The product implements a security identifier mechanism to differentiate what actions are allowed or disallowed when a transaction originates from an entity. A transaction is sent without a security identifier.

In a System-On-Chip (SoC), various integrated circuits and hardware engines generate transactions such as to access (reads/writes) assets or perform certain actions (e.g., reset, fetch, compute). A typical transaction is comprised of source identity (to identify the originator of the transaction) and a destination identity (to route the transaction to the respective entity) in addition to much more information in the message. Sometimes the transactions are qualified with a Security Identifier. This Security Identifier helps the destination agent decide on the set of allowed or disallowed actions.

A weakness that can exist in such transaction schemes is that the source agent does not consistently include the necessary Security Identifier with the transaction. If the Security Identifier is missing, the destination agent might drop the message (resulting in an inadvertent Denial-of-Service (DoS)) or take inappropriate action by default in its attempt to execute the transaction, resulting in privilege escalation or provision of unintended access.

Modes Of Introduction

Architecture and Design : Such issues could be introduced during hardware architecture and design and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
Implementation : Such issues could be introduced during implementation and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.

Applicable Platforms

Language

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Potential Mitigations

Phases : Architecture and Design
Transaction details must be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses.
Phases : Implementation
Security identifier definition and programming flow must be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Rationale : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comments : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Related Attack Patterns

Submission

Modifications