CWE-293 Detail

CWE-293

Using Referer Field for Authentication
High
Draft
2006-07-19
00h00 +00:00
2023-06-29
00h00 +00:00
CWE Mitre.org
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Name: Using Referer Field for Authentication

The referer field in HTTP requests can be easily modified and, as such, is not a valid means of message integrity checking.

General Informations

Background Details

The referer field in HTML requests can be simply modified by malicious users, rendering it useless as a means of checking the validity of the request in question.

Modes Of Introduction

Architecture and Design : COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.

Applicable Platforms

Language

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Scope Impact Likelihood
Access ControlGain Privileges or Assume Identity

Note: Actions, which may not be authorized otherwise, can be carried out as if they were validated by the server referred to.

Potential Mitigations

Phases : Architecture and Design
In order to usefully check if a given action is authorized, some means of strong authentication and method protection must be used. Use other means of authorization that cannot be simply spoofed. Possibilities include a username/password or certificate.

Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Effectiveness : High

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Justification : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comment : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

References

REF-62

The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.

REF-18

The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf

Submission

Name Organization Date Date release Version
CLASP 2006-07-19 +00:00 2006-07-19 +00:00 Draft 3

Modifications

Name Organization Date Comment
CWE Content Team MITRE 2008-09-08 +00:00 updated Alternate_Terms, Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2011-06-01 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-05-11 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-10-30 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2014-07-30 +00:00 updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-11-08 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Relevant_Properties
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-02-24 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-03-15 +00:00 updated References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes