CWE-329 Detail

CWE-329

Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode
Medium
Draft
2006-07-19
00h00 +00:00
2023-06-29
00h00 +00:00
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Name: Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode

The product generates and uses a predictable initialization Vector (IV) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode, which causes algorithms to be susceptible to dictionary attacks when they are encrypted under the same key.

CWE Description

CBC mode eliminates a weakness of Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode by allowing identical plaintext blocks to be encrypted to different ciphertext blocks. This is possible by the XOR-ing of an IV with the initial plaintext block so that every plaintext block in the chain is XOR'd with a different value before encryption. If IVs are reused, then identical plaintexts would be encrypted to identical ciphertexts. However, even if IVs are not identical but are predictable, then they still break the security of CBC mode against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA).

General Informations

Background Details

CBC mode is a commonly used mode of operation for a block cipher. It works by XOR-ing an IV with the initial block of a plaintext prior to encryption and then XOR-ing each successive block of plaintext with the previous block of ciphertext before encryption.

C_0 = IV
C_i = E_k{M_i XOR C_{i-1}}

When used properly, CBC mode provides security against chosen plaintext attacks. Having an unpredictable IV is a crucial underpinning of this. See [REF-1171].


Modes Of Introduction

Implementation : Developers might dismiss the importance of an unpredictable IV and choose an easier implementation to save effort, weakening the scheme in the process.

Applicable Platforms

Language

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined)

Common Consequences

Scope Impact Likelihood
ConfidentialityRead Application Data

Note: If the IV is not properly initialized, data that is encrypted can be compromised and leak information.

Observed Examples

References Description

CVE-2020-5408

encryption functionality in an authentication framework uses a fixed null IV with CBC mode, allowing attackers to decrypt traffic in applications that use this functionality

CVE-2017-17704

messages for a door-unlocking product use a fixed IV in CBC mode, which is the same after each restart

CVE-2017-11133

application uses AES in CBC mode, but the pseudo-random secret and IV are generated using math.random, which is not cryptographically strong.

CVE-2007-3528

Blowfish-CBC implementation constructs an IV where each byte is calculated modulo 8 instead of modulo 256, resulting in less than 12 bits for the effective IV length, and less than 4096 possible IV values.

CVE-2011-3389

BEAST attack in SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0. In CBC mode, chained initialization vectors are non-random, allowing decryption of HTTPS traffic using a chosen plaintext attack.

Potential Mitigations

Phases : Implementation
NIST recommends two methods of generating unpredictable IVs for CBC mode [REF-1172]. The first is to generate the IV randomly. The second method is to encrypt a nonce with the same key and cipher to be used to encrypt the plaintext. In this case the nonce must be unique but can be predictable, since the block cipher will act as a pseudo random permutation.

Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Effectiveness : High

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Justification : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comment : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

NotesNotes

As of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary, distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.

References

REF-62

The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.

REF-18

The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf

REF-1171

Why IND-CPA implies randomized encryption
Matthew Green.
https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/why-ind-cpa-implies-randomized-encryption/

REF-1172

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation
NIST.
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf

Submission

Name Organization Date Date release Version
CLASP 2006-07-19 +00:00 2006-07-19 +00:00 Draft 3

Modifications

Name Organization Date Comment
Eric Dalci Cigital 2008-07-01 +00:00 updated Time_of_Introduction
CWE Content Team MITRE 2008-09-08 +00:00 updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Functional_Areas, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2011-06-01 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-05-11 +00:00 updated References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-10-30 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2014-07-30 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-11-08 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2019-06-20 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-02-24 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-03-15 +00:00 updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-07-20 +00:00 updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Name, References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-10-28 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-04-28 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-01-31 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Detection_Factors, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes