Such a scenario is commonly observed when:
In the generic exploit of session fixation vulnerabilities, an attacker creates a new session on a web application and records the associated session identifier. The attacker then causes the victim to associate, and possibly authenticate, against the server using that session identifier, giving the attacker access to the user's account through the active session.
Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
---|---|---|
Access Control | Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Reference | Description |
---|---|
Website software for game servers does not proprerly terminate user sessions, allowing for possible session fixation |
CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
---|---|
CAPEC-196 | Session Credential Falsification through Forging An attacker creates a false but functional session credential in order to gain or usurp access to a service. Session credentials allow users to identify themselves to a service after an initial authentication without needing to resend the authentication information (usually a username and password) with every message. If an attacker is able to forge valid session credentials they may be able to bypass authentication or piggy-back off some other authenticated user's session. This attack differs from Reuse of Session IDs and Session Sidejacking attacks in that in the latter attacks an attacker uses a previous or existing credential without modification while, in a forging attack, the attacker must create their own credential, although it may be based on previously observed credentials. |
CAPEC-21 | Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers An adversary guesses, obtains, or "rides" a trusted identifier (e.g. session ID, resource ID, cookie, etc.) to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service. |
CAPEC-31 | Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies This attack relies on the use of HTTP Cookies to store credentials, state information and other critical data on client systems. There are several different forms of this attack. The first form of this attack involves accessing HTTP Cookies to mine for potentially sensitive data contained therein. The second form involves intercepting this data as it is transmitted from client to server. This intercepted information is then used by the adversary to impersonate the remote user/session. The third form is when the cookie's content is modified by the adversary before it is sent back to the server. Here the adversary seeks to convince the target server to operate on this falsified information. |
CAPEC-39 | Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation. |
CAPEC-59 | Session Credential Falsification through Prediction This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. |
CAPEC-60 | Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay) This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay. |
CAPEC-61 | Session Fixation The attacker induces a client to establish a session with the target software using a session identifier provided by the attacker. Once the user successfully authenticates to the target software, the attacker uses the (now privileged) session identifier in their own transactions. This attack leverages the fact that the target software either relies on client-generated session identifiers or maintains the same session identifiers after privilege elevation. |
Name | Organization | Date | Date Release | Version |
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7 Pernicious Kingdoms | Draft 3 |
Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
---|---|---|---|
Eric Dalci | Cigital | updated Time_of_Introduction | |
Veracode | Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping | ||
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Observed_Examples | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships |