Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
---|---|---|
Access Control | Bypass Protection Mechanism, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity Note: This weakness can allow an attacker to access resources which are not otherwise accessible without proper authentication. |
References | Description |
---|---|
CVE-2022-30319 | S-bus functionality in a home automation product performs access control using an IP allowlist, which can be bypassed by a forged IP address. |
CVE-2009-1048 | VOIP product allows authentication bypass using 127.0.0.1 in the Host header. |
CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
---|---|
CAPEC-21 | Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers An adversary guesses, obtains, or "rides" a trusted identifier (e.g. session ID, resource ID, cookie, etc.) to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service. |
CAPEC-22 | Exploiting Trust in Client An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack. |
CAPEC-459 | Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority. |
CAPEC-461 | Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension Weakness An adversary utilizes a hash function extension/padding weakness, to modify the parameters passed to the web service requesting authentication by generating their own call in order to generate a legitimate signature hash (as described in the notes), without knowledge of the secret token sometimes provided by the web service. |
CAPEC-473 | Signature Spoof An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions. |
CAPEC-476 | Signature Spoofing by Misrepresentation An attacker exploits a weakness in the parsing or display code of the recipient software to generate a data blob containing a supposedly valid signature, but the signer's identity is falsely represented, which can lead to the attacker manipulating the recipient software or its victim user to perform compromising actions. |
CAPEC-59 | Session Credential Falsification through Prediction This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. |
CAPEC-60 | Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay) This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay. |
CAPEC-667 | Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS) An adversary disguises the MAC address of their Bluetooth enabled device to one for which there exists an active and trusted connection and authenticates successfully. The adversary can then perform malicious actions on the target Bluetooth device depending on the target’s capabilities. |
CAPEC-94 | Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) An adversary targets the communication between two components (typically client and server), in order to alter or obtain data from transactions. A general approach entails the adversary placing themself within the communication channel between the two components. |
Name | Organization | Date | Date release | Version |
---|---|---|---|---|
PLOVER | Draft 3 |
Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
---|---|---|---|
Sean Eidemiller | Cigital | added/updated demonstrative examples | |
Eric Dalci | Cigital | updated Time_of_Introduction | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationship_Notes | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Observed_Examples |