CWE-1303 Detail

Hardware structures shared across execution contexts (e.g., caches and branch predictors) can violate the expected architecture isolation between contexts.

Modern processors use techniques such as out-of-order execution, speculation, prefetching, data forwarding, and caching to increase performance. Details about the implementation of these techniques are hidden from the programmer's view. This is problematic when the hardware implementation of these techniques results in resources being shared across supposedly isolated contexts. Contention for shared resources between different contexts opens covert channels that allow malicious programs executing in one context to recover information from another context.

Some examples of shared micro-architectural resources that have been used to leak information between contexts are caches, branch prediction logic, and load or store buffers. Speculative and out-of-order execution provides an attacker with increased control over which data is leaked through the covert channel.

If the extent of resource sharing between contexts in the design microarchitecture is undocumented, it is extremely difficult to ensure system assets are protected against disclosure.

Modes Of Introduction

Architecture and Design : Such issues could be introduced during hardware architecture and design and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
Implementation : Such issues could be introduced during implementation and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.

Applicable Platforms

Language

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Potential Mitigations

Phases : Architecture and Design
Microarchitectural covert channels can be addressed using a mixture of hardware and software mitigation techniques. These include partitioned caches, new barrier and flush instructions, and disabling high resolution performance counters and timers.
Phases : Requirements
Microarchitectural covert channels can be addressed using a mixture of hardware and software mitigation techniques. These include partitioned caches, new barrier and flush instructions, and disabling high resolution performance counters and timers.

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comment : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Related Attack Patterns

NotesNotes

As of CWE 4.9, members of the CWE Hardware SIG are closely analyzing this entry and others to improve CWE's coverage of transient execution weaknesses, which include issues related to Spectre, Meltdown, and other attacks. Additional investigation may include other weaknesses related to microarchitectural state. Finally, this entry's demonstrative example might not be appropriate. As a result, this entry might change significantly in CWE 4.10.

References

REF-1121

Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space
Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher, Werner Haas, Anders Fogh, Jann Horn, Stegfan Mangard, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom, Mike Hamberg.
https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf

REF-1122

Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher, Werner Haas, Anders Fogh, Jann Horn, Stegfan Mangard, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom, Mike Hamberg.
https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf

REF-1123

Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7783743/

REF-1124

A Survey of Microarchitectural Timing Attacks and Countermeasures on Contemporary Hardware
Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, David Cock, Gernot Heiser.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/613.pdf

Submission

Modifications