CWE-1266
Alerte pour un CWE
Improper Scrubbing of Sensitive Data from Decommissioned Device
Extended Description
When a product is decommissioned - i.e., taken out of service - best practices or regulatory requirements may require the administrator to remove or overwrite sensitive data first, i.e. "scrubbing." Improper scrubbing of sensitive data from a decommissioned device leaves that data vulnerable to acquisition by a malicious actor. Sensitive data may include, but is not limited to, device/manufacturer proprietary information, user/device credentials, network configurations, and other forms of sensitive data.
Informations
Modes Of Introduction
Architecture and DesignPolicy
Implementation
Applicable Platforms
Language
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)Operating Systems
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)Architectures
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)Technologies
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)Common Consequences
| Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality | Read Memory |
Potential Mitigations
Phases : Architecture and DesignFunctionality to completely scrub data from a product at the conclusion of its lifecycle should be part of the design phase. Trying to add this function on top of an existing architecture could lead to incomplete removal of sensitive information/data.
Phases : Policy
The manufacturer should describe the location(s) where sensitive data is stored and the policies and procedures for its removal. This information may be conveyed, for example, in an Administrators Guide or a Statement of Volatility.
Phases : Implementation
If the capability to wipe sensitive data isn't built-in, the manufacturer may need to provide a utility to scrub sensitive data from storage if that data is located in a place which is non-accessible by the administrator. One example of this could be when sensitive data is stored on an EEPROM for which there is no user/admin interface provided by the system.
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Rationale : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Related Attack Patterns
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-150 | Collect Data from Common Resource Locations An adversary exploits well-known locations for resources for the purposes of undermining the security of the target. In many, if not most systems, files and resources are organized in a default tree structure. This can be useful for adversaries because they often know where to look for resources or files that are necessary for attacks. Even when the precise location of a targeted resource may not be known, naming conventions may indicate a small area of the target machine's file tree where the resources are typically located. For example, configuration files are normally stored in the /etc director on Unix systems. Adversaries can take advantage of this to commit other types of attacks. |
| CAPEC-37 | Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data An attacker examines a target system to find sensitive data that has been embedded within it. This information can reveal confidential contents, such as account numbers or individual keys/credentials that can be used as an intermediate step in a larger attack. |
| CAPEC-545 | Pull Data from System Resources An adversary who is authorized or has the ability to search known system resources, does so with the intention of gathering useful information. System resources include files, memory, and other aspects of the target system. In this pattern of attack, the adversary does not necessarily know what they are going to find when they start pulling data. This is different than CAPEC-150 where the adversary knows what they are looking for due to the common location. |
| CAPEC-546 | Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to insecure or incomplete data deletion in a multi-tenant environment. If a cloud provider fails to completely delete storage and data from former cloud tenants' systems/resources, once these resources are allocated to new, potentially malicious tenants, the latter can probe the provided resources for sensitive information still there. |
| CAPEC-675 | Retrieve Data from Decommissioned Devices An adversary obtains decommissioned, recycled, or discarded systems and devices that can include an organization’s intellectual property, employee data, and other types of controlled information. Systems and devices that have reached the end of their lifecycles may be subject to recycle or disposal where they can be exposed to adversarial attempts to retrieve information from internal memory chips and storage devices that are part of the system. |
Notes
This entry is still under development and will continue to see updates and content improvements.References
REF-1080
Security Failures in Secure DevicesChristopher Tarnovsky.
https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-08/Tarnovsky/Presentation/bh-eu-08-tarnovsky.pdf
Submission
| Name | Organization | Date | Date Release | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Paul A. Wortman | Wells Fargo | 4.1 |
Modifications
| Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes |
