This allows attackers to traverse the file system to access files or directories that are outside of the restricted directory.
The "../" manipulation is the canonical manipulation for operating systems that use "/" as directory separators, such as UNIX- and Linux-based systems. In some cases, it is useful for bypassing protection schemes in environments for which "/" is supported but not the primary separator, such as Windows, which uses "\" but can also accept "/".
Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
---|---|---|
Confidentiality Integrity | Read Files or Directories, Modify Files or Directories |
Reference | Description |
---|---|
Chain: a learning management tool debugger uses external input to locate previous session logs (CWE-73) and does not properly validate the given path (CWE-20), allowing for filesystem path traversal using "../" sequences (CWE-24) |
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Name | Organization | Date | Date Release | Version |
---|---|---|---|---|
PLOVER | Draft 3 |
Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
---|---|---|---|
Eric Dalci | Cigital | updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Time_of_Introduction | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Observed_Examples |