CVE-2015-4211 : Detail

CVE-2015-4211

A01-Broken Access Control
0.04%V3
Local
2015-06-24
08h00 +00:00
2016-12-23
17h57 +00:00
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CVE Descriptions

Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client 3.1(60) on Windows does not properly validate pathnames, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted INF file, aka Bug ID CSCus65862.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-264 Category : Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls
Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V2 7.2 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C [email protected]

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 38289

Publication date : 2015-09-21 22h00 +00:00
Author : Google Security Research
EDB Verified : Yes

Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=460 Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v3.1.08009 Elevation of Privilege Platform: Windows 8.1 Update, Client version 3.1.08009 (tested on 32 bit only) Class: Elevation of Privilege Summary: The fix for CVE-2015-4211 is insufficient which allows a local application to elevate to local system through the CMainThread::launchDownloader command. Description: This is directly related to http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId=39466. The fix for this issue seemed to be modifying the file verification process to only allow a signed file which also has in its version information the original filename of vpndownloader.exe. This, along with the name change makes it clear you only want to execute the VPN Downloader application. However the code doesn’t limit the location of the executable file, so one exploitation vector is DLL planting. The downloader loads a lot of DLLs from the executable directory first, so by copying the vpndownloader.exe file from Program Files to a temporary directory and dropping an appropriately named DLL you can get code execution as SYSTEM. One such DLL is dbghelp.dll which is loaded explicitly by the downloader using LoadLibrary, but there are many more. Even if by luck the executable wasn’t vulnerable to DLL planting there’s many other potential issues, for example even though a lock is made on the executable file during signature verification it’s possible to use symbolic links to exploit this as a race condition and switch the executable file after verification has completed. There’s many other possibilities as well. I’d recommend that if you’re really only supposed to be executing vpndownloader you only execute it from the secure program files directory which would eliminate this issue. This was based on work previous done by Kostya Kortchinsky. Proof of Concept: The PoC demonstrates the vulnerability and should create a copy of CMD.EXE running at SYSTEM on the current user’s desktop. I’ve provided source for the exploit.exe written in C# 4 and the dbghelp.dll in C++, as well as binaries. It should run on 32 and 64 bit platforms but I’ve only tested it on 32 bit. 1) Copy the exploit.exe and dbghelp.dll to a location on a local hard disk which the current user can write to. 2) Execute exploit.exe as the normal user 3) A command prompt should appear running at SYSTEM Expected Result: The service rejects the executable request Observed Result: The service executes the file from the temporary directory and allows for elevation. Proof of Concept: https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/38289.zip

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Cisco>>Anyconnect_secure_mobility_client >> Version 3.1\(60\)

Microsoft>>Windows >> Version *

References

http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1032704
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_SECTRACK
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/75373
Tags : vdb-entry, x_refsource_BID