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CWE-122 Detail

CWE-122

Heap-based Buffer Overflow
HIGH
Draft
2006-07-19 00:00 +00:00
2024-02-29 00:00 +00:00
CWE Mitre.org

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Heap-based Buffer Overflow

A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc().

Informations

Modes Of Introduction

Implementation

Applicable Platforms

Language

Name: C (Undetermined)
Name: C++ (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Scope Impact Likelihood
AvailabilityDoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart, DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU), DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)

Note: Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.
Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability
Access Control		Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Modify Memory

Note: Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy. Besides important user data, heap-based overflows can be used to overwrite function pointers that may be living in memory, pointing it to the attacker's code. Even in applications that do not explicitly use function pointers, the run-time will usually leave many in memory. For example, object methods in C++ are generally implemented using function pointers. Even in C programs, there is often a global offset table used by the underlying runtime.
Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability
Access Control
Other		Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Other

Note: When the consequence is arbitrary code execution, this can often be used to subvert any other security service.

Observed Examples

Reference Description
CVE-2021-43537Chain: in a web browser, an unsigned 64-bit integer is forcibly cast to a 32-bit integer (CWE-681) and potentially leading to an integer overflow (CWE-190). If an integer overflow occurs, this can cause heap memory corruption (CWE-122)
CVE-2007-4268Chain: integer signedness error (CWE-195) passes signed comparison, leading to heap overflow (CWE-122)
CVE-2009-2523Chain: product does not handle when an input string is not NULL terminated (CWE-170), leading to buffer over-read (CWE-125) or heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122).
CVE-2021-29529Chain: machine-learning product can have a heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122) when some integer-oriented bounds are calculated by using ceiling() and floor() on floating point values (CWE-1339)
CVE-2010-1866Chain: integer overflow (CWE-190) causes a negative signed value, which later bypasses a maximum-only check (CWE-839), leading to heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122).

Potential Mitigations

Pre-design: Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.
Phases : Operation // Build and Compilation

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.


Phases : Operation // Build and Compilation

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].


Phases : Implementation
Implement and perform bounds checking on input.
Phases : Implementation
Do not use dangerous functions such as gets. Look for their safe equivalent, which checks for the boundary.
Phases : Operation
Use OS-level preventative functionality. This is not a complete solution, but it provides some defense in depth.

Detection Methods

Fuzzing

Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.
Effectiveness : High

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Rationale : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comments : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-92 Forced Integer Overflow
This attack forces an integer variable to go out of range. The integer variable is often used as an offset such as size of memory allocation or similarly. The attacker would typically control the value of such variable and try to get it out of range. For instance the integer in question is incremented past the maximum possible value, it may wrap to become a very small, or negative number, therefore providing a very incorrect value which can lead to unexpected behavior. At worst the attacker can execute arbitrary code.

Notes

Heap-based buffer overflows are usually just as dangerous as stack-based buffer overflows.

References

REF-7

Writing Secure Code
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc.
https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223

REF-44

24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega.

REF-62

The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.

REF-62

The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.

REF-58

Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista
Michael Howard.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista

REF-60

PaX
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX

REF-64

Position Independent Executables (PIE)
Grant Murphy.
https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie

REF-18

The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf

REF-1337

Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years
Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd.
https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf

REF-1332

Prelink and address space randomization
John Richard Moser.
https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/

REF-1333

Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh.
http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf

REF-1334

Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)
D3FEND.
https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/

REF-1335

Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)
D3FEND.
https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/

Submission

Name Organization Date Date Release Version
CLASP 2006-07-19 +00:00 2006-07-19 +00:00 Draft 3

Modifications

Name Organization Date Comment
Eric Dalci Cigital 2008-07-01 +00:00 updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
KDM Analytics 2008-08-01 +00:00 added/updated white box definitions
CWE Content Team MITRE 2008-09-08 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
CWE Content Team MITRE 2008-11-24 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2009-01-12 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2009-10-29 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-02-16 +00:00 updated References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2011-06-01 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-05-11 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-10-30 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2013-02-21 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2014-06-23 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2014-07-30 +00:00 updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-11-08 +00:00 updated Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
CWE Content Team MITRE 2018-03-27 +00:00 updated References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2019-01-03 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-02-24 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-03-15 +00:00 updated References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-07-20 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-10-26 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2024-02-29 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples, Taxonomy_Mappings

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