Background Details
Modes Of Introduction
Implementation : Developers might dismiss the importance of an unpredictable IV and choose an easier implementation to save effort, weakening the scheme in the process.
Applicable Platforms
Language
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Technologies
Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined)
Common Consequences
| Scope |
Impact |
Likelihood |
| Confidentiality | Read Application Data
Note: If the IV is not properly initialized, data that is encrypted can be compromised and leak information. | |
Observed Examples
| References |
Description |
| encryption functionality in an authentication framework uses a fixed null IV with CBC mode, allowing attackers to decrypt traffic in applications that use this functionality |
| messages for a door-unlocking product use a fixed IV in CBC mode, which is the same after each restart |
| application uses AES in CBC mode, but the pseudo-random secret and IV are generated using math.random, which is not cryptographically strong. |
| Blowfish-CBC implementation constructs an IV where each byte is calculated modulo 8 instead of modulo 256, resulting in less than 12 bits for the effective IV length, and less than 4096 possible IV values. |
| BEAST attack in SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0. In CBC mode, chained initialization vectors are non-random, allowing decryption of HTTPS traffic using a chosen plaintext attack. |
Potential Mitigations
Phases : Implementation
NIST recommends two methods of generating unpredictable IVs for CBC mode [REF-1172]. The first is to generate the IV randomly. The second method is to encrypt a nonce with the same key and cipher to be used to encrypt the plaintext. In this case the nonce must be unique but can be predictable, since the block cipher will act as a pseudo random permutation.
Detection Methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Effectiveness : High
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comment : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Notes
As of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and
predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other
communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within
cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a
measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within
standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of
CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary,
distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for
different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for
mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.
References
REF-62
The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.
REF-18
The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf REF-1171
Why IND-CPA implies randomized encryption
Matthew Green.
https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/why-ind-cpa-implies-randomized-encryption/ REF-1172
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation
NIST.
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf
Submission
| Name |
Organization |
Date |
Date release |
Version |
| CLASP |
|
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
Draft 3 |
Modifications
| Name |
Organization |
Date |
Comment |
| Eric Dalci |
Cigital |
2008-07-01 +00:00 |
updated Time_of_Introduction |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-09-08 +00:00 |
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Functional_Areas, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-10-30 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-07-30 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-06-20 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-03-15 +00:00 |
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-07-20 +00:00 |
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Name, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities |