115] full_proxy_write+0x68/0xc8 [67841.129175] vfs_write+0xd8/0x3f0 [67841.132708] ksys_write+0x70/0x108 [67841.136317] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38 [67841.140440] invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 [67841.144385] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 [67841.149273] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 [67841.152773] el0_svc+0x38/0xd8 [67841.156009] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8 [67841.160361] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 [67841.164189] Code: b9000882 d2800002 d2800023 f9800011 (c85ffc05) [67841.170443] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- To fix this issue, create all directories and files during debugfs initialization. In this way, the driver only needs to allocate memory space to save information each time the user triggers dumping.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-476 NULL Pointer Dereference
The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

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EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version To (excluding) 6.12.5

References