CWE-309
Use of Password System for Primary Authentication
HIGH
Draft
2006-07-19 00:00 +00:00
2023-06-29 00:00 +00:00
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Use of Password System for Primary Authentication
The use of password systems as the primary means of authentication may be subject to several flaws or shortcomings, each reducing the effectiveness of the mechanism.
Informations
Background Details
Password systems are the simplest and most ubiquitous authentication mechanisms. However, they are subject to such well known attacks,and such frequent compromise that their use in the most simple implementation is not practical.Modes Of Introduction
Architecture and DesignApplicable Platforms
Language
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)Common Consequences
| Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
|---|---|---|
| Access Control | Bypass Protection Mechanism, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity Note: A password authentication mechanism error will almost always result in attackers being authorized as valid users. |
Potential Mitigations
Phases : Architecture and DesignIn order to protect password systems from compromise, the following should be noted:
- Passwords should be stored safely to prevent insider attack and to ensure that -- if a system is compromised -- the passwords are not retrievable. Due to password reuse, this information may be useful in the compromise of other systems these users work with. In order to protect these passwords, they should be stored encrypted, in a non-reversible state, such that the original text password cannot be extracted from the stored value.
- Password aging should be strictly enforced to ensure that passwords do not remain unchanged for long periods of time. The longer a password remains in use, the higher the probability that it has been compromised. For this reason, passwords should require refreshing periodically, and users should be informed of the risk of passwords which remain in use for too long.
- Password strength should be enforced intelligently. Rather than restrict passwords to specific content, or specific length, users should be encouraged to use upper and lower case letters, numbers, and symbols in their passwords. The system should also ensure that no passwords are derived from dictionary words.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Use a zero-knowledge password protocol, such as SRP.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Ensure that passwords are stored safely and are not reversible.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Implement password aging functionality that requires passwords be changed after a certain point.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Use a mechanism for determining the strength of a password and notify the user of weak password use.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Inform the user of why password protections are in place, how they work to protect data integrity, and why it is important to heed their warnings.
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Rationale : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Related Attack Patterns
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-16 | Dictionary-based Password Attack An attacker tries each of the words in a dictionary as passwords to gain access to the system via some user's account. If the password chosen by the user was a word within the dictionary, this attack will be successful (in the absence of other mitigations). This is a specific instance of the password brute forcing attack pattern. Dictionary Attacks differ from similar attacks such as Password Spraying (CAPEC-565) and Credential Stuffing (CAPEC-600), since they leverage unknown username/password combinations and don't care about inducing account lockouts. |
| CAPEC-49 | Password Brute Forcing An adversary tries every possible value for a password until they succeed. A brute force attack, if feasible computationally, will always be successful because it will essentially go through all possible passwords given the alphabet used (lower case letters, upper case letters, numbers, symbols, etc.) and the maximum length of the password. |
| CAPEC-509 | Kerberoasting Through the exploitation of how service accounts leverage Kerberos authentication with Service Principal Names (SPNs), the adversary obtains and subsequently cracks the hashed credentials of a service account target to exploit its privileges. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. As an authenticated user, the adversary may request Active Directory and obtain a service ticket with portions encrypted via RC4 with the private key of the authenticated account. By extracting the local ticket and saving it disk, the adversary can brute force the hashed value to reveal the target account credentials. |
| CAPEC-55 | Rainbow Table Password Cracking An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of passwords are stored. They then use a rainbow table of pre-computed hash chains to attempt to look up the original password. Once the original password corresponding to the hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain access to the system. |
| CAPEC-555 | Remote Services with Stolen Credentials This pattern of attack involves an adversary that uses stolen credentials to leverage remote services such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC to log into a system. Once access is gained, any number of malicious activities could be performed. |
| CAPEC-560 | Use of Known Domain Credentials An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service. |
| CAPEC-561 | Windows Admin Shares with Stolen Credentials An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows administrator credentials (e.g. userID/password) to access Windows Admin Shares on a local machine or within a Windows domain. |
| CAPEC-565 | Password Spraying In a Password Spraying attack, an adversary tries a small list (e.g. 3-5) of common or expected passwords, often matching the target's complexity policy, against a known list of user accounts to gain valid credentials. The adversary tries a particular password for each user account, before moving onto the next password in the list. This approach assists the adversary in remaining undetected by avoiding rapid or frequent account lockouts. The adversary may then reattempt the process with additional passwords, once enough time has passed to prevent inducing a lockout. |
| CAPEC-600 | Credential Stuffing An adversary tries known username/password combinations against different systems, applications, or services to gain additional authenticated access. Credential Stuffing attacks rely upon the fact that many users leverage the same username/password combination for multiple systems, applications, and services. |
| CAPEC-652 | Use of Known Kerberos Credentials An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Kerberos credentials (e.g. Kerberos service account userID/password or Kerberos Tickets) with the goal of achieving authenticated access to additional systems, applications, or services within the domain. |
| CAPEC-653 | Use of Known Operating System Credentials An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate operating system credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions on the system, under the guise of an authenticated user or service. This applies to any Operating System. |
| CAPEC-70 | Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords An adversary may try certain common or default usernames and passwords to gain access into the system and perform unauthorized actions. An adversary may try an intelligent brute force using empty passwords, known vendor default credentials, as well as a dictionary of common usernames and passwords. Many vendor products come preconfigured with default (and thus well-known) usernames and passwords that should be deleted prior to usage in a production environment. It is a common mistake to forget to remove these default login credentials. Another problem is that users would pick very simple (common) passwords (e.g. "secret" or "password") that make it easier for the attacker to gain access to the system compared to using a brute force attack or even a dictionary attack using a full dictionary. |
References
REF-18
The CLASP Application Security ProcessSecure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf
Submission
| Name | Organization | Date | Date Release | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CLASP | Draft 3 |
Modifications
| Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Veracode | Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping | ||
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes |
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