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CWE-1189 Detail

CWE-1189

Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
Stable
2020-02-24 00:00 +00:00
2023-06-29 00:00 +00:00
CWE Mitre.org

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Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)

The System-On-a-Chip (SoC) does not properly isolate shared resources between trusted and untrusted agents.

Extended Description

A System-On-a-Chip (SoC) has a lot of functionality, but it may have a limited number of pins or pads. A pin can only perform one function at a time. However, it can be configured to perform multiple different functions. This technique is called pin multiplexing. Similarly, several resources on the chip may be shared to multiplex and support different features or functions. When such resources are shared between trusted and untrusted agents, untrusted agents may be able to access the assets intended to be accessed only by the trusted agents.

Informations

Modes Of Introduction

Architecture and Design
Implementation

Applicable Platforms

Language

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologies

Class: System on Chip (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Scope Impact Likelihood
Access ControlBypass Protection Mechanism

Note: If resources being used by a trusted user are shared with an untrusted user, the untrusted user may be able to modify the functionality of the shared resource of the trusted user.
IntegrityQuality Degradation

Note: The functionality of the shared resource may be intentionally degraded.

Observed Examples

Reference Description
CVE-2020-8698Processor has improper isolation of shared resources allowing for information disclosure.
CVE-2019-6260Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) device implements Advanced High-performance Bus (AHB) bridges that do not require authentication for arbitrary read and write access to the BMC's physical address space from the host, and possibly the network [REF-1138].

Potential Mitigations

Phases : Architecture and Design

When sharing resources, avoid mixing agents of varying trust levels.

Untrusted agents should not share resources with trusted agents.


Detection Methods

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Pre-silicon / post-silicon: Test access to shared systems resources (memory ranges, control registers, etc.) from untrusted software to verify that the assets are not incorrectly exposed to untrusted agents. Note that access to shared resources can be dynamically allowed or revoked based on system flows. Security testing should cover such dynamic shared resource allocation and access control modification flows.


Effectiveness : High

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Rationale : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comments : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-124 Shared Resource Manipulation
An adversary exploits a resource shared between multiple applications, an application pool or hardware pin multiplexing to affect behavior. Resources may be shared between multiple applications or between multiple threads of a single application. Resource sharing is usually accomplished through mutual access to a single memory location or multiplexed hardware pins. If an adversary can manipulate this shared resource (usually by co-opting one of the applications or threads) the other applications or threads using the shared resource will often continue to trust the validity of the compromised shared resource and use it in their calculations. This can result in invalid trust assumptions, corruption of additional data through the normal operations of the other users of the shared resource, or even cause a crash or compromise of the sharing applications.

References

REF-1036

Ghost in the PLC Designing an Undetectable Programmable Logic Controller Rootkit via Pin Control Attack
Ali Abbasi and Majid Hashemi.
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-16/materials/eu-16-Abbasi-Ghost-In-The-PLC-Designing-An-Undetectable-Programmable-Logic-Controller-Rootkit-wp.pdf

REF-1138

CVE-2019-6260: Gaining control of BMC from the host processor
Stewart Smith.
https://www.flamingspork.com/blog/2019/01/23/cve-2019-6260:-gaining-control-of-bmc-from-the-host-processor/

Submission

Name Organization Date Date Release Version
Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Intel Corporation 2019-10-15 +00:00 2020-02-24 +00:00 4.0

Modifications

Name Organization Date Comment
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-08-20 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-12-10 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-07-20 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-10-28 +00:00 updated Description, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-10-13 +00:00 updated Detection_Factors
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships

More information
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