Within a System-On-a-Chip (SoC), various circuits and hardware engines generate transactions for the purpose of accessing (read/write) assets or performing various actions (e.g., reset, fetch, compute, etc.). Among various types of message information, a typical transaction is comprised of source identity (identifying the originator of the transaction) and a destination identity (routing the transaction to the respective entity). Sometimes the transactions are qualified with a Security Token. This Security Token helps the destination agent decide on the set of allowed actions (e.g., access to an asset for reads and writes). A policy encoder is used to map the bus transactions to Security Tokens that in turn are used as access-controls/protection mechanisms. A common weakness involves using an encoding which is no longer trusted, i.e., an obsolete encoding.
Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
---|---|---|
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Access Control | Modify Memory, Read Memory, Modify Files or Directories, Read Files or Directories, DoS: Resource Consumption (Other), Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Reduce Reliability | High |
Security Token Decoders should be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses.
Access and programming flows should be tested in both pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.
CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
---|---|
CAPEC-121 | Exploit Non-Production Interfaces An adversary exploits a sample, demonstration, test, or debug interface that is unintentionally enabled on a production system, with the goal of gleaning information or leveraging functionality that would otherwise be unavailable. |
CAPEC-681 | Exploitation of Improperly Controlled Hardware Security Identifiers An adversary takes advantage of missing or incorrectly configured security identifiers (e.g., tokens), which are used for access control within a System-on-Chip (SoC), to read/write data or execute a given action. |
Name | Organization | Date | Date release | Version |
---|---|---|---|---|
Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi | Intel Corporation | 4.1 |
Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
---|---|---|---|
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes |