Modes Of Introduction
Architecture and Design
Implementation : REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Applicable Platforms
Language
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Common Consequences
Scope |
Impact |
Likelihood |
Access Control Other | Bypass Protection Mechanism, Other
Note: An attacker could easily guess the values used. This could lead to unauthorized access to a system if the seed is used for authentication and authorization. | |
Observed Examples
References |
Description |
| Product uses 5 alphanumeric characters for filenames of expense claim reports, stored under web root. |
| Product uses small number of random numbers for a code to approve an action, and also uses predictable new user IDs, allowing attackers to hijack new accounts. |
| SYN cookies implementation only uses 32-bit keys, making it easier to brute force ISN. |
| Complex predictability / randomness (reduced space). |
Potential Mitigations
Phases : Architecture and Design // Requirements
Use products or modules that conform to FIPS 140-2 [REF-267] to avoid obvious entropy problems. Consult FIPS 140-2 Annex C ("Approved Random Number Generators").
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comment : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
NotesNotes
As of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and
predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other
communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within
cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a
measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within
standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of
CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary,
distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for
different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for
mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.
References
REF-267
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES
Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology.
https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/fips/140/2/final/documents/fips1402.pdf REF-44
24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega.
Submission
Name |
Organization |
Date |
Date release |
Version |
PLOVER |
|
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
Draft 3 |
Modifications
Name |
Organization |
Date |
Comment |
Eric Dalci |
Cigital |
2008-07-01 +00:00 |
updated Time_of_Introduction |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-09-08 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-03-10 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-12-28 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2010-06-21 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-09-13 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, References |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-10-30 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-07-20 +00:00 |
updated Maintenance_Notes |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated References, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |