CWE-259 Detail

CWE-259

Use of Hard-coded Password
High
Draft
2006-07-19
00h00 +00:00
2024-02-29
00h00 +00:00
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Name: Use of Hard-coded Password

The product contains a hard-coded password, which it uses for its own inbound authentication or for outbound communication to external components.

CWE Description

A hard-coded password typically leads to a significant authentication failure that can be difficult for the system administrator to detect. Once detected, it can be difficult to fix, so the administrator may be forced into disabling the product entirely. There are two main variations:

Inbound: the product contains an authentication mechanism that checks for a hard-coded password.
Outbound: the product connects to another system or component, and it contains hard-coded password for connecting to that component.

In the Inbound variant, a default administration account is created, and a simple password is hard-coded into the product and associated with that account. This hard-coded password is the same for each installation of the product, and it usually cannot be changed or disabled by system administrators without manually modifying the program, or otherwise patching the product. If the password is ever discovered or published (a common occurrence on the Internet), then anybody with knowledge of this password can access the product. Finally, since all installations of the product will have the same password, even across different organizations, this enables massive attacks such as worms to take place.

The Outbound variant applies to front-end systems that authenticate with a back-end service. The back-end service may require a fixed password which can be easily discovered. The programmer may simply hard-code those back-end credentials into the front-end product. Any user of that program may be able to extract the password. Client-side systems with hard-coded passwords pose even more of a threat, since the extraction of a password from a binary is usually very simple.

General Informations

Modes Of Introduction

Implementation : REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Architecture and Design

Applicable Platforms

Language

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Scope Impact Likelihood
Access ControlGain Privileges or Assume Identity

Note: If hard-coded passwords are used, it is almost certain that malicious users will gain access through the account in question.

Observed Examples

References Description

CVE-2022-29964

Distributed Control System (DCS) has hard-coded passwords for local shell access

CVE-2021-37555

Telnet service for IoT feeder for dogs and cats has hard-coded password [REF-1288]

CVE-2021-35033

Firmware for a WiFi router uses a hard-coded password for a BusyBox shell, allowing bypass of authentication through the UART port

Potential Mitigations

Phases : Architecture and Design
For outbound authentication: store passwords outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible.
Phases : Architecture and Design
For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded password. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.
Phases : Architecture and Design

For inbound authentication: apply strong one-way hashes to your passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When receiving an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the hash that you have saved.

Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that you generate. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.


Phases : Architecture and Design

For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete.

The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords which are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals.
Next, the passwords used should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access.
Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay style attacks.

Detection Methods

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Black Box

Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.

Attach the monitor to the process and perform a login. Using disassembled code, look at the associated instructions and see if any of them appear to be comparing the input to a fixed string or value.


Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Effectiveness : High

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Justification : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comment : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

NotesNotes

This entry could be split into multiple variants: an inbound variant (as seen in the second demonstrative example) and an outbound variant (as seen in the first demonstrative example). These variants are likely to have different consequences, detectability, etc. More importantly, from a vulnerability theory perspective, they could be characterized as different behaviors.

References

REF-6

Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors
Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess, Gary McGraw.
https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf

REF-44

24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega.

REF-1283

OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management
Forescout Vedere Labs.
https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/

REF-1288

Ethical hacking of a Smart Automatic Feed Dispenser
Julia Lokrantz.
http://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1561552/FULLTEXT01.pdf

REF-1304

ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-13-164-01): Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords
ICS-CERT.
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-alerts/ics-alert-13-164-01

Submission

Name Organization Date Date release Version
7 Pernicious Kingdoms 2006-07-19 +00:00 2006-07-19 +00:00 Draft 3

Modifications

Name Organization Date Comment
Eric Dalci Cigital 2008-07-01 +00:00 updated Time_of_Introduction
KDM Analytics 2008-08-01 +00:00 added/updated white box definitions
Veracode 2008-08-15 +00:00 Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
CWE Content Team MITRE 2008-09-08 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
CWE Content Team MITRE 2008-10-14 +00:00 updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2008-11-13 +00:00 Significant description modifications to emphasize different variants.
CWE Content Team MITRE 2008-11-24 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2009-01-12 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2009-03-10 +00:00 updated Potential_Mitigations
KDM Analytics 2009-07-17 +00:00 Improved the White_Box_Definition
CWE Content Team MITRE 2009-07-27 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, White_Box_Definitions
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-02-16 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-04-05 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-06-21 +00:00 updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-09-27 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-12-13 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2011-06-01 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-05-11 +00:00 updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-10-30 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2014-07-30 +00:00 updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2015-12-07 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-01-19 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-05-03 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-11-08 +00:00 updated Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, White_Box_Definitions
CWE Content Team MITRE 2019-01-03 +00:00 updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2019-06-20 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-02-24 +00:00 updated References, Relationships, Type
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-08-20 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-12-10 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-03-15 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-10-28 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-10-13 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-01-31 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Description
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2024-02-29 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples