CWE-1300 Detail

CWE-1300

Improper Protection of Physical Side Channels
Stable
2020-08-20
00h00 +00:00
2025-04-03
00h00 +00:00
CWE Mitre.org
Notifications for a CWE
Stay informed of any changes for a specific CWE.
Notifications manage

Name: Improper Protection of Physical Side Channels

The device does not contain sufficient protection mechanisms to prevent physical side channels from exposing sensitive information due to patterns in physically observable phenomena such as variations in power consumption, electromagnetic emissions (EME), or acoustic emissions.

CWE Description

An adversary could monitor and measure physical phenomena to detect patterns and make inferences, even if it is not possible to extract the information in the digital domain.

Physical side channels have been well-studied for decades in the context of breaking implementations of cryptographic algorithms or other attacks against security features. These side channels may be easily observed by an adversary with physical access to the device, or using a tool that is in close proximity. If the adversary can monitor hardware operation and correlate its data processing with power, EME, and acoustic measurements, the adversary might be able to recover of secret keys and data.

General Informations

Modes Of Introduction

Implementation

Applicable Platforms

Language

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Scope Impact Likelihood
ConfidentialityRead Memory, Read Application Data

Observed Examples

References Description

CVE-2022-35888

Power side-channels leak secret information from processor

CVE-2021-3011

electromagnetic-wave side-channel in security-related microcontrollers allows extraction of private key

CVE-2019-14353

Crypto hardware wallet's power consumption relates to total number of pixels illuminated, creating a side channel in the USB connection that allows attackers to determine secrets displayed such as PIN numbers and passwords

CVE-2020-27211

Chain: microcontroller system-on-chip contains uses a register value stored in flash to set product protection state on the memory bus but does not contain protection against fault injection (CWE-1319), which leads to an incorrect initialization of the memory bus (CWE-1419) leading the product to be in an unprotected state.

CVE-2013-4576

message encryption software uses certain instruction sequences that allows RSA key extraction using a chosen-ciphertext attack and acoustic cryptanalysis

CVE-2020-28368

virtualization product allows recovery of AES keys from the guest OS using a side channel attack against a power/energy monitoring interface.

CVE-2019-18673

power consumption varies based on number of pixels being illuminated in a display, allowing reading of secrets such as the PIN by using the USB interface to measure power consumption

Potential Mitigations

Phases : Architecture and Design
Apply blinding or masking techniques to implementations of cryptographic algorithms.
Phases : Implementation
Add shielding or tamper-resistant protections to the device to increase the difficulty of obtaining measurements of the side-channel.

Detection Methods

Manual Analysis

Perform a set of leakage detection tests such as the procedure outlined in the Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) test requirements for AES [REF-1230]. TVLA is the basis for the ISO standard 17825 [REF-1229]. A separate methodology is provided by [REF-1228]. Note that sole reliance on this method might not yield expected results [REF-1239] [REF-1240].
Effectiveness : Moderate

Manual Analysis

Post-silicon, perform full side-channel attacks (penetration testing) covering as many known leakage models as possible against test code.


Effectiveness : Moderate

Manual Analysis

Pre-silicon - while the aforementioned TVLA methods can be performed post-silicon, models of device power consumption or other physical emanations can be built from information present at various stages of the hardware design process before fabrication. TVLA or known side-channel attacks can be applied to these simulated traces and countermeasures applied before tape-out. Academic research in this field includes [REF-1231] [REF-1232] [REF-1233].


Effectiveness : Moderate

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comment : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-189 Black Box Reverse Engineering
An adversary discovers the structure, function, and composition of a type of computer software through black box analysis techniques. 'Black Box' methods involve interacting with the software indirectly, in the absence of direct access to the executable object. Such analysis typically involves interacting with the software at the boundaries of where the software interfaces with a larger execution environment, such as input-output vectors, libraries, or APIs. Black Box Reverse Engineering also refers to gathering physical side effects of a hardware device, such as electromagnetic radiation or sounds.
CAPEC-699 Eavesdropping on a Monitor
An Adversary can eavesdrop on the content of an external monitor through the air without modifying any cable or installing software, just capturing this signal emitted by the cable or video port, with this the attacker will be able to impact the confidentiality of the data without being detected by traditional security tools

References

REF-1117

Introduction to differential power analysis and related attacks
Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, Benjamin Jun.
https://www.rambus.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/DPATechInfo.pdf

REF-1118

The EM Side-Channel(s)
Dakshi Agrawal, Bruce Archambeault, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi.
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/3-540-36400-5_4.pdf

REF-1119

RSA key extraction via low-bandwidth acoustic cryptanalysis
Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, Eran Tromer.
https://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2014/86160149/86160149.pdf

REF-1120

Power Analysis for Cheapskates
Colin O'Flynn.
https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/OFlynn/bh-eu-13-for-cheapstakes-oflynn-wp.pdf

REF-1055

Data Remanence in Semiconductor Devices
Peter Gutmann.
https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/sec01/full_papers/gutmann/gutmann.pdf

REF-1218

This Black Box Can Brute Force Crack iPhone PIN Passcodes
Graham Cluley.
https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/iphone-pin-pass-code/

REF-1221

A Side Journey to Titan
Victor Lomne, Thomas Roche.
https://web.archive.org/web/20210107182441/https://ninjalab.io/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/a_side_journey_to_titan.pdf

REF-1228

A testing methodology for side-channel resistance validation
Gilbert Goodwill, Benjamin Jun, Josh Jaffe, Pankaj Rohatgi.
https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/events/non-invasive-attack-testing-workshop/documents/08_goodwill.pdf

REF-1229

ISO/IEC 17825:2016: Testing methods for the mitigation of non-invasive attack classes against cryptographic modules
ISO/IEC.
https://www.iso.org/standard/60612.html

REF-1230

Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) Derived Test Requirements (DTR) with AES
Cryptography Research Inc..
https://www.rambus.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/TVLA-DTR-with-AES.pdf

REF-1231

Towards efficient and automated side-channel evaluations at design time
Danilo Šijaˇci´, Josep Balasch, Bohan Yang, Santosh Ghosh, Ingrid Verbauwhede.
https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/publications/article-3204.pdf

REF-1232

Efficient simulation of EM side-channel attack resilience
Amit Kumar, Cody Scarborough, Ali Yilmaz, Michael Orshansky.
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.5555/3199700.3199717

REF-1233

Pre-silicon Architecture Correlation Analysis (PACA): Identifying and Mitigating the Source of Side-channel Leakage at Gate-level
Yuan Yao, Tuna Tufan, Tarun Kathuria, Baris Ege, Ulkuhan Guler, Patrick Schaumont.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/530.pdf

REF-1234

Power Analysis Attacks - Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards
Elisabeth Oswald, Thomas Popp, Stefan Mangard.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-0-387-38162-6

REF-1235

Side-Channel Attacks on the Yubikey 2 One-Time Password Generator
David Oswald, Bastian Richter, Christof Paar.
https://www.emsec.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/media/crypto/veroeffentlichungen/2014/02/04/paper_yubikey_sca.pdf

REF-1239

How (not) to Use Welch's T-test in Side-Channel Security Evaluations
François-Xavier Standaert.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/138.pdf

REF-1240

A Critical Analysis of ISO 17825 ('Testing methods for the mitigation of non-invasive attack classes against cryptographic modules')
Carolyn Whitnall, Elisabeth Oswald.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1013.pdf

REF-1285

Physical Security Attacks Against Silicon Devices
Texas Instruments.
https://www.ti.com/lit/an/swra739/swra739.pdf?ts=1644234570420

REF-1286

On The Susceptibility of Texas Instruments SimpleLink Platform Microcontrollers to Non-Invasive Physical Attacks
Lennert Wouters, Benedikt Gierlichs, Bart Preneel.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/328.pdf

REF-1368

mod_exp.v
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/b9ecdf6068445d76d6bee692d163fededf7a9d9b/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/rsa/mod_exp.v#L46:L47

REF-1369

Fix CWE-1300
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/37e42f724c14b8e4cc8f6e13462c12a492778219/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/rsa/mod_exp.v#L47:L51

Submission

Name Organization Date Date release Version
Nicole Fern Cycuity (originally submitted as Tortuga Logic) 2020-05-29 +00:00 2020-08-20 +00:00 4.2

Modifications

Name Organization Date Comment
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-03-15 +00:00 updated Functional_Areas, Maintenance_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-07-20 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-10-28 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-06-28 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-10-13 +00:00 updated References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-01-31 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-10-26 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2025-04-03 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples