Modes Of Introduction
Architecture and Design : Such issues could be introduced during hardware architecture and design and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
Implementation : Such issues could be introduced during implementation and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
Applicable Platforms
Language
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Operating Systems
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
Architectures
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
Technologies
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
Common Consequences
Scope |
Impact |
Likelihood |
Access Control | Modify Memory
Note: Registers protected by lock bit can be modified even when lock is set. | High |
Observed Examples
References |
Description |
| chip reset clears critical read/write lock permissions for RSA function |
Potential Mitigations
Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation // Testing
- Security lock bit protections must be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses.
- Security lock programming flow and lock properties must be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.
Detection Methods
Manual Analysis
Set the lock bit. Power cycle the
device. Attempt to clear the lock bit. If the
information is changed, implement a design
fix. Retest. Also, attempt to indirectly clear the lock
bit or bypass it.
Effectiveness : High
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comment : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Related Attack Patterns
CAPEC-ID |
Attack Pattern Name |
CAPEC-680 |
Exploitation of Improperly Controlled Registers
An adversary exploits missing or incorrectly configured access control within registers to read/write data that is not meant to be obtained or modified by a user.
|
References
REF-1350
reglk_wrapper.sv
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/b9ecdf6068445d76d6bee692d163fededf7a9d9b/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/reglk/reglk_wrapper.sv#L80C1-L80C48 REF-1351
fix cwe 1199 in reglk
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/commit/5928add42895b57341ae8fc1f9b8351c35aed865#diff-1c2b09dd092a56e5fb2be431a3849e72ff489d2ae4f4a6bb9c0ea6b7d450135aR80
Submission
Name |
Organization |
Date |
Date release |
Version |
Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi |
Intel Corporation |
2020-01-15 +00:00 |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
4.0 |
Modifications
Name |
Organization |
Date |
Comment |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-06-25 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-08-20 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References |