Modes Of Introduction
Architecture and Design : Failure to design appropriate countermeasures to common fault injection techniques can manifest this weakness.
Implementation : This weakness can arise if the hardware design incorrectly implements countermeasures to prevent fault injection.
Applicable Platforms
Language
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Operating Systems
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
Architectures
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
Technologies
Class: System on Chip (Undetermined)
Common Consequences
| Scope |
Impact |
Likelihood |
Confidentiality Integrity Authentication | Bypass Protection Mechanism, Alter Execution Logic, Unexpected State
Note: Depending on the context, instruction skipping can
have a broad range of consequences related to the
generic bypassing of security critical code. | High |
Observed Examples
| References |
Description |
| fault injection attack bypasses the verification mode, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution. |
Potential Mitigations
Phases : Architecture and Design
Design strategies for ensuring safe failure if
inputs, such as Vcc, are modified out of acceptable
ranges.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Design strategies for ensuring safe behavior if
instructions attempt to be skipped.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Identify mission critical secrets that should
be wiped if faulting is detected, and design a
mechanism to do the deletion.
Phases : Implementation
Add redundancy by performing an operation
multiple times, either in space or time, and perform
majority voting. Additionally, make conditional
instruction timing unpredictable.
Phases : Implementation
Use redundant operations or canaries to
detect and respond to faults.
Phases : Implementation
Ensure that fault mitigations are strong enough
in practice. For example, a low power detection
mechanism that takes 50 clock cycles to trigger at lower
voltages may be an insufficient security mechanism if
the instruction counter has already progressed with no
other CPU activity occurring.
Detection Methods
Automated Static Analysis
This weakness can be found using automated static analysis once a developer has indicated which code paths are critical to protect.
Effectiveness : Moderate
Simulation / Emulation
This weakness can be found using automated dynamic analysis. Both emulation of a CPU with instruction skips, as well as RTL simulation of a CPU IP, can indicate parts of the code that are sensitive to faults due to instruction skips.
Effectiveness : Moderate
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be found using manual (static) analysis. The analyst has security objectives that are matched against the high-level code. This method is less precise than emulation, especially if the analysis is done at the higher level language rather than at assembly level.
Effectiveness : Moderate
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comment : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Related Attack Patterns
| CAPEC-ID |
Attack Pattern Name |
| CAPEC-624 |
Hardware Fault Injection
The adversary uses disruptive signals or events, or alters the physical environment a device operates in, to cause faulty behavior in electronic devices. This can include electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, ambient temperature extremes, and more. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information. |
| CAPEC-625 |
Mobile Device Fault Injection
Fault injection attacks against mobile devices use disruptive signals or events (e.g. electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, etc.) to cause faulty behavior. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information. Although this attack usually requires physical control of the mobile device, it is non-destructive, and the device can be used after the attack without any indication that secret keys were compromised. |
References
REF-1161
An In-depth and Black-box Characterization of the Effects of Clock Glitches on 8-bit MCUs
Josep Balasch, Benedikt Gierlichs, Ingrid Verbauwhede.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6076473 REF-1222
Experimental Analysis of the Electromagnetic Instruction Skip Fault Model
Alexandre Menu, Jean-Max Dutertre, Olivier Potin, Jean-Baptiste Rigaud.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9081261 REF-1223
Controlling PC on ARM using Fault Injection
Niek Timmers, Albert Spruyt, Marc Witteman.
https://fdtc.deib.polimi.it/FDTC16/shared/FDTC-2016-session_2_1.pdf REF-1224
Attacking USB Gear with EMFI
Colin O'Flynn.
https://www.totalphase.com/media/pdf/whitepapers/Circuit_Cellar_TP.pdf REF-1286
On The Susceptibility of Texas Instruments SimpleLink Platform Microcontrollers to Non-Invasive Physical Attacks
Lennert Wouters, Benedikt Gierlichs, Bart Preneel.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/328.pdf
Submission
| Name |
Organization |
Date |
Date release |
Version |
| Jasper van Woudenberg |
Riscure |
2020-10-14 +00:00 |
2020-12-10 +00:00 |
4.3 |
Modifications
| Name |
Organization |
Date |
Comment |
| Jasper van Woudenberg |
Riscure |
2021-01-11 +00:00 |
|
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-03-15 +00:00 |
updated Description, Functional_Areas, Potential_Mitigations, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-06-28 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-10-13 +00:00 |
updated References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-04-03 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |