CWE-262
Alerte pour un CWE
Not Using Password Aging
Extended Description
Password aging (or password rotation) is a policy that forces users to change their passwords after a defined time period passes, such as every 30 or 90 days. Without mechanisms such as aging, users might not change their passwords in a timely manner.
Note that while password aging was once considered an important security feature, it has since fallen out of favor by many, because it is not as effective against modern threats compared to other mechanisms such as slow hashes. In addition, forcing frequent changes can unintentionally encourage users to select less-secure passwords. However, password aging is still in use due to factors such as compliance requirements, e.g., Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS).
Informations
Modes Of Introduction
Architecture and Design : COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.Applicable Platforms
Language
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)Common Consequences
| Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
|---|---|---|
| Access Control | Gain Privileges or Assume Identity Note: As passwords age, the probability that they are compromised grows. |
Potential Mitigations
Phases : Architecture and DesignAs part of a product's design, require users to change their passwords regularly and avoid reusing previous passwords.
Phases : Implementation
Developers might disable clipboard paste operations into password fields as a way to discourage users from pasting a password into a clipboard. However, this might encourage users to choose less-secure passwords that are easier to type, and it can reduce the usability of password managers [REF-1294].
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Rationale : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Related Attack Patterns
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-16 | Dictionary-based Password Attack An attacker tries each of the words in a dictionary as passwords to gain access to the system via some user's account. If the password chosen by the user was a word within the dictionary, this attack will be successful (in the absence of other mitigations). This is a specific instance of the password brute forcing attack pattern. Dictionary Attacks differ from similar attacks such as Password Spraying (CAPEC-565) and Credential Stuffing (CAPEC-600), since they leverage unknown username/password combinations and don't care about inducing account lockouts. |
| CAPEC-49 | Password Brute Forcing An adversary tries every possible value for a password until they succeed. A brute force attack, if feasible computationally, will always be successful because it will essentially go through all possible passwords given the alphabet used (lower case letters, upper case letters, numbers, symbols, etc.) and the maximum length of the password. |
| CAPEC-509 | Kerberoasting Through the exploitation of how service accounts leverage Kerberos authentication with Service Principal Names (SPNs), the adversary obtains and subsequently cracks the hashed credentials of a service account target to exploit its privileges. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. As an authenticated user, the adversary may request Active Directory and obtain a service ticket with portions encrypted via RC4 with the private key of the authenticated account. By extracting the local ticket and saving it disk, the adversary can brute force the hashed value to reveal the target account credentials. |
| CAPEC-55 | Rainbow Table Password Cracking An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of passwords are stored. They then use a rainbow table of pre-computed hash chains to attempt to look up the original password. Once the original password corresponding to the hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain access to the system. |
| CAPEC-555 | Remote Services with Stolen Credentials This pattern of attack involves an adversary that uses stolen credentials to leverage remote services such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC to log into a system. Once access is gained, any number of malicious activities could be performed. |
| CAPEC-560 | Use of Known Domain Credentials An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service. |
| CAPEC-561 | Windows Admin Shares with Stolen Credentials An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows administrator credentials (e.g. userID/password) to access Windows Admin Shares on a local machine or within a Windows domain. |
| CAPEC-565 | Password Spraying In a Password Spraying attack, an adversary tries a small list (e.g. 3-5) of common or expected passwords, often matching the target's complexity policy, against a known list of user accounts to gain valid credentials. The adversary tries a particular password for each user account, before moving onto the next password in the list. This approach assists the adversary in remaining undetected by avoiding rapid or frequent account lockouts. The adversary may then reattempt the process with additional passwords, once enough time has passed to prevent inducing a lockout. |
| CAPEC-600 | Credential Stuffing An adversary tries known username/password combinations against different systems, applications, or services to gain additional authenticated access. Credential Stuffing attacks rely upon the fact that many users leverage the same username/password combination for multiple systems, applications, and services. |
| CAPEC-652 | Use of Known Kerberos Credentials An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Kerberos credentials (e.g. Kerberos service account userID/password or Kerberos Tickets) with the goal of achieving authenticated access to additional systems, applications, or services within the domain. |
| CAPEC-653 | Use of Known Operating System Credentials An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate operating system credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions on the system, under the guise of an authenticated user or service. This applies to any Operating System. |
| CAPEC-70 | Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords An adversary may try certain common or default usernames and passwords to gain access into the system and perform unauthorized actions. An adversary may try an intelligent brute force using empty passwords, known vendor default credentials, as well as a dictionary of common usernames and passwords. Many vendor products come preconfigured with default (and thus well-known) usernames and passwords that should be deleted prior to usage in a production environment. It is a common mistake to forget to remove these default login credentials. Another problem is that users would pick very simple (common) passwords (e.g. "secret" or "password") that make it easier for the attacker to gain access to the system compared to using a brute force attack or even a dictionary attack using a full dictionary. |
References
REF-18
The CLASP Application Security ProcessSecure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf
REF-44
24 Deadly Sins of Software SecurityMichael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega.
REF-1305
Discussion Thread: Time to retire CWE-262 and CWE-263Kurt Seifried and other members of the CWE-Research mailing list.
https://www.mail-archive.com/cwe-research-list@mitre.org/msg00018.html
REF-1289
Time for Password Expiration to DieLance Spitzner.
https://www.sans.org/blog/time-for-password-expiration-to-die/
REF-1290
Time to rethink mandatory password changesLorrie Cranor.
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy-research/tech-at-ftc/2016/03/time-rethink-mandatory-password-changes
REF-1291
Security Myths and PasswordsEugene Spafford.
https://www.cerias.purdue.edu/site/blog/post/password-change-myths/
REF-1292
Password administration for system ownersNational Cyber Security Centre.
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/passwords
REF-1293
Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Lifecycle Management(SP 800-63B)NIST.
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf
REF-1294
Let them paste passwordsNational Cyber Security Centre.
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/let-them-paste-passwords
Submission
| Name | Organization | Date | Date Release | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CLASP | Draft 3 |
Modifications
| Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Potential_Mitigations, References, Type | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes |
